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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the efficiency of selected financial markets. The first and 
the second paper concern the currency market. The first paper presents an inefficiency in the 
currency market, as the uncovered interest rate parity seems to fail. This failure leads to the 
profitability of the carry trade. In the second paper, the “opposite” result is presented, as the 
uncovered interest rate parity does in fact hold. The important difference is that it holds for 
long-term interest rates, but not for short-term ones. The solution to this puzzle is that long-
term interest rates are a bad proxy for the future short-term interest rate, and the failure of 
this expectation theory arises from the profitability of the carry trade working with short-term 
interest rates. The third paper analyzes the cash equity and futures market. The analysis shows 
that these markets are quite efficient in every kind of view, except for certain small 
inefficiencies during the financial crisis. However, this efficiency leads to a tax arbitrage 
opportunity, as the markets have different tax proprieties. 
The first paper makes the basic assumptions that exchange rates follow a random walk, which 
proves to be a reasonable assumption in the empirical section. Given this, the uncovered 
interest rate parity is said to be failing. With this assumption, the carry trade – borrowing in 
low-yielding currencies and lending in high-yielding currencies – is expected to be profitable. 
However, the traditional carry trade contains a high crash risk. To control this risk, I used a 
mean-variance optimization approach with interest differentials as expected return, and 
historical volatility as forecast for the expected volatility. The crash risk can be diversified 
away with a mean-variance optimized portfolio, as mean-variance outperforms an equal 
weighted 1/n portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. The diversified carry trade turns out to have 
been a surprisingly low-risk strategy over the last 20 years, with Sharpe ratios between 0.8 and 
1.6 depending on the design of the strategy. The results are robust over the investment 
horizon, the currency universe, and the optimization methodology. UIP can be rejected for all 
strategies.  
The second paper analyses the well-documented failure of the uncovered interest rate parity 
over short horizons. While this failure can be confirmed with short-term interest rates, 
uncovered interest rate parity holds for long-term interest rate returns, even over short 
horizons. The distinctive point is that the return of the 1-month interest rate over one month is 
exactly that interest rate (respectively 1/12 of it), while the return of an investment in a long-
term interest rate, which is an investment in a bond or an interest rate swap, is dominated by 
the change in the interest rate during that month. The puzzle is still why the uncovered 
interest rate parity fails for maturities between one month and six months, but holds for 
maturities between one year and 30 years. The solution to this puzzle is that the expectation 
theory of the interest rate term structure also fails, as long-term interest rates are a bad 
predictor for future short-term interest rates. Because of the expectation theory failure, UIP 
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cannot hold for all interest rate maturities, and empirical analysis definitively shows that long-
term maturities are better able to explain short-term exchange rate movements. 
The third paper compares the equity futures with the cash market. The futures market proves 
to be highly efficient, with hardy arbitrage opportunities. Transaction costs in futures are on 
average one third of those in the cash market, but ongoing costs are higher due to rollover 
costs. Even the future-implied market estimation of futures dividends is quite efficient, with an 
exception in 2008, when either the market had underestimated the subsequent dividends, or its 
increased risk aversion caused market values of futures dividends that were too low. Despite 
this efficiency, investments in the futures or cash market are not identical, as the cash market 
has a tax disadvantage. In the cash market, dividends are taxed with the withholding tax, and 
many investors cannot reclaim them in foreign countries. In the futures market, dividends are 
not taxed, as they are earned indirectly within the futures price. Therefore, for tax-exempt 
investors, long-term investments should be conducted in the cash market, while investors who 
cannot reclaim foreign withholding taxes should only invest in futures. Short-term investments 
in futures are superior for all investors, due to the lower transaction costs. 
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Currency Portfolio Optimization under the Random 
Walk Hypothesis 
Fabian Ackermann  
December 11, 2012* 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to address risk in carry-based currency portfolios. I take 
the interest differentials of currencies as the return forecast, assuming that currency 
movements follow a random walk. The historical volatility serves as basis to 
forecast the variance. Traditional carry trades tend to be profitable, but contain a 
high crash risk. The approach presented herein is a mean-variance optimization of 
a currency portfolio in order to obtain the best return-to-risk ratio. The crash risk 
can be diversified away with a mean-variance optimized portfolio, as mean-variance 
outperforms an equal weighted 1/n portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. The 
diversified carry trade turns out to have been a surprisingly low-risk strategy over 
the last 20 years, with Sharpe ratios between 0.8 and 1.6 depending on the design 
of the strategy and the time period. This means the uncovered interest rate parity 
can be rejected. The results are robust over the investment horizon, the currency 
universe, and the optimization methodology.  
 
  
 
* A new version of this paper with the title “On the Risk and Return of the Carry Trade” was 
submitted to The Review of Financial Studies. 
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I.1 Introduction 
The foreign exchange market is by far the biggest financial market in the world, with a daily 
turnover rate of $4 trillion,1 and is characterized by high liquidity and low transaction costs. 
Despite those features, there is still no consensus on which model can predict exchange rate 
movements over the short time horizon (<1 year).  
There are two major advocators of exchange rate models: on one hand, there are fundamental 
models that try to predict the future exchange rate with fundamental data, while on the other 
hand the random walk model says that exchange rate movements are not predictable. Three 
fundamental models are well established in the recent literature. 
The uncovered interest rate parity model (UIP)2, first proposed by Fisher [1896], states that a 
currency with a high interest rate should depreciate compared to a low interest rate currency 
ceteris paribus, in order to exactly offset the gains received by the higher yield. The idea 
behind UIP is that an unattractive currency that is expected to depreciate has to offer a higher 
interest rate in order to offset the depreciation. Gassel [1918] proposed the concept of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) to predict exchange rates. PPP is based on the law of one 
price. When the price level in the domestic country is lower than it is in the foreign country, 
the exchange rate of the domestic country should appreciate compared to the foreign country. 
A more recent macroeconomic model that includes exchange rate theory is the Mundell-
Fleming model, which was developed independently by Mundell [1963] and Fleming [1962]. The 
Mundell-Fleming model is an extension of the IS-LM model for an open economy. In this 
model, the exchange rate depends on the current account and the capital account.3 A current 
account surplus produces an upward pressure on the domestic currency. The domestic currency 
appreciates until the surplus vanishes. Thus, a current account surplus predicts an appreciation 
of the domestic currency. 
The random walk model was first mentioned by Meese and Rogoff [1983] in association with 
exchange rate models. In the random walk model, the expected change of the exchange rate is 
zero. Hence, the current exchange rate is the best estimation for the future exchange rate, as 
supported by Meese and Rogoff with empirical data for short time horizons. Recently, Engel 
and West [2005] and Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual [2005] confirmed these findings with data 
that are more recent, as did many others in the meantime.  
                                         
1 Compare to “Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2010“, BIS 
2 UIP is also known as international Fisher effect 
3 The capital account is the opposite of the current account; a current account deficit is always financed 
by a capital account surplus. 
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The basic assumption in this paper is that exchange rates follow a random walk, since 
empirical evidence strongly supports this theory.  
The empirical failure of fundamental models induces a puzzle in the covered interest rate parity 
(CIP). In CIP, the forward exchange rate is equal to the spot exchange rate minus the interest 
rate difference between the currencies of the forward contract. In contrast to UIP, CIP must 
hold in the absence of arbitrage. If the actual forward rate for a higher-yielding currency were 
equal to the spot rate, an arbitrageur could buy the currency at the spot rate and sell it 
simultaneously at the forward rate; hence, there is no exchange rate risk. However, the 
arbitrageur will earn the interest yield of the high-yielding currency, instead of that of the low-
yielding currency. In fact, Taylor [1987] shows that CIP holds in general. Thus, an investor can 
buy a high interest rate currency against a low interest rate currency for a forward rate that is 
lower than is the expected future spot rate. This is called a carry-trade. The carry trade 
generates an expected profit in the amount of the interest differential, given the random walk 
assumption of the exchange rate.  
Fama [1984] was the first to observe this forward premium puzzle. Subsequently, many studies 
were published, showing profitable trading strategies that exploited this puzzle. Sarno and 
Taylor [2002] surveyed the research in this area. Other studies tried to explain part of the 
puzzle via the peso problem, where rare but extreme events could reverse the returns (see 
Krasker [1980]). Wu [2007] proposed a nonlinear relationship between spot and forward rates as 
an explanation. Lustig and Verdelhan [2007] explained higher interest rates with time-varying 
risk premium factors. Nonetheless, the carry trade strategy has been empirically proven to be 
profitable. 
I.2 Diversification of Currency Risk 
The implementation of the carry trade strategy in praxis bears an exchange rate risk, which 
can be highly risky if only the currencies with the highest and lowest interest rates are 
considered (see Table 3 in section I.4.5). By forming a portfolio of currencies, the diversification 
leads to a reduction of the risk, but lowers the expected return. The expected return is 
maximal if the highest interest rate currency is bought and the lowest is sold. Thus, there is a 
tradeoff between risk and return, which can be analyzed via a mean-variance analysis. 
At this stage, various approaches to forming a diversified currency portfolio exist. Levy [1981] 
used an ex-post covariance to build a mean-variance portfolio, allowing for negative weights. 
Mettler, Thoeny, and Schmidt [2010] formulated an interest-weighted portfolio, where each 
currency is weighted with the difference of its interest rate minus the mean interest rate of all 
currencies, allowing for positive and negative weights. Baz, Breedon, Naik, and Peress [2001] 
and Huang [2002] followed a mean-variance approach by minimizing the variance given a 
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target return. For the optimization process, they used a periodically estimated covariance 
matrix, and interest rate differentials as estimated returns.  
The focus in this paper is a practical approach to optimizing a currency portfolio. I minimize 
the risk for a given return. The implementation and backtest is done with currency forwards, 
which means very little collateral is necessary4. The risk minimization for a given return gives 
the best return-to-risk relation. In other words, the resulting portfolio will be on the steepest 
point of the estimated efficient frontier. Thus, by definition, leverage of this strategy will 
always be equal or superior to all other possible strategies on a risk-return perspective, as long 
as I forecast the steepest point on the efficient frontier accurately. Hence, I use an ex ante 
estimated covariance to optimize the portfolio. I show different models to estimate the 
covariance and their implications for the estimation results. The year 2008 is also included in 
the dataset, as one of the biggest world economic crises during the last decades, which offers 
new, additional insights. The performance of the resulting currency portfolio is much less 
volatile than existing approaches, and shows robustness in turbulent years. The risk-adjusted 
performance is significantly higher than those in existing approaches, and UIP can be rejected 
for all strategies.  
The idea is a sequel to the study of Baz, Breedon, Naik, and Peress [2001], who had already 
produced convincing results for a currency basket of five currencies. The key differences from 
their study are: 
• A longer time horizon: 1987-2010 instead of 1989-1999 
• A financial crisis in the backtest period 
• A broader currency basket: 11 currencies instead of 5 
• Forward implied interest rates instead of LIBOR 
I.2.1 Single Carry Trade 
The exchange rate is the price of one currency relative to another currency. I define the spot 
exchange rate, St, as the price of one unit of foreign currency in the domestic currency. Thus, 
an increase in St means the foreign currency appreciates. 
How does a single carry trade between two currencies work? Let rt be the one-period foreign 
interest rate for borrowing and lending, and rtd the corresponding risk-free rate in the domestic 
currency. Assuming that the foreign interest rate is higher than is the domestic one, a carry 
trade is supposed to be prosperous if the investor borrows in the domestic currency and invests 
in the foreign currency. For one unit of domestic currency, the investor gets 1/St units of the 
                                         
4 At the Zuercher Kantonalbank (ZKB), depending on the risk of a currency, around 10% of a currency 
forwards nominal has to be deposited as collateral. 
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foreign currency. After one period, the investor receives (1 + rt)/St  for the investment in the 
foreign currency and repays the loan plus interest costs 1 + rtd in the domestic currency. In the 
domestic currency, this is 
While rt, rtd and St are known at t, the future value of St+1 is unknown. However, under the 
random walk assumption, the expected exchange rate in t+1 is equal to the one in t 
퐸(푆푡+1) =  푆푡 
and the expected profit from the investment is 
as long as rt > rtd, the expected profit of this carry trade, is positive. 
The risk of the carry trade is measured by the variance 
푉푎푟 (푆푡+1푆푡 (1 + 푟푡) − (1 + 푟푡푑)) = 푉푎푟 (
푆푡+1푆푡 ) (1 + 푟푡)2 
The Sharpe ratio is the excess return above the risk-free rate, divided by the volatility of the 
excess return. Thus, the Sharpe ratio of the carry trade is 
I.2.2 Portfolio of Optimal Carry Trades  
For a portfolio of currencies, it is reasonable to define all exchange rates in terms of the 
investor’s domestic currency5. Let us assume that the investor has a portfolio of n foreign 
currency instead of just 1. The interest rates for those currencies are rti  for i=1..n and rtd. The 
interest rates of those currencies are rti  for i=1..n, and rtd is the interest rate of the domestic 
currency. For n foreign currencies and the domestic currencies, n exchange rates exist between 
the foreign and the domestic currency. These exchange rates can be considered to be 
investments with the usual risk and return characteristics. For rti  > rtd , the expected return of 
the investment is positive, while it is negative for rti  < rtd. The risk can be measured by the 
volatility of the exchange rate, and by the correlation between the exchange rates. 
                                         
5 The optimal long-short portfolio is almost “domestic” currency independent; nevertheless, it is better to 
focus on one domestic currency for the consistent illustration of the other currencies. However, the risk-
free interest rate depends directly on the domestic currency.  
 푆푡+1푆푡 (1 + 푟푡) − (1 + 푟푡푑).   
 rt−rtd, (1) 
 
푆 = 푟푡−푟푡푑√푉푎푟 (푆푡+1푆푡 ) (1 + 푟푡)
 
(2) 
15 
The weight of each currency in the portfolio is wtd for the domestic currency and wti  for the 
foreign currencies. Under the constraint that the sum of all weights is 1, wtd can be replaced by 1 − ∑ wtini=1 . The weights wti  are unconstrained, and can also be negative. A negative weight 
means the investor is borrowing in this currency, whereas a positive weight means that he or 
she is lending in that currency.  
The mean-variance approach is still the most widespread methodology in practice. Despite 
some criticism, it is a reliable approach to obtaining a well-balanced portfolio (Kritzman 
[2011]).  
The expected portfolio return under the random walk hypothesis is 
휇푡푝 = 퐸 [(1 − ∑ 푤푡푖푛푖=1 ) 푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖
푆푡+1푖푆푡푖 푟푡푖
푛
푖=1
] = (1 − ∑ 푤푡푖푛푖=1 ) 푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖푟푡푖
푛
푖=1
= 푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖(푟푡푖 − 푟푡푑)푛푖=1  
In the vector notation (see Fabozzi, Kolm, Pachamanova, and Focardi [2007]), the vector of 
returns is rt = (rt1, rt2, . . , rtn), vector of weights is wt = (wt1, wt2, . . , wtn) and the vector of ones is  ι = (1,1, . . ,1)′. Under this vector notation, the return is 
The covariance of returns for the investment in the foreign currencies i and j is 
since the interest rate rti  is assumed to be risk-free. Denoting the variance-covariance matrix at 
time t by Σt, the portfolio variance is 
(휎푡푝)2 = 푤푡′훴푡푤푡 
If the investor demands a return of µ0, then the portfolio optimization problem at time t is as 
follows: 
푚푖푛푤푡       푤푡′훴푡푤푡      푠. 푡.        푟푡푑 + 푤푡′(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄) = 휇0. 
The optimal portfolio weights solving this optimization problem are 
These weights are identical to the solution to the Sharpe ratio-maximization problem, 
푚푎푥푤푡         
푤푡′(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄)√푤푡′훴푡푤푡  푠. 푡.        푟푡푑 + 푤푡′(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄) = 휇0, 
 µtp = rtd + wt′(rt − rtdι). (3) 
 퐶표푣 [푆푡+1푖푆푡푖 (1 + 푟푡푖),
푆푡+1푗푆푡푗 (1 + 푟푡
푗)] = 퐶표푣 [푆푡+1푖푆푡푖 ,
푆푡+1푗푆푡푗 ] (1 + 푟푡
푖)(1 + 푟푡푗) (4) 
 푤푡∗ = 휇0 −     푟푡푑(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄)′훴푡−1(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄) 훴푡−1(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄). (5) 
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because the optimal unconstrained weights, wt∗, will always maximize the Sharpe ratio. All 
components, except Σt, are known at t. Σt is the only uncertain variable and has to be 
estimated. 
The Sharpe ratio can also be maximized with this maximization problem: 
푚푎푥푤푡         
푤푡′(푟푡 − 푟푡푑휄)√푤푡′훴푡푤푡  s. t.           √wt′Σtwt = σ. 
In practice, investors often want to hedge the currency risk, but are reluctant because some 
currencies are costly to hedge due to the higher interest rates. I suggest that those investors 
should use the Sharpe ratio-maximization formula with additional constraints for the currencies 
to hedge6. σ has to be set at the desired level of volatility of the currency portfolio. 
I.2.3 Estimation of the Variance-Covariance Matrix 
There are numerous models for the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix. I used the 
most common models which, in my opinion, are the GARCH (generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity model), the EWMA (exponentially weighted moving average 
model), and the traditional moving average model. All models use historically realized returns 
to estimate the future variance-covariance matrix. Andersen [2006] compared the different 
models and surveyed the related literature. 
Let d be the number of days from the past that are used for the covariance estimation. The 
estimated covariance between the returns of the foreign currencies i and j in the moving 
average model is: 
The expected covariance at date t is the equally weighted average covariance of the historically 
realized returns from the past d days. 
In the EWMA model, the more recent return has an exponentially increasing weight. This is 
defined as  
                                         
6 While the standard approach of risk minimization for a given return of risk delivers only the maximal 
Sharpe ratio in the event of there being no other constraints, the Sharpe ratio maximization delivers the 
highest Sharpe ratio for every optimization problem.  
 퐸(퐶표푣푡푖,푗) = ∑ 퐶표푣[
푆푥푖푆푥−1푖 , 푆푥
푗
푆푥−1푗 ]
푡푥=푡−푑
푛 (1 + 푟푡푖)(1 + 푟푡푗). (6) 
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where λ is a constant between 0 and 1. 
The generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (GARCH (1, 1)) is defined 
as 
where α, β  and γ are constants, and VL is the long-term variance. In addition, α + β < 1 is 
required for a stable process. 
The multivariate GARCH model can be expressed by the dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC) model of Engel (2002). 
퐶표푣 = DtRt Dt   Dt is a diagonal n × n matrix, where every component is defined by a univariate GARCH (1, 
1) process as defined in (9). Rt is the correlation matrix and is defined as follows: 
Rt = 푑푖푎푔{Qt}−1Qt푑푖푎푔{Qt}−1 
and  
Qt = (1 − ∑ 훼푚푚1 − ∑ 훽푛푛1 ) 푄̅̅̅̅ + ∑ 훼푚푚1 (휀푡−푚 − 휀′푡−푚) + ∑ 훽푛Q(t-n)푛1  Q̅̅̅̅̅ is the unconditional covariance matrix of εt and of εt is Dt−1 multiplied by µtp. 
I.2.4 Benchmark Carry Trade Strategies 
For the comparison of the optimization strategy, I used three benchmark strategies to 
determine the weights, wti , of all currencies, including the domestic currency. For simplicity, 
the sum of the absolute value of the weights is normalized to one and the weight of the 
domestic currency is the resulting weight +1. These strategies are commonly used in the 
existing literature. 
The simple carry strategy (SI) has +0.5 weight for the currency with the highest interest rate, 
and -0.5 for the lowest yielding currency. This strategy maximizes the expected return, but is 
probably also the riskiest of the strategies, since there is no diversification. 
The equally weighted carry strategy (EW) has a weight of + 1n  for each of the  n+12  currencies 
among the n+12  highest interest rates, and a weight of − 1n for each of the other 푛+12   currencies 
 퐸(퐶표푣푡푖,푗) = [휆 퐶표푣 [ 푆푡푖푆푡−1푖 ,
푆푡푗푆푡−1푗 ] + (1 − 휆) 퐸(퐶표푣푡−1
푖,푗 )] (1 + 푟푡푖)(1 + 푟푡푗) (7) 
퐸(퐶표푣푡푖,푗) = [훾푉퐿 + 훼 ( 푆푡푖푆푡−1푖 − 1) ∗ (
푆푡푗푆푡−1푗 − 1) + 훽 퐸(퐶표푣푡−1
푖,푗 )] (1 + 푟푡푖)(1 + 푟푡푗) (8) 
 푤푡푖 = ⎩{⎨
{⎧+0.5       푖푓 푟푡푖 = 푚푎푥 (푅푡)−0.5       푖푓 푟푡푖 = 푚푖푛 (푅푡)0           푖푓 푚푖푛  (푅푡) < 푟푡푖 < 푚푎 푥(푅푡) 
 (9) 
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among the lowest interest rates. This strategy is also known as the 1/n approach. The rank of 
the highest interest rate is 1 and the lowest is n. This strategy is risk minimizing under the 
condition that the exchange rates are uncorrelated and are equally risky. 
The interest weight carry strategy (IW) has a weight for each currency that is proportional to 
the interest rate difference between its interest rate and the average interest rate of all 
currencies. This strategy is a compromise between return maximizing and risk minimizing, 
given that all exchange rates are uncorrelated and are equally risky. 
The term ∑ abs(rti − rt̅)ni=1  normalizes the sum of the absolute values of all weights to one. 
I.3 Carry Trade for Practitioners 
I.3.1 Carry Trade Implementation 
In practice, the implementation of the carry trade is typically done through currency forwards. 
A currency forward is a contract to buy a specific amount of one currency, and to sell another 
currency at a specific date in the future at a price that is fixed today. There is no initial cash 
flow. The forward price, also called the outright, consists of the current spot rate and the 
forward points for the time until delivery.  
The forward exchange rate is: 
퐹푡 = 푆푡 (1 + 푟푡푑)(1 + 푟푡푖) 
where Ft is the current forward rate, rtd is the interest rate corresponding to the domestic 
currency for the time to expiry of the currency forward, and rti  is the interest rate of the foreign 
currency. The forward points, the difference between the spot rate and the forward rate, are 
defined as: 
퐹표푟푤푎푟푑 푃표푖푛푡푠 = 푆푡 [(1 + 푟푡푑)(1 + 푟푡푖) − 1] 
The market for the forward points is a separate market for trading interest differentials, and is 
organized as follows: 
 푤푡푖 =
⎩{⎨
{⎧+ 1푛        푖푓 푟푎푛푘 (푟푡푖)|(푅푡) ≤ 푛 + 12
− 1푛        푖푓 푟푎푛푘 (푟푡푖)|(푅푡) > 푛 + 12 
 (10) 
 푤푖(푡) = (푟푡푖 − 푟푡̅)∑ 푎푏푠(푟푡푖 − 푟푡̅)푛푖=1  (11) 
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For the customer (i.e. the investor), the market is not separated, since s/he will get one price 
for the currency forward. However, for the counterparty of the customer (i.e. the bank), there 
are two separate markets in the interbank market. For one trade with the customer, the bank 
will buy the currency on the spot market, through selling the other currency. This is done by 
the spot trading desk. Let us assume that the customer buys AUD and sells USD one year 
forward. The bank will then buy AUD and sell USD on the spot market today. Furthermore, 
the bank has to refinance the short USD position daily, and earns interest for the AUD. 
However, there is a duration mismatch between the demand obligation to the customer and the 
position of the bank. Therefore, the bank (as performed by the forward trading desk) will make 
an FX Swap7, which buys USD and sells AUD today, but has to obligation to buy AUD back 
in a year through selling the USD. The difference between today’s price and the one in the 
following year are the forward points (in the words of the customer), or the swap spread (in the 
words of the bank).  
The forward points depend on the interest rate difference between the two currencies, the time 
to maturity, and the spot rate price. Contract specifications are custom, but standard is the 
nominal exchange at the delivery date with no margining meanwhile. The profit and loss is 
realized at the delivery date. 
Due to the positive interest rate difference in the carry trade, the forward price is lower than is 
the current spot price. If the spot rate does not change, the profit is the interest rate difference, 
which corresponds to the forward points. The interest rate difference can be earned 
subsequently by rolling-over the contract as long as the interest rate difference remains 
positive. 
Numerical example for the client: The client sells 1 million USD and buys AUD one year 
forward. The current spot rate is 0.95 AUD/USD. The 1-year interest rate is 5% for AUD and 
1% for USD. The forward points are -0.0362 (= (1.01/1.05-1)*0.95), and the forward rate is 
0.9138; thus, 1’094’320 AUD are bought forward. Assume the spot rate is still 0.95 AUD/USD 
in one year. Then, in one year, the contract delivers 1’094’320 AUD by paying 1 million USD. 
The AUD can be sold at 0.95, which is 1’039’604 USD. The profit is 39’604 USD. 
Numerical example for the bank: The banks sells 1’039’604 USD, and buys 1’094’320 
AUD on the spot market today (spot rate 0.95). On the swap market, the following transaction 
takes place: FX Swap AUD-USD from today to one year at the swap rate of -0.0362. The FX 
Swap consists of two transactions, sell 1’094’320 AUD today and buy 1’039’604 USD at 0.95, 
and buy 1’094’320 AUD and sell 1’000’000 USD in a year at 0.9138. 
                                         
7 The majority of the deals will run through FX swaps (see Biz 2010). However, the forward trader also 
has the option of buying an interest rate future, or and cash bond. 
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Alternatively, the bank could sell 1’000’000 USD and buy 1’052’632 AUD on the spot market 
today (spot rate 0.95). It could then buy an Australian bond that yields 5%. In one year, it 
would earn 52’632 AUD interest and have 1’105’263 AUD. However, for the 1 million USD, the 
credit costs are 1%, which is 10’000 USD, respectively expected to be 10’943 AUD 
(=10’000/0.9138). Therefore, in one year, the bank has 1’094’319 AUD (=1’105’263-10’943), 
which it has to deliver to the client. The client gives the bank 1’000’000 USD, which it can use 
to pay back the credit. However, there is a risk that the exchange rate is not 0.9138 in one year 
and the bank does not pay exactly 10’943 AUD - in the case of the random walk, the 10’000 
USD will be only 10’526 AUD. To hedge against this risk, the bank could make a forward deal 
and sell 10’000 USD today for 10’943 AUD. However, the impact of this risk is small. 
I.3.2 Transaction Costs 
The following table shows half of the bid-ask spread for one month’s currency forwards (source: 
ZKB trading desk, from their experience with institutional clients8): 
Table 1: Spot and Forward Transaction Costs 
 CHF/USD EUR/USD JPY/USD GBP/USD AUD/USD 
Spot 0.016% 0.013% 0.019% 0.012% 0.025% 
Swap 0.004% 0.002% 0.002% 0.003% 0.010% 
      
 CAD/USD NOK/USD SEK/USD SGD/USD NZD/USD 
Spot 0.014% 0.025% 0.022% 0.050% 0.060% 
Swap 0.005% 0.012% 0.006% 0.002% 0.017% 
The table indicates the transaction costs for specific currency spot and currency spot trades. ZKB 
trading desks are the source for the transaction costs for institutional investors. 
If the investors invest in a new currency AUD-USD forward, the transaction costs consist of 
0.025% for the spot deal and 0.010% for the swap deal. However, if the AUD-USD forward is 
at expiry and the bank wants to refresh it (rollover) for one more month, the costs are only 
0.010%. This is because, in this case, the currency swap is done by the investors themselves. In 
the terms of the numerical example above, the bank sells 1’094’319 AUD today and buys it a 
year later at the same spot rate, plus the forward points. Since the bank sells at the spot rate 
and buys at the same spot rate (plus the forward points), there is no bid-ask spread on the 
spot rate, but only on the forward points, namely 0.010%. More precisely, there is no trade on 
the spot market. If the bank does not want to take up a new position, it will get 1’094’319 
AUD and will have to deliver 1’000’000 USD. If the bank does not want to have the AUD in 
                                         
8 Smaller clients pay higher spreads, since the transaction fee is included in the spread. Some very large 
investors probably pay smaller spreads. The figures here are a good proxy for transactions with a volume 
of between 1 million and 50 million. 
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the investors’ account, it can sell them at the current spot rate and pay half of the spot bid-ask 
spread, which is 0.025%. 
I.3.3 Return Measurement 
There are two ways to measure the return on the investment. If no leverage is allowed, the net 
return (net transaction costs) is measured as the profit in t+1 divided by the invested amount 
in t which, for a currency portfolio, is: 
휇푡푝 =
(1 − ∑ 푤푡푖푛푖=1 )푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖 푆푡+1푖푆푡푖 푟푡푖푛푖=1∑ 푎푏푠(푤푡푖)푛푖=1 − 푇푟푎푛푠푎푐푡푖표푛 푐표푠푡푠
9 
This ensures that the sum of the weights is not larger than 1. The same in terms of forward 
prices, is: 
휇푡푝 =
(1 − ∑ 푤푡푖푛푖=1 )푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖 [(1 + 푆푡+1푖 − 퐹푡푖푆푡푖 ) (1 + 푟푡푖) − 1]푛푖=1∑ 푎푏푠(푤푡푖)푛푖=1 − 푇푟푎푛푠푎푐푡푖표푛 푐표푠푡푠
10 
For the excess return, the risk-free interest rate rtd has to be deducted from the net return. 
If leverage is allowed, the net return is: 
Here, the sum of the weights can be larger than 1.  
                                         
9 Theoretically, the transaction costs should be included in the optimization formula. However, in order 
to reduce complexity and since the costs are insignificant, the transaction costs are ignored in the 
optimization process. 
10 Theoretically, the transaction costs should be included in the optimization formula. However, in order 
to reduce complexity and since the costs are insignificant, the transaction costs are ignored in the 
optimization process. The complexity of the transaction cost inclusions arises from the fact that there are 
initial costs and maintenance costs. The initial must be spread over the future holding period, which is 
unknown in advance. 
 휇푡푝 = (1 − ∑ 푤푡푖푛푖=1 ) 푟푡푑 + ∑ 푤푡푖
푆푡+1푖푆푡푖 푟푡푖
푛
푖=1
− 푇푟푎푛푠푎푐푡푖표푛 푐표푠푡푠 (12) 
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I.4 Empirical Currency Portfolio Optimization 
I.4.1 Data  
I tested the efficacy of the diversified carry trade strategy as follows: I first took the US dollar 
(USD) as the domestic currency. The basic foreign currency universe consists of the Euro 
(EUR), the Japanese yen (JPY), the British pound (GBP), the Swiss franc (CHF), the 
Canadian dollar (CAD), the New Zealand dollar (NZD), the Australian dollar (AUD), the 
Norwegian krona (NOK), the Swedish krona (SEK), and the Singapore dollar (SGD). This 
corresponds to the universe of the so-called developed countries, except for the exclusion of the 
Danish krona. The broad foreign currency universe also considers the Danish krona (DKK), the 
Hungarian forint (HUF), the South African rand (ZAR), the Mexican peso (MXN), and the 
Polish zloty (PLN).  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Interest Rates 
Exchange Rate 
Return 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
Exchange Rate 
Skewness 
JPY 0.13% 2.03% 11.74% 0.78 
CHF 1.37% 2.40% 10.97% 0.56 
SGD 2.44% 0.92% 5.78% -0.03 
EUR 2.97% 1.17% 10.39% 0.07 
CAD 3.61% 2.36% 8.29% -0.23 
SEK 3.62% 1.31% 11.25% 0.08 
USD 3.77% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00 
NOK 4.47% 1.49% 10.66% -0.21 
GBP 4.79% 0.51% 8.47% -0.27 
AUD 5.57% 2.25% 12.16% -0.50 
NZD 6.52% 1.94% 12.54% -0.16 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the 11 currencies during the period from December 31 
1994 to October 31 2010. The interest rate is the average interest rate in that period. The exchange rate 
return is the arithmetic average of the monthly change in the exchange rate versus the USD. A positive 
figure means that this currency has appreciated against the USD. Exchange rate volatility is the annual 
volatility of the exchange rate versus the USD. Skewness is the skewness of the monthly exchange rate 
change. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the 11 currencies in this data set, sorted by the 
average interest rate. The average interest rates range from 0.13% for the JPY to 6.52% for the 
NZD. In addition, the table reports the average, standard deviation, and skewness of the 
exchange rate changes of each currency versus the USD. On average, all the currencies 
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appreciated against the USD between January 1995 and October 2010, even though four of 
them had average interest rates exceeding the average interest rate in the U.S. Consequentially, 
UIP must fail for these currencies. Another readily apparent pattern is that the two highest 
and the two lowest interest rate currencies are among the five currencies having the highest 
volatility. A mean-variance analysis strategy will naturally try to minimize its exposure to that 
extra volatility, if possible. 
I used (5) to calculate the weights each month with the data available at this time point, so 
that it would have been possible to implement it in practice. The required excess return 
휇0 − 푟푡푑 is set to 6.5%, which is the long-term excess return for US equities (for details, see 
Mehra [2006]). The resulting currency allocation is held for one month. The monthly return is 
computed with (12). For the monthly estimation of the new covariance in the MA model (6), I 
used the previous 250 trading days and scaled it by 22 to obtain monthly values. I call this 
method MA 250. For the GARCH model (8), I used the Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
Multivariate GARCH model as proposed by Sheppard [2003]. The weighing factors in GARCH 
are also recalibrated monthly. In EWMA (7), I used a constant weighting factor (λ) of 0.94. 
RiskMetrics Group [1996] found that λ=0.94 delivers the best results for a broad range of 
backtests. In EMWA and GARCH, the entire data horizon available at one specific point in 
time was used with the daily data, starting at the beginning of the dataset for the estimation of 
the parameters. In addition, I computed the performance with the weights of the benchmark 
strategies (9)-(11) as a comparison. Here, I scaled the weight so that the expected excess return 
is 6.5%. For example, if the resulting weights from benchmark (9) generate an expected return 
of 3.25%, then all weights are multiplied by 2 in order to have an expected excess return of 
6.5%. 
I.4.2 Data Source 
I used two sources for the data, Datastream and Bloomberg. In both cases, I took the German 
mark (DEM) as a substitute for the EUR for the time period before January 1 1999. All the 
data are the daily data from every weekday. The timeframe and currency universe were chosen 
in order to obtain as much data as possible for large countries with liquid currencies. Reliable 
data existed for only a few currencies before 1985.  
In Datastream, I used exchange rates and interest rates. For the exchange rates, I took the 
middle rates provided by Barclays Bank International from January 1 1985 to October 10 2010. 
For the interest rates, I used one month’s interbank rates from December 31 1986 to October 
30 201011. USD, CHF, JPY, GBP and AUD interest rates were provided by Barclays Bank 
                                         
11 I needed at least 250 trading days preceding the start of the backtest for the computation of the 
variance-covariance matrix. 
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International, NOK was provided by Norgres Bank, EUR by Thomson Reuters, SGD by 
Development Bank of Singapore, NZD by Datex (New Zealand) until December 31 2003 and by 
Barclays Bank International afterwards, while SEK was from http://www.riksbank.com until 
December 31 1992, and from Barclays Bank International afterwards. All rates are offered 
rates, except for NZD and SGD, which are middle rates. In Bloomberg, I used exchange and 
forward middle rates from January 1 1994, and forward rates from December 31 1994. 
Transaction costs for the spot and forward trades of each currency pair are provided by the 
trading unit of Zuercher Kantonalbank, and are assumed to be constant over time.12  
I.4.3 Data Manipulation 
Missing data in exchange rates were completed with the value of the previous day. For forward 
rates, a missing value was completed with the value of the previous day multiplied by the spot 
rate change from the previous day to the current day. This means that, if there were no 
forward rate at t, then the forward at t would be Ft  = Ft−1St/St−1. This is because forward 
points are roughly constant, in contrast to the volatile spot rates.  
A special case is the EUR/DEM time series. For the computation of the covariance matrix, I 
used the continued DEM time series, which is exactly the same as the EUR time series 
multiplied with a fixed conversion factor from the switch data on December 31 1998. 
Some days were eliminated from the time series. If the exchange rates of all currencies from one 
day were identical to those of the previous day, then, for all time series, both Datastream and 
Bloomberg, the latter day was removed. This was typically the case for important holidays. 
Overall, 226 weekdays were removed over the 25-year time horizon, which is 9 days per year. 
I.4.4 Data Quality 
The data quality of the exchange rates is good in both Datastream and in Bloomberg. The only 
difference is that the Bloomberg data are from 6 pm, while those of Datastream are from 5:30 
pm London time. 
The data quality of Datastream for forward rates is modest, since there are jumps in the 
forward points throughout the entire time period. Therefore, I did not consider these rates. 
However, Datastream has a very long track record of data until 1987 for all interest rates and 
up to 1985 for the exchange rates. The problem with interbank interest is that it consists of 
non-binding offered rates that are subject to manipulation (see Snider and Youle [2009]). 
Furthermore, the covered interest rate parity holds often, but not always. If it does not hold, 
                                         
12 The transaction costs are listed in Figure 1. 
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the carry trade is not implementable analogously with currency forwards. Deviations have been 
found during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (see. Coffey, Hrung, and Sarkar [2009]), as well as 
in the example of the SGD, whose average interbank interest rate over the sample period is 
2.44, compared with a 2.94 forward implied interest rate. The effect from the covered interest 
rate parity violation is large for SGD, since having short SGD generates a negative return. For 
the other currencies, the effect is small. 
The advantage of the Bloomberg data is the high quality forward rates. The data source for 
the exchange and forward rates is Bloomberg BGN. This data source, according to Bloomberg, 
is “...totally resistant to manipulation by market participants. The prices in Bloomberg for 
each currency pair is based on input prices from a subset of Bloomberg’s more than 1000 
contributors of FX prices.”13 An algorithm eliminates outliers and creates the middle price of 
each exchange and forward rate. Before 1994, the forward rates in Bloomberg were of low 
quality. Low quality means that the forward implied interest rate has sudden moves at some 
data points, which cannot be seen in the related interest rates. The problem is that forward 
rates have to be measured at exactly the same point in time as the spot rates. If that is not the 
case, there could be an illusionary trading opportunity. The lack of quality before 1994 is 
probably because electronic trading emerged with the launch of Reuters 2000 in 1992, and the 
recording of data was difficult in an OTC market working with phone calls.  
I.4.5 Results of Empirical Currency Portfolio Optimization 
Figure 1 presents the cumulated return, when optimization is applied (5) with monthly 
rebalancing, using (6) to estimate the covariance matrix with the MA 250 method, and (12) to 
compute the return net of transaction costs. The data are from Bloomberg, using forward rates 
to back out the interest rates. 
The plot in Figure 1 clearly shows how successful the strategy was. The return was 
continuously positive, with a major exception from mid-2007 to end of 2008. Moreover, the 
continuous return indicates that the interest rate difference was the driver of the return.  
However, profitability itself does not guarantee superiority to other strategies. One important 
feature of a successful strategy is beating the risk-free interest rate. Consequently, the risk-free 
interest rate needs to be deducted from the net return in order to obtain the excess return. 
Figure 2 plots the excess return of the optimized strategy and the three benchmark strategies 
(9)-(11), the simple method (SI), the equally weighted method (EW), and interest weighted 
method (IW).  
 
                                         
13 Source is the description of the Bloomberg BGN rates available on a Bloomberg terminal. 
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Figure 1: Cumulated Net Return of Optimized Carry Trade 
 
The figure plots the cumulated net return for the optimized currency carry trade with a target excess 
return of 6.5% in the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The optimized portfolio is 
rebalanced monthly. The return is the net of transaction costs. 
All the strategies generated significant excess returns over the past 16 years, although the 
profit in 2008 was negative for all strategies. None of the strategies is significantly better than 
another, but the simple benchmark strategy is, as expected, the most volatile, showing a huge 
loss of 56% from July 2007- January 2009. The results show that the carry trade strategy is 
generally successful, although not every year, and some years have been quite damaging for 
certain strategies.  
The return figures are separated into FX returns (the return from exchange rate movements 
= ∑ wti (St+1iSti ) − 1ni=1 ), IR returns (the return from the interest rates), the carry effect 
(= (1 − ∑ wtini=1 )rtd + ∑ wti rtini=1 ), transaction costs, and the risk-free return, rtd. The net return 
is the total return less transaction costs, and the excess return is the net return less the risk-
free return. 
Table 3 presents the return and risk figures of these strategies. All data have been measured 
monthly, and are presented in an annualized form. 
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Figure 2: Cumulated Excess Return of Optimized Carry Trade and Benchmark 
Strategies 
This figure plots the cumulated excess return for different currency strategies with a target excess return 
of 6.5% for the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. MA 250 is the optimized strategy, 
with an estimated covariance matrix based on the moving average of the previous 250 trading days. 
EWMA is the optimized strategy, with the estimated covariance matrix based on the exponentially 
moving average, with a decay factor of 0.94. GARCH is the optimized strategy, with an estimated 
covariance matrix based on a DCC GARCH model. SI is the simple carry trade strategy, which buys the 
currency with the highest interest rate and sells the currency with the lowest interest rate. EW is the 
equally weighted strategy that buys the 50% highest yielding currencies and sells the 50% lowest yielding 
currencies. IW is the interest-weighted strategy that buys all currencies with above-average interest rates 
and sells all currencies with below-average interest rates, weighting them proportionally to their interest 
rate levels. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The excess return is the net of the transaction costs and 
the risk free rate. 
The most striking result is the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity, which is disclosed 
by the positive FX return. According to UIP, the FX return should be the opposite of the IR 
return minus the risk-free return, while the excess return should be zero. However, the FX 
return is slightly positive and, in the case of MA 250 and EWMA, it is even significantly 
positive at a 10% significance level. This is an indication for the random walk theory, and for 
the persistence of the forward premium puzzle. Although high-yielding currencies, such as 
AUD, NZD, NOK, and GBP, depreciated around 20% against the USD, and the low-yielding 
currency JPY appreciated over 20% in 2008, the forward anomaly persists. The SI benchmark 
strategy had a loss of -37% in 2008, but even here the average annual FX return is positive. 
This means the drawdown in 2008 was only a correction of previous exaggerations. Thus, there 
is still no evidence for the peso theory. Furthermore, and most importantly, the excess return is 
significantly positive at 1% level for all strategies. This means, no matter how the carry trade 
was implemented, it was historically very successful. 
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Table 3: Risk and Return Figures of Optimized Carry Trade and Benchmark 
Strategies 
 
Optimized 
(MA 250) 
Optimized 
(EWMA) 
Optimized 
(GARCH) 
Benchmark 
(SI) 
Benchmark 
(EW) 
Benchmark 
(IW) 
FX Return 4.28% 3.89% 2.14% 2.39% 4.88% 3.85% 
IR Return 10.29% 10.29% 10.29% 10.29% 10.29% 10.29% 
Transaction costs 0.66% 0.65% 0.75% 0.40% 0.49% 0.36% 
Net Return 13.93% 13.55% 11.69% 12.29% 14.70% 13.79% 
Risk-free Return 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 
Excess Return 10.14% 9.76% 7.90% 8.50% 10.91% 10.00% 
Volatility 9.32% 9.16% 9.86% 13.76% 13.80% 12.26% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.09 1.07 0.80 0.62 0.79 0.82 
Best Year 34.35% 34.52% 31.52% 41.46% 53.15% 56.85% 
Worst Year -5.83% -6.43% -8.96% -37.27% -15.62% -25.88% 
FX Return <>0 *14 * - - - - 
Net Return >0 ***15 *** *** *** *** *** 
Skewness Excess Return 1.11 0.94 -0.05 -0.57 0.51 0.40 
This table presents the risk and return figures for the return of different currency strategies, with a 
target excess return of 6.5% during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010.All data are 
annualized, based on monthly measurements. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. FX Return is the 
return that would result from the strategy if gains or losses from the interest rate differentials were to be 
ignored. IR return is the return that would result from the strategy if gains or losses from the exchange 
rate returns were to be ignored. The excess return is the net of the transaction costs and the risk-free 
rate. 
Volatility is the most decisive factor of the results, as all the strategies were given the same 
target excess return of 6.5%. With the random walk assumption, the difference in the FX 
return is merely random. The volatility of the optimized strategies is between 9.16% and 
9.86%, and is therefore substantially lower than that of the benchmark strategies, which have a 
volatility of between 12.26% and 13.80%. The lowest volatility has the optimized strategy 
EWMA, which is 9.16%. This compares to the lowest volatility of the benchmark strategies, 
which has an IW of 12.26%. At first glance, it might seem surprising that the EW benchmark 
has the highest volatility and not the SI benchmark, as the SI benchmark is less diversified. 
                                         
14 *=10% Alpha 
15 ***=1% Alpha 
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This surprise vanishes if no leverage is allowed16. The SI strategy has the most negative results 
in the worst year, with -37.27%, while the optimized strategies have the least worse results in 
the worst year, which confirms the expectations. Furthermore, the SI strategy is negatively 
skewed, which is considered to be an unpleasant attribute by investors. The optimized 
strategies are neither negatively nor positively skewed.  
With regard to the Sharpe ratio, the SI benchmark has the lowest Sharpe ratio (0.62), although 
this is still higher than the typical Sharpe ratios of equity indices, which are below 0.517. The 
Sharpe ratio improves further with the optimized strategies: MA 250 has a Sharpe ratio of 1.09, 
EWMA 1.07, and GARCH of 0.80. The high Sharpe ratios are strong evidence that the interest 
rate differentials cannot be explained via risk premiums. While MA 250 and EWMA reveal 
similar returns, the GARCH produces substantially worse return results. This can be explained 
by the lower FX return, while the volatility estimates seem to be similar. A measure of 
analyzing the forecast accuracy of the covariance estimation is the mean absolute percentage 
error, which compares the estimated volatility with the realized one.18 This error is similar for 
all methods, being 72.4% for MA 250, 73.7% for EWMA, and 72.8% for GARCH. 
Figure 3 shows the monthly values for the volatility of the AUD/USD exchange rate. GARCH, 
EWMA, and MA 250 are estimated values using the corresponding model, while “Realized” is 
the actual, realized volatility, measuring the daily volatility of the forecast month. 
All methods have their advantages. GARCH has the most volatile values, similar to the 
realized volatility, but lagging by one month. The problem with this GARCH method is that 
the forecast is actually for one day, but is extrapolated for the entire month in this model. 
However, the results do not improve when using monthly changes as input instead of daily 
ones. The disadvantage of monthly values is that the change to the exchange rate can be close 
to zero in a month, although it was very volatile during the month. MA 250 is even more 
lagging than the realized volatility, but it has the advantage of being more stable than is 
GARCH. Thus, although MA 250 is not exactly right, on average, it is a good indicator. 
EWMA is less lagging than is MA 250, since the more recent values are higher weighted, but it 
is still close to the values of MA 250. 
 
                                         
16 With no leverage, SI has the highest return and the highest volatility, while EW has the lowest 
volatility and return, in line with the theory. EW has the highest Sharpe ratio (0.76), followed by IW 
(0.70), and SI (0.49). 
17 Fama and French [2002] evaluated the Sharpe ratio for the S&P 500, which was 0.23 over the time 
horizon from 1872-1950, and 0.44 from 1951-2000. The Sharpe ratio for the time horizon from 1995-2010 
is 0.25 for MSCI World in USD. 
18 Russell and Adam [1987] 
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Figure 3: Different Volatility Estimations for the AUD/USD Exchange Rate 
This figure presents the volatility estimated for the optimized portfolio with a target excess return of 
6.5%, based on different covariance estimation methods, and compares it with the realized volatility 
using the daily-realized returns of the forecast month. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 
31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly.  
The transaction costs are higher in the optimized strategies, indicating that the turnover in 
those strategies is higher. A possible explanation is that the interest rates are very stable, while 
the correlation and the volatility change faster. 
The IR return is 10.29% for all strategies, as implied by the risk-free rate of 3.79% and the 
given expected return of 6.5%. 
Overall, the optimized strategy worked quite well, and the method of the covariance estimation 
did not make much difference. Consequently, I focus on the optimized strategy in the 
remainder of the paper, and I chose the MA 250 method to estimate the covariance, since the 
other two methods did not work significantly better than did the MA 250, which is also most 
easily implementable. 
I.4.6 Detailed Analysis of the Optimized Strategy 
Table 4 presents the risk and return figures of the optimized strategy (MA 250), again 
separated into four periods, each with a length of four years. 
The separation offers new insights. The first three periods were very similar. The FX Return 
was clearly positive and, consequently, so was the excess return. The low volatility 
environment produced much higher Sharpe ratios, between 1.49 and 2.00. However, the 
skewness was around zero. In the last period of the financial crisis, the figures changed. The FX 
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Return was considerably lower than it was in the previous periods, but it was still positive. 
Transaction costs doubled with regard to the previous two periods, while the volatility 
increased more than twice. The higher volatility and the lower return depressed the Sharpe 
ratio to 0.52. However, that is still a sizeable result for the worst crisis for decades. Most 
astonishingly, the skewness of the net profit is positive. The portfolio composition and the 
leverage help to explain this result. 
Table 4: Periodical Analysis of Risk and Return Figures 
  
1995-
2010 
1995-
1998 
1999-
2002 
2003-
2006 
2007-
2010 
FX Return 4.28% 4.45% 5.25% 4.97% 2.36% 
IR Return 10.29% 12.18% 10.88% 9.26% 8.78% 
Transaction costs 0.66% 0.76% 0.45% 0.45% 0.99% 
Net Return 13.93% 15.88% 15.70% 13.80% 10.17% 
Risk-free Return 3.79% 5.68% 4.38% 2.76% 2.28% 
Excess Return 10.14% 10.21% 11.33% 11.05% 7.89% 
Volatility 9.32% 6.04% 5.67% 7.43% 15.32% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.09 1.69 2.00 1.49 0.52 
Skewness Excess Return 1.11 -0.61 0.34 -0.22 1.24 
This table presents the risk and return figures for the return of the optimized currency strategy, with a 
target excess return of 6.5% for various sub-periods for the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 
2010. All the data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
The FX Return is the return that would result from the strategy if the gains or losses from the interest 
rate differentials were to be ignored. IR return is the return that would result from the strategy if the 
gains or losses from the exchange rate returns were to be ignored.  
Table 5 presents the best and worst monthly returns during the entire period. The worst 
month was December 2008, followed by the fourth largest loss in January 2009, just before the 
recovery of the carry trade. The second and third largest losses occurred in July 2009 and June 
2010, and were mainly driven by a high leverage in these months. The best month was 
September 2009, followed by March 2009, June 2009 and, in fourth place, November 2008 - 
right in the middle of the crisis. The gain in November 2008 was driven by huge short positions 
in CHF, SGD, and SEK, whilst the USD was very strong against these and other currencies in 
this month. 
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Table 5: Best and Worst Monthly Net Returns 
 
Min Max 
1. -6.00% 15.12% 
2. -5.79% 10.73% 
3. -5.15% 10.69% 
4. -4.87% 9.12% 
5. -4.17% 7.12% 
6. -4.10% 6.27% 
This table presents the six best and worst monthly net returns for the optimized currency, with a target 
excess return of 6.5% during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is 
rebalanced monthly. 
I.4.7 Leverage 
Figure 4 shows the portfolio leverage throughout the backtest period. 
Figure 4: Portfolio Leverage 
This figure plots the leverage of the optimized currency portfolio, with a target excess return of 6.5% 
during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
A leverage of 100% means that, for one unit of cash (in this paper, USD), the same amount is 
invested in foreign currencies. There are two factors that can increase the leverage, given a 
constant expected return. Firstly, the leverage will increase if the interest rate differentials 
decrease. Secondly, if the volatility of two currencies with a low interest differential decreases, 
more weight will be put on these currencies, which again increases the leverage. Throughout 
the period, the leverage was between 200% and 600%, until the financial crisis. During the 
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crisis, the leverage increased sharply. The first increase was in November 2008, after the 
Lehman failure. This increase was mainly driven by shifts in volatility and correlation, since 
the interest rates did not change significantly and the highest difference was still 5.9%. During 
the following months, the exposure increased further, and spiked in May 2009 at 1001%, which 
was mainly driven by the converging interest rates. The largest interest differential was only 
3.1% in May 2009. 
The consequence for the performance of the currency portfolio was positive. The comeback for 
the carry trade started in February 2009, which was the first positive month for the simple 
carry trade after eight consecutively negative months. While the optimized strategy had to 
endure losses during the crisis, the gains during the rebound after the crisis more than offset 
the losses, since the leverage was much higher. These strong, positive results during the 
rebound finally led to the positive skewness in this period.  
I.4.8 Portfolio Composition 
Looking at the portfolio composition, there are some figures that might help to explain the 
superiority of the optimized results. Figure 5 plots the weights of the most famous carry trade 
currencies, JPY as a funding currency, and AUD and NZD as lending currencies. 
Figure 5: Portfolio Weight of Selected Currencies 
This figure plots the weights of selected currencies for the optimized currency portfolio, with a target 
excess return of 6.5% during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is 
rebalanced monthly. 
Historically, the typical carry trader bought the NZD, which was the highest yielding currency, 
with an average interest rate of 6.5%, and sold the JPY, the lowest yielding currency, with an 
average of 0.1%. In the optimized currency portfolio, those currencies play different roles in the 
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portfolio composition. JPY was not a funding currency during the recent financial crisis, even 
though it had the lowest interest rates. Since October 2008, the weight of the JPY has been 
consistently positive. The weight of the NZD and the AUD was not always positive, although a 
typical carry trader would have always overweighed them. In the optimized portfolio, one of 
the two was always positive since, most of the time, they were the highest yielding currencies. 
However, the other currency sometimes served as the funding currency. Why was that? A carry 
trade going long AUD and short JPY seems to be much more risky than one being long AUD 
and short NZD.19 The short position in one of the two can be interpreted as a protection 
against losses in the other currencies, which is costly in the sense of lower interest rate 
differentials. This could be seen perfectly in November 2009, when the weight of the NZD was 
reduced by 94% and became negative afterwards, while the weight of the AUD increased by 
83% and subsequently became even more positive. In the last year, the interest rate for AUD 
was 1 to 1.5% higher than for NZD, and this carry trade was exploited by the optimizer. Thus, 
rather than making overcrowded bets in the best-yielding currency pair, the optimizer chose 
positive-yielding but low-risk currencies. 
The highest average weight was not for NZD, which had an average weight of 23%, but for 
NOK, with 41%. Thus, long NOK seems to have been a low-risk long position. The lowest 
average weight was for CHF, with a weight of -69%, while the average weight for JPY was -
10%. Even CAD had a lower average weight of -23%, although this is also a typical long 
position for carry trades. The problem of typical carry trading currencies is that they made 
sudden adverse moves during a crisis, caused by all carry traders unwinding their positions in 
order to reduce their risk. With the optimization approach, this crash risk can simply be 
diversified away. 
I.4.9 Volatility and Correlation with Other Market Risks 
The increased leverage had strong implications for the expected volatility of the portfolio. 
Figure 6 presents the development of the expected volatility. The expected volatility was stable 
at between 4% and 9% until the financial crisis. During the crisis, the volatility increased more 
than six-fold, up to 33.2%. There were two reasons for the increase. One was the higher 
leverage during the last couple of years, remembering that the leverage doubled during this 
period. The other reason was the higher volatility of the currencies, which tripled during the 
crisis. 
                                         
19 An explanation for this circumstance is that many investors that play the carry trade, and are long 
AUD and NZD, and short JPY. During the crisis, the return-to-risk ratio was less favorable, and many 
investors chose to unwind their positions when selling AUD and NZD. However, if one is long AUD and 
short NZD, there is no risk from such a sudden unwinding. Autumn of 2008 is a very good example: 
AUD and NZD lost -17.8%, respectively -16.0% in that period, while JPY gained 19.8%. A carry trade 
between AUD and JPY was much more risky than was one between AUD and NZD. 
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Figure 6: Expected Volatility 
This figure plots the expected volatility of the optimized currency portfolio, with a target excess return 
of 6.5% during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced 
monthly. 
The volatility of the currency portfolio itself is not the only important factor. A currency 
portfolio is not only an own-asset class, but is always concomitant with every asset class. As an 
example, the MSCI World Index contains the equity component currency risk of every country 
listed in the index. The correlation between these market risks and the currency portfolios 
assists in understanding whether a reallocation of the asset classes’ currency structure reduces 
the overall risk. 
Table 6 presents the correlation of the monthly excess returns between other market risks and 
the currency portfolio. For the market risks, I used the equity risk (MSCI World Excess Return 
Index), the commodity risk (GSCI Excess Return Index), and the interest rate risk (Citigroup 
Global Government Bond Index). Since the carry trade strategies generate positive returns, a 
low or negative correlation means that a currency optimization of a distinct asset lowers the 
overall risk, but increases the return.20 
The correlation analysis shows that the return of the currency portfolio is almost uncorrelated 
with other market risks, which means that the returns are almost independent. Although the 
positive correlation to equities is not a pleasant feature, the correlation is much lower (0.09) 
than is the correlation between commodities and equities (0.29), and between bonds and 
equities (0.15). This means that the currency portfolio can be added to these asset classes, and 
can improve the return-to-risk ratio of the combined portfolio. 
                                         
20 The return increases since the currency excess return can be added to the return of the other assets. 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
E
xp
ec
te
d 
V
ol
at
ili
ty
Date
36 
Table 6: Correlation between the Currency Portfolio and Other Market Risks 
 
Equity Bonds Commodity Carry 
Equity 1.00 0.15 0.29 0.09 
Bonds 
 
1.00 0.15 -0.07 
Commodity 
  
1.00 -0.05 
Carry 
   
1.00 
     
Excess Return 3.90% 3.01% 3.38% 10.14% 
Volatility 15.88% 7.13% 23.12% 9.32% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.25 0.42 0.15 1.09 
This table presents the correlation between various market risks and the optimized currency portfolio, 
with a target excess return of 6.5% during the period from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The 
portfolio is rebalanced monthly. All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
A glance at the individual asset classes reveals that the currency portfolio was the most 
successful during the backtest period, clearly having the highest return and Sharpe ratio. The 
equities had a historically low excess return of only 3.9% during this period, influenced by two 
worldwide recessions in 2001/2002 and in 2008/2009, which lead to a low Sharpe ratio of 0.25. 
Bonds had quite a good environment for positive excess returns, since interest rates were in a 
downward trend during the entire period, generating a Sharpe ratio of 0.42. Commodities had 
the lowest Sharpe ratio, because they were been extremely volatile, with 23.12% volatility per 
annum. The currency portfolio is not only the best asset from a single asset perspective, but is 
also the most favorable combination with other assets. 
Bliss and Panigirtzoglou [2004], as well as many others, showed that investors are generally risk 
averse. In the event that returns are skewed, the risk aversion increases (compare this with 
Harvey and Siddique [2000]). Thus, the negative skewness of the simple carry trade, 
accompanied by some returns that were significantly worse and the positive correlation with 
equity and commodity indices, which was most pronounced during the recent financial crisis, 
might be the main reason why some investors abandoned the carry trades. Nonetheless, the 
forward premium puzzle remains, since the optimized currency portfolio is not negatively 
skewed, has a better Sharpe ratio, and the correlation with other market risks is almost 
inexistent. During the past 16 years, an investment in an optimized currency portfolio was low 
risk and was profitable. 
I.4.10 Inter-temporal Weighting Scheme 
Investors have different requirements for inter-temporal returns. Some want to achieve a 
constant return, which is what the optimization (5) intends to achieve. Others want to have a 
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constant volatility, which could also be achieved by adding the constraint √wt′Σtwt = σ in 
(5). The math can be simplified by using the results of (5) to calculate the expected volatility. 
The weights can then be recalibrated proportionally, so that the expected volatility reaches the 
desired level. With this closed-end formula, no optimization is necessary. A third possibility for 
inter-temporal returns is to have a constant exposure, which means that the sum of the 
absolute values of the weights is constant. If the sum is 1 and the basis is 1 USD, then there is 
no leverage. Again, these weights can be calculated using formula (5), by dividing the resulting 
weights by the sum of the absolute values of all weights.21 
The constant return strategy ensures, as the name says, a constant expected return. The 
method using constant volatility has the advantage that the exposure will be reduced when the 
expected volatility increases. From an inter-temporal perspective, bets are higher when the risk 
is lower, and vice versa. The constant exposure strategy is often a given constraint on the part 
of the regulator, who does not allow leverage for many investors. Table 7 compares the results 
of the different weighting strategies. 
Table 7: Risk and Return Figures of Various Inter-temporal Weighting Strategies 
 
Constant 
Return 
(6.5%) 
Constant 
Volatility 
(16%) 
Constant 
Exposure 
(100%) 
FX Return 4.28% 7.69% 0.87% 
IR Return 10.29% 20.34% 5.38% 
Transaction Costs 0.66% 1.48% 0.14% 
Net Return 13.93% 26.58% 6.11% 
Risk-free Return 3.79% 3.79% 3.79% 
Excess Return 10.14% 22.79% 2.32% 
Volatility 9.32% 18.15% 1.76% 
Sharpe ratio 1.09 1.26 1.32 
Skewness Excess Return 1.11 -0.01 -0.06 
This table presents the risk and return figures for various weighting strategies of the optimized currency 
portfolio. The second column has a target excess return of 6.5%. The third column has a target volatility 
of 16%, and the last column scales the weights of a target excess return of 6.5% down, so that there is no 
leverage. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
A constant expected excess return of 6.5% does not guarantee that the realized excess return is 
equal (10.14%), nor does a constant expected volatility of 16% guarantee that the realized 
volatility is equal (18.15%). The first phenomenon can be explained by the uncertainty of FX 
                                         
21 Individual constraints for every currency can also be added to formula (5). In this case, the Sharpe 
ratio maximization formula is more suitable for guaranteeing the maximal Sharpe ratio. Risk 
minimization at a given return only maximizes the Sharpe ratio if there are no individual constraints. I 
suggest using the equations with MATLAB, employing the barrier method algorithm provided by Knitro 
6.0. 
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returns, while the latter can be explained by the volatility estimation error. The volatility over 
time is higher than is the expected volatility, because the uncertainty in the realized volatility 
(the volatility of the deviations in the volatility) increases the average realized volatility. For 
example, if the volatility was 12% in period 1 and 20% in period 2, the average of periods 1 
and 2 would be 16%, but the volatility measured over both periods is higher than 16%, due to 
the quadratic error measurement. 
The constant volatility and the exposure strategy both have higher Sharpe ratios than does the 
constant return. The relatively low Sharpe ratio of the constant return strategy is caused by 
the greater inter-temporal volatility of the returns. While the volatility tripled during the 
financial crisis, the expected return sank by only about 50%. The volatility was more “volatile” 
than was the return; as a result, stabilizing the volatility was more successful for the Sharpe 
ratio. The constant exposure strategy is somewhere between constant return and constant 
volatility. Apparently, this well-balanced method produced the best Sharpe ratio. 
The skewness of the constant volatility and exposure strategy is slightly negative. As we have 
seen, the positive skewness in the constant return strategy was produced by very high weights 
at the end of the crisis at the beginning of 2009. These returns were significantly higher than 
any previous returns, and thus pushed the skewness into the positive area, although it was 
negative before 2007. The negative skewness of the latter two strategies gives a better image of 
the reality for normal days, since the positive in the constant strategy was shaped by a single 
event. 
I.4.11 Interest Rates versus Forward Rates 
It does not matter whether I used interest rates or forward rates, if the covered interest rate 
parity holds. Historical evidence shows that the covered interest rate parity holds often, but 
not always. In this dataset, there have been two major violations of CIP. There has been a 
long-term violation in SGD, and a violation of all currencies during the months of the Lehman 
failure, when the markets were in dysfunction.  
Table 8 presents the results of forward rates again, this time using Bloomberg’s data compared 
to interest rates from Datastream, once in exactly the same time period and once in the full 
time period available, which is a further eight years. The latter cannot be compared directly 
with the others, but helps one to see that the carry trade is also profitable over a longer time 
horizon. Table 8 reveals that returns using forward rates differ from the returns using interest 
rates, even if the time period is exactly the same. There are two reasons for the different 
returns: in those cases where CIP does not hold, the different return as an input for the 
optimization produces different optimal weights. Furthermore, the different interest return 
obviously changes the return itself. These two factors can be separated as follows:  
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If the weights produced by the forward rate optimization are multiplied by the realized return 
using interest rates, the IR return is 10.17% instead of 10.29%. This substitution produces a 
small return difference, while the volatility remains largely unchanged, since the weights are 
still the same. This means that it does not really matter which interest rates are used to 
calculate the portfolio return. If the weights produced by the interest rate optimization are 
multiplied by the realized return using forward rates, the IR return is 9.99%, and the FX 
return is 2.56% instead of 4.28%. Once again, the IR return does not change much. The FX 
return difference is more affected, since the returns are volatile. However, the difference in FX 
return is random under the random walk hypothesis. Thus, it does not really matter whether 
forward rates or interest rates are used for the IR return, although the total return is different 
because of different weights that produce different FX returns.The main difference between the 
two is the different SGD interest rates. The average forward implied interest rate is 2.4%, 
whereas the interbank interest rate average is 1.9%. Consequently, the average SGD weight in 
the optimization with forward rates was -56%, while it was -88% in the optimization with 
interest rates. 
The backtest with interest rates starting in 1987 has an excess return of 6.69%, which is very 
close to the target return of 6.5%. Thus, over a longer time horizon, the FX return is very close 
to a random walk, with only +0.71%. The Sharpe ratio is lower, especially because the FX 
return is lower. 
Table 8: Return of Interest Rates and Forward Rates 
 
Forward 
Rates  
(1995-2010) 
Interest 
Rates  
(1995-2010) 
Interest 
Rates  
(1987-2010) 
FX Return 4.28% 2.61% 0.71% 
IR Return 10.29% 10.29% 11.11% 
Transaction Costs 0.66% 0.50% 0.50% 
Net Return 13.93% 12.42% 11.30% 
Risk-free Return 3.79% 3.79% 4.61% 
Excess Return 10.14% 8.63%F 6.69% 
Volatility 9.32% 8.50% 7.56% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.09 1.02 0.89 
FX Return <>0 * - - 
Skewness net Return 1.02 0.25 -0.11 
This table compares the risk and return figures for interest rate and forward rates for the optimized 
portfolio, with a target excess return of 6.5%. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010 
for columns two and three, and from December 31 1986 to October 31 2010 for the last column. The 
portfolio is rebalanced monthly. All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
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Figure 7 shows the historical SGD LIBOR and the forward implied interest rate of SGD, 
implied by the SGD/USD forward rate and the USD LIBOR. The forward implied interest rate 
was often higher than was the LIBOR and, in 1997, it was more than twice as high, which is a 
clear violation of CIP. The rates have been closer together since 2002 but, during the financial 
crisis, there again was a deviation. The violation of CIP is caused by capital constraints for 
foreign investors. Before 2002, a trade had to be related to an economic activity (Hohensee and 
Lee [2004]). 
Figure 7: Forward Implied Interest Rate versus LIBOR Rate SGD 
This figure compares the LIBOR interest rate for SGD with the SGD interest implied by the SGD-USD 
forward rate. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. 
Figure 8 presents the interest rates for a fully free-tradable currency; here, GBP is used as an 
example. The forward implied rate tracked the LIBOR very closely until the financial crisis, 
when the forward rate was below that of the LIBOR. During the crisis, arbitrage was more 
difficult, since the volatility increased and the risk limits for arbitrageurs were cut. 
Furthermore, there was an immense need for USD since many products had to refinance with 
USD. The highest difference was 5.4% in September 2008, the month of the Lehman failure. 
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Figure 8: Forward Implied Interest Rate versus LIBOR Rate GBP 
This figure compares the LIBOR interest rate for GBP with the GBP interest implied by the GBP-USD 
forward rate. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. 
I.4.12 The Special Case of the Danish Krona 
The currency DKK is excluded in the studies above and, together with HKD, is the only 
currency in the developed markets that was excluded. The reason for this measurement is that 
the DKK is pegged to the EUR in a small range, while all the other currencies are free-
floating22. The volatility of the EUR/DKK exchange rate was only 1.2%. Including DKK 
partially distorts the results of the other currencies. The effect is presented in Table 9. 
The inclusion of the DKK boosts the Sharpe ratio to 1.27. However, in this case it is actually a 
peso problem. The pegging of the DKK to the EUR did work during these 16 years, but it is 
not guaranteed that it will work forever. Figure 9 shows that the weight of the EUR and the 
DKK was often contrary, as one was positive while the other was negative, depending on which 
had the higher interest rate. There was a fear during the financial crisis that Denmark could 
collapse, which pushed interest rates for the DKK more than 1% above the EUR rates. This 
interest rate difference is exploited by the optimization, since it is nearly risk-free, based on the 
historical volatility. However, the probability of a future collapse is not considered in the 
optimization. Since the DKK is pegged to the EUR, the risk will not appear in the exchange 
rate and thus neither in the optimization, which can be regarded as a lack of a backward-
looking volatility model. 
 
                                         
22 Except for the second excluded currency, the HKD, which is pegged to the USD. 
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Table 9: Inclusive of the DKK Currency 
 
Excluding 
DKK 
Including 
DKK 
FX Return 4.28% 3.06% 
IR Return 10.29% 10.29% 
Transaction Costs 0.66% 0.76% 
Net Return 13.93% 12.61% 
Risk-free Return 3.79% 3.79% 
Excess Return 10.14% 8.82% 
Volatility 9.32% 6.95% 
Sharpe Ratio 1.09 1.27 
Skewness Net Return 1.02 -0.19 
This table compares the risk and return figures for the optimized portfolio, with a target excess return of 
6.5%, with and without the currency DKK. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. 
The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
Figure 9: Historical Weight of the DKK and the EUR 
This figure plots the weights of the DKK and the DMS for the optimized currency portfolio, with a 
target excess return of 6.5%, for the currency universe including DKK. The period is from December 31 
1994 to October 31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. 
I.4.13 Extension of the Currency Universe 
The currency universe in the previous empirical analysis was chosen according to the data 
available. Nonetheless, there are more data available for a shorter time horizons or for different 
investment horizons that prove the robustness of the results. 
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From December 29 2000, the currency universe could be extended to 15 currencies, with the 
additional currencies HUF, PLN, ZAR, and MXN. These countries are commonly known as 
emerging market currencies. Thus, all currencies that are tradable without restrictions23 are 
included in the dataset, except for TRY, CZK, ISK, and ILS, where data are not available for 
the entire period. Non-deliverable forwards24 are also excluded from the dataset, since CIP is 
not guaranteed for those contracts.  
I divided the currency universe into three baskets: 
7 currencies: USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP , AUD, CAD 
11 currencies: USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP , AUD, CAD, NOK, SEK, SGD, NZD 
15 currencies: USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP , AUD, CAD, NOK, SEK, SGD, NZD, HUF, 
PLN, ZAR, MXN 
Table 10 presents the results for optimized currency portfolios with different amounts of 
currencies. 
Table 10: Backtest Results for Different Currency Baskets 
  7 Currencies 11 Currencies 15 Currencies 
FX Return 0.06% 2.16% -0.12% 
IR Return 8.94% 8.94% 8.94% 
Transaction Costs 0.47% 0.73% 0.66% 
Risk-free Rate 2.44% 2.44% 2.44% 
Gross Return 8.56% 10.41% 8.18% 
Excess Return 6.12% 7.97% 5.74% 
Volatility 14.45% 11.13% 5.92% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.42 0.72 0.97 
This table compares the risk and return figures for the optimized portfolio, with a target excess return of 
6.5% for the various currency universes. The 7-currency universe includes USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP, 
AUD, and CAD. The 11-currency universe includes USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, CAD, NOK, 
SEK, SGD, and NZD. The 15-currency universe includes USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, CAD, 
NOK, SEK, SGD, NZD, HUF, PLN, ZAR, and MXN. The period is from December 31 2001 to October 
31 2010. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
The bigger the currency basket, the higher the Sharpe ratio. This is consistent with the theory, 
since the result from an unconstrained basket should not decrease if the universe is increased, 
                                         
23 According to the ZKB trading unit, status 01.01.2009 
24A non-deliverable forward is a forward contract for a currency that is not deliverable. At maturity, 
there is only a profit or loss settlement, which will be in a currency that is deliverable. 
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given that the volatility can be estimated sufficiently precisely. The higher Sharpe ratio is 
driven by the lower volatility, which profits from the improved degree of diversification. 
Interestingly, the 15-currency basket is the only one that has a negative FX. This might be an 
indication that the additional four currencies depreciated in the direction of the UIP. This 
result for these so-called emerging market currencies is consistent with Burnside, Eichenbaum, 
and Rebelo [2007]. The average interest rate for the four currencies over the entire sample was 
7.5%, while it was 2.9% for the other 11 currencies. Thus, the extreme interest rate difference 
caused the depreciation of the high interest rate currencies to a small extent. Nevertheless, the 
UIP can be rejected, as the net profit is significantly positive. 
Baz, Breedon, Naik, and Peress [2001] conducted a similar analysis, using the currencies USD, 
CHF, EUR, JPY, and GBP. They set µ0 − rtd = 2%, and used optimization (5). The 
methodology for the variance-covariance matrix is not precisely defined, except that they took 
an estimation window of two years. The interest rate source is LIBOR, and the rebalancing day 
is the first day of the month. The backtest period is from November 1989 to June 1999. 
I recalculated their results using (6) for the variance-covariance matrix with a moving average 
of 500 days. Figure 10 presents the cumulated return of my calculations. 
Figure 10: Cumulated Return of Baz et al. 
This figure plots the cumulated excess return for the optimized currency carry trade, with a target excess 
return of 2% during the period from October 31 1989 to June 30 1999. The currency universe consists of 
USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, and GBP. The optimized portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The excess return is 
before transaction costs.  
Figure 10 looks very similar to the results in Baz et al., yet the result is different. Baz et al. 
have an excess return of 2.38% and a volatility of 3.96%, while my calculations resulted in a 
return of 1.35% and a volatility of 4.13%. Furthermore, Baz et al. report a Sharpe ratio of 0.60, 
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while I obtained only 0.33. The problem is that the methodology in Baz et al. is too imprecisely 
described to make an exact replication. Also, the source of the exchange rates is not declared. 
I.4.14 Investment Horizon 
The investment horizon and rebalancing frequency up to this point has been one month. Table 
11 presents the results for different investment horizons. All results are annualized with 
aggregated data of three months, in order to obtain a comparison with the longest time 
horizon. This is especially important for the volatility, where I annualized the quarterly results 
by multiplying them by the square root of 4. The figures for the one-month horizon are slightly 
different from the results in Table 3, because here the backtest ends on September 30, instead 
of October 30, so as to match the data of the three-month horizon, and the volatility is 
computed with quarterly results.  
Table 11: Backtest Results for Different Investment Horizons 
  1 Week 1 Month 3 Months 
FX Return 3.80% 4.37% 4.98% 
IR Return 10.25% 10.31% 10.46% 
Transaction costs 1.89% 0.66% 0.42% 
Risk-free Rate 3.75% 3.81% 3.96% 
Gross Return 14.10% 13.82% 13.79% 
Excess Return 8.45% 9.99% 9.77% 
Volatility 8.17% 8.67% 9.09% 
Sharpe ratio 1.03 1.15 1.08 
This table compares the risk and return figures for the optimized portfolio, with a target excess return of 
6.5% for different rebalancing frequencies. The currency universe includes USD, CHF, EUR, JPY, GBP, 
AUD, CAD, NOK, SEK, SGD, and NZD. The period is from December 31 1994 to September 30 2010. 
All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
The analysis shows that it does not matter how long the investment horizon is. All horizons 
achieve Sharpe ratios above 1. The risk-free rate increases with the investment horizon, since 
the yield curve increased. The advantage of the shorter horizon seems to be a better and faster 
adaption to new circumstances, which results in lower volatility. However, transaction costs are 
higher for shorter horizons, due to the higher turnover. Thus, the optimization results generally 
improve with a shorter time horizon, but the higher transaction costs offsets the gains. If we 
only compare the expected excess return net of the transaction costs with the realized volatility 
and do not consider the random FX return, then the one-month horizon is the optimal one. In 
one week, transaction costs increase by 1.23% for a reduction of 0.5% volatility, which is not a 
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good trade-off in terms of the Sharpe ratio. In three months, the transaction costs reduce by 
0.24%, for a volatility increase of 0.42%, which not a good result either. 
I.4.15 Constraining the Sharpe Ratio 
Since investors like a high Sharpe ratio, the strategy can be extended, with a restriction of 
investing only in the carry trade when the expected Sharpe ratio has at least a certain level. 
This has the additionally attractive side effect that the carry trade will not be implemented 
when all the interest differentials are zero, or even when they are close to zero. 
Table 12: Backtest Results for Various Expected Sharpe Ratios 
  
<0.8 >=0.8 >=1 >=1.2 >=1.4 
Excess Return 1.93% 2.42% 2.80% 2.42% 3.90% 
Volatility 2.29% 1.61% 1.63% 1.64% 1.22% 
Sharpe ratio 0.84  1.50 1.71 1.47 3.21 
Skewness 0.02  -0.06 -0.11 0.11 -0.04 
Number  38 152 109 55 15 
This table compares the risk and return figures for the optimized portfolio, with a target excess return of 
6.5% for an unlevered portfolio when restricting it to a certain level of an expected Sharpe ratio. >= 0:6 
means that the expected Sharpe ratio must be at least 0.6 for the following period to be considered. The 
realized return figures are then computed for the months in which the restriction was fulfilled. The 
portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The period is from December 31 1994 to October 31 2010. All data are 
annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
Table 12 shows the results of the optimized strategy for different constraints of the expected 
Sharpe ratio. Here, I used the methodology of constant exposure in order to compare the 
market volatility. 
The restriction of the expected Sharpe ratio is quite effective. If the dynamic strategy is 
implemented only when the expected Sharpe ratio is at least 0.8, the realized Sharpe ratio is 
boosted to 1.50, in contrast to the situation in which there is no restriction, where the Sharpe 
ratio is 1.32 (Table 7). However, this requires that there was no investment in the carry trade 
since November 2008, when the expected Sharpe ratio dropped below 1. The expected Sharpe 
ratio had its lowest value on August 31 2009, with 0.20, while the last value in the sample 
reports an expected Sharpe ratio of 0.57. If we were to only invest if the expected Sharpe ratio 
were lower than 0.8, the realized Sharpe ratio would have been 0.84. Thus, the expected Sharpe 
ratio predicts the realized Sharpe ratio. 
There are two reasons for the lower than expected Sharpe ratio. Firstly, the volatility spiked 
after the Lehman collapse on September 15 2008, from 1.4% in August 2008 to 3.8% in August 
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2009. These figures were measured for an unlevered portfolio, in order to distinguish between 
expected returns and expected volatility. Thus, the financial crisis is a very good example of 
the carry trade crash risk. However, volatility cannot be the explanation for the lower-than-
expected Sharpe ratio in recent years, as the expected volatility dropped back to normal levels 
in May 2010 (see Figure 6). The main reason for the sustainably lower level of the expected 
Sharpe ratio is the convergence of global interest rates that are close to zero, a response from 
central banks to poor economic growth since the financial crisis. Thus, the expected return on 
the unlevered portfolio is only half of what it was before the crisis, and the same holds for the 
realized return. However, the lower return of the carry trade has not been caused by the crash 
itself during the Lehman collapse, as returns on the diversified carry trade were positive in 
September and in October 2008. Therefore, the crash risk was diversified away. 
Although the carry trade has been historically a very successful strategy and will probably be 
so in the future, at present the carry trade is not as attractive as it was previously. In order for 
the carry trade to get back to the same success level that it experienced historically, the 
expected Sharpe ratio needs to increase to more elevated levels, which first requires that 
interest differentials increase to higher levels. 
Figure 11: Expected Sharpe Ratio 1995-2010 
This figure presents the expected Sharpe ratio for the optimized portfolio, with a target excess return of 
6.5% for an unlevered portfolio. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The period is from December 31 
1994 to October 31 2010. All data are annualized, based on monthly measurements. 
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I.5 Conclusion 
The carry trade has traditionally had a reputation for risk. In some ways, this reputation is 
well earned. Undiversified portfolios face the risk of large losses, as realized in the wake of the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. For example, an investor who was long in the Australian dollar 
and short in the yen would have lost 22% in October of 2008. Even a trader who held a 
diversified 1/n portfolio would have lost -7.79% from July to December 2008. In sharp contrast, 
the diversified portfolio constructed using a mean-variance analysis had a positive performance 
(+0.62%) during that period. A portfolio constructed using a mean-variance analysis can 
identify opportunities that a more heuristic method will not detect. For example, a mean-
variance analysis recognizes that, while the yen has a lower interest rate, the Singapore dollar 
is a more desirable investment because of its superior risk/return trade-off. Once sufficiently 
diversified, the carry trade is revealed to have been a surprisingly low-risk strategy over the 
last 20 years, and the crash risk has been diversified away via a mean-variance optimization. 
Furthermore, returns have a low correlation to other assets classes and have better Sharpe 
ratios than do equities, bonds, and commodities. The results are robust for the investment 
horizon, the currency universe, and the optimization methodology.  
During the last couple of years, the carry trade had been less successful, as most interest 
differentials converged close to zero. Therefore, the expected Sharpe ratio from the carry trade 
strategy is well below 1, which means that investment in the carry trade is not currently as 
attractive as it was before, unless interest differentials increase to a more elevated level. 
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Abstract 
The failure of uncovered interest rate parity to explain short-term exchange rate 
movements is well documented. The return of a long-term bond should be equal to 
the risk-free rate under the expectation theory of interest rates. Given this theory, 
the uncovered interest rate parity should be equal for short- and long-term interest 
rates. However, I will show that the uncovered interest rate parity fails for short-
term interest rates but holds for long-term interest rates, even over short horizons. 
Furthermore, controlling for a time-varying risk of the exchange rate improves the 
relationship with the long-term interest rates. These ambiguous results are caused 
by the failure of the expectation theory for the term structure of interest rates, as 
long-term interest rates are a bad predictor for future short-term interest rates. 
The significance increased over the last decade, as the liquidity of the exchange 
rate and the interest rate market increased. The results are robust for interest-rate 
maturities of between 12 months and 30 years. 
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II.1 Introduction 
Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is a controversial theory that connects exchange rates and 
interest rates. According to UIP, the exchange rate between countries with high interest rates 
and countries with low interest rates should depreciate to exactly the same degree as the 
interest differential between the two countries. 
Despite its inherent plausibility, empirical evidence provides little support for the UIP theory. 
Several studies have found that exchange rates behave contrary to the expectations of UIP, in 
that currencies with high interest rates appreciate against currencies with low interest rates. 
A large quantity of literature is devoted to investigating the puzzle of UIP failure. Bacchetta 
[2001] summarizes the recent explanations for UIP failure, namely risk premium, limited 
participation, and deviations from rational expectations. Risk premium means a small deviation 
from UIP can be accepted, as investors demand a risk premium to push exchange rates towards 
UIP. The limited participation rationale says that the exchange rate is not always a fair 
economic value, as only a fraction of foreign currency holdings is actively managed. In the 
deviations from the rational expectations theory, investors either believe that interest 
differentials are more temporary than they really are, or investors are ambiguity-averse. 
In this study, I will reconsider the question of UIP. In previous studies, UIP was typically 
tested via interest rates that were being kept until maturity. I used the returns on 10-year 
interest rate swaps over 1-month horizons to test UIP for all G7 currency pairs. The main 
difference is that the return of the swap consists not only of interest rate earnings, but also of 
changes in interest rates. Using the return of the 10-year interest rate has the advantage that 
future interest rate expectations, and therefore deviations from rational expectations, are also 
included in the regression. The difference between the expected and the unexpected return of 
the 10-year interest rate can be measured. Furthermore, I used the monthly change of the 
currency volatility to account for the fact that investors are risk-averse, and risk varies over 
time. The relationship becomes stronger over the sample period as the liquidity of the exchange 
rate market increases.   
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II.2 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
II.2.1 Main Idea 
The uncovered interest rate parity model (UIP)1, first proposed by Fisher [1896], states that a 
currency with a high interest rate should depreciate compared to a low interest rate currency, 
ceteris paribus, in order to exactly offset the gains received by the higher yield: 
Where st+1 − st is the change of the log spot exchange rate, st is quoted as the amount of 
domestic currency necessary to buy one unit of the foreign currency, and it − it∗ is the interest 
differential between the domestic and the foreign interest rates. This means that if the interest 
differential between the domestic and the foreign currency is negative (the foreign interest rate 
is higher than is the domestic interest rate), st+1 − st is also negative and the foreign currency 
will depreciate by it − it∗. 
To illustrate the relationship, let us assume that there is a hypothetical currency pair with an 
exchange rate of 1, and interest rates are equal in both currencies; consequently, the interest 
rate differential is 0. At time t, the central bank of the foreign country announces an increase 
in the interest rate of 2% for one period. After that period, the interest rate will again decrease 
to the same level as it is in the domestic country. Figure 1 presents the theoretical development 
of the exchange rate, and the total return. 
At the time that the interest rate of the foreign country is increased, the exchange rate (in this 
example, quoted as the amount of domestic currency necessary to buy one unit of the foreign 
currency) will appreciate by 2%, from 1 to 1.02, since the foreign currency has a 2% higher 
value due to the interest rate advantage. The total return from this investment is 2% at time t. 
However, according to UIP, the exchange rate will again depreciate, from 1.02 to 1 between t 
and t+1. The exchange rate loss between t and t+1 is offset by the gain of the higher interest 
rate; thus, the total return will remain unchanged at 2%. 
 
                                         
1 UIP is also known as the international Fisher effect. 
 st+1 − st = it − it∗. (1) 
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate and Total Return Development 
 
This illustration shows the effect of an unexpected interest rate increase on the future exchange rate and 
the interest rate return, with the assumption of risk-neutral investors. 
The standard regression to test UIP measures whether the interest gain between t and t+1 is 
offset by the exchange rate loss (or vice versa), using the following regression: 
where et+1 is the disturbance term that is independent from the interest rate difference and the 
exchange rate. The UIP hypothesis is a test of α = 0 and βLevel = 1. 
Another way to test UIP is the following regression: 
where ft is the logarithm of the forward rate, which is the ‘today’s value’ of the future spot rate st+1. Using the covered interest rate parity, ft is defined as follows (log rates): 
The problem with both regressions (2) and (3) is the case in which the interest differential is 0. 
This problem can be avoided by substituting the regressions as follows: 
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 st+1 − st = α + βLevel(it − it∗) + et+1 (2) 
 st+1 − st = α + βLevel(ft − st) + et+1 (3) 
 ft = st + it − it∗. (4) 
 st+1 − st − it∗ = α + βLevel(it) + et+1. (5) 
 st+1 = α + βLevel(ft) + et+1. (6) 
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II.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Previous research provides little evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Please refer to Hodrick 
[1987], Froot, and Thaler [1990], and Engel [1996] for surveys of the existing literature. 
Estimates for βLevel are highly unstable, and depend on the analyzed period, the investment 
horizon, and the currency pairs. Nevertheless, βLevel = 1  can often be rejected, while β = 0 
cannot be rejected in many analyses, and the estimate for beta is often negative. For example, 
the average beta in 75 papers surveyed by Froot and Thaler [1990] is -0.88.  
The bulk of the literature analyzed the period from the seventies, using short-term interest 
rates from one month up to one year, with the main focus on dollar exchange rates. While one 
might argue such a time horizon was too short for papers published in the eighties, this 
argument no longer holds, as there exists now nearly 40 years of data since the abandonment of 
the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1973. However, even recent papers rarely 
never report positive values for beta. 
One of these exceptions is the analysis by Lothian and Wu [2011]. They ran the UIP regression 
for the dollar-sterling and the franc-sterling exchange rates since 1831, using short-term 
(maturity below one year) and long-term (maturity above 10 years) interest rates. The beta for 
the dollar-sterling rate is 0.38 for the long-term rate and 0.14 for the short-term rate, while it is 
0.73 and 0.97, respectively, for the franc-sterling rate. In the case of the long-term rate for the 
franc-sterling, UIP cannot be rejected, while βLevel = 0 can be rejected. For the short-term rate 
for the franc-sterling, neither βLevel = 0 nor βLevel = 1 can be rejected. In the sub-periods, they 
only found negative betas in the seventies and eighties, which could explain some of the 
negative betas in the literature from this area. However, various problems reduce the reliability 
of the result: interest rates are not equal across the countries, as some include credit risk while 
others are assumed to be risk-free, and the maturity of the interest rate also differs. 
Furthermore, there are only two currency pairs, and the data quality of 200-year old data is 
also questionable, since trading in the pre-computer era was completely different. 
Campbell, Koedijk, Lothian, and Mathieu [2007] analyzed 20 currencies against USD from 1976 
to 2005, using short-term interest rates. They found slightly positive betas for 6 of 20 
currencies but, for 15 of 20 currencies, the hypothesis βLevel = 1 could be rejected at a 5% 
significance level. In a second step, they averaged the data over 5, 15, and 30 years. The 
resulting betas from the cross-panel regressions are positive, at 0.04, 0.69, and 0.58. 
Chinn [2006] analyzed the G7 currencies against the USD from 1980-2000, using interest rates 
of between 3 months and 10 years. While the beta is negative for the panel estimates with 
interest rates of up to 12 months, it is positive for the 3, 5 and 10-year interest rates, with 
values of 0.03, 0.67, and 0.68. Chinn concludes than UIP seems to hold better at long horizons 
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than at short ones. He argues that measured interest rates and exchange rates are imperfect 
measurements of the equilibrium values, but that the errors-in-variable problem is relatively 
smaller for long-term variables. Nonetheless, he admits that, for long-term rates, the analyzed 
horizon is rather short, as he holds long-term interest rates always to maturity. 
Another positive finding is with long-term interest rates over medium horizons. Alexius and 
Sellin [2012]) found positive betas by using expected 10-year bond returns over periods from 
one to 30 weeks. They obtained significant positive betas from the 8- to 30-week horizon for the 
USD/DEM exchange rate in the sample period from October 1993 to November 1998. 
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw [2013] ran the UIP regression with one-year forward 
interest rates, ranging from one to four years forward. Using these forward rates, they obtained 
positive betas for the exchange rates USD/CHF, USD/DEM, and USD/GBP for the period 
from 1980-2010. Nonetheless, they noted that the coefficients are noisy, and vary between -0.16 
and 3.41 However, this still supports the existing evidence that UIP does not work for short 
term interest rates, while it seems to be a better fit for long-term interest rates. 
II.2.3 Explanations for UIP failure 
In recent years, research has shifted from testing the UIP regression to explaining why UIP 
fails. There are numerous explanations for such failure, including the risk aversion of investors, 
peso problems, and distorted beliefs. 
Risk aversion 
Risk aversion can explain the deviations of beta below 1, but not of those below 0. Two effects 
of risk aversion could influence the UIP relationship. Firstly, an increase in risk reduces the 
profitability of the attempt to exploit UIP failure (the carry trade), as the expected return 
remains the same but, as the risk increases, the return-to-risk ratio decreases. If the return-to-
risk ratio is too low, it is not worth exploiting UIP failure when other investments offer a 
better reward. Secondly, the carry trade is often implemented through leveraged investment, 
since returns from unleveraged investments are somewhat small. If the risk increases, the 
levered investors (such as hedge funds) might be forced to reduce their positions, as their 
brokers require higher margins to cover potential losses. When losses occur, existing positions 
must be sold to cover the losses, leading to a downward spiral. In this downward spiral, UIP 
seems to work quite well, as high yielding currencies depreciate, as seen in 2008. However, 
when the risk decreases again, exchange rates move against UIP, as high yielding currencies 
also begin to appreciate. Melvin and Taylor [2009] provide a good overview regarding the 
relationships between currencies, interest rates, and risk. 
Given the factor of risk aversion, Figure 1 would change slightly, as presented in Figure 2: 
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Figure 2: Exchange Rate and Total Return Development with Risk Aversion 
 
This illustration shows the effect of an unexpected interest rate increase on the future exchange rate and 
interest rate return, with the assumption of risk-averse investors. 
In the example of Figure 2, the exchange rate does not initially appreciate by 2%, since return-
to-risk ratio is too small after a certain level of the exchange rate. From t to t+1, the total 
return from the investment in the high-yielding currency generates a profit, since the exchange 
rate loss is smaller than is the interest rate gain. Nonetheless, this does not explain why most 
studies observe gains in the exchange rate. 
Some people have tested whether risk aversion could explain the failure. If the UIP fails and 
the beta is below 1, or even below 0, profits can be generated by buying high-yielding 
currencies and selling low-yielding ones. This strategy is famously known as the carry trade. If 
the carry trade portfolios generate significantly risk-adjusted profits, then UIP failure cannot be 
explained via risk alone. Another large body of literature has analyzed this phenomenon and 
has found evidence against UIP. 
Baz, Breedon, Naik, and Peress [2001] report a Sharpe ratio of 0.6, while Ackermann, Pohl, and 
Schmedders [2012] report a Sharpe ratio2 of 1.01 before and of 0.93 after transaction cost for a 
carry-trade portfolio consisting of 11 currencies in the period from 1990-2012. This is compared 
to a Sharpe ratio of 0.36 for the S&P 500 over the same sample period. If UIP fails, the return 
from the carry trade should be significantly different from 0, which is the case in most studies. 
Skewness is positive, while equity markets have negative skewness (S&P 500 was -0.56 over the 
same period). The high Sharpe ratios suggest that the optimized carry trade is one of the most 
                                         
2 The Sharpe ratio is the ratio of excess return to risk. 
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profitable investment strategies known. It is no accident that Jylhä and Suominen [2011] found 
that 16% of the overall hedge fund returns are related to the carry trade. The profitability of 
the carry trade strategy confirms the failure of the puzzle of UIP measured with short-term 
interest rates. 
Clarida, Davis, and Pedersen [2009] went one step further and ran the regression for equation 
(2) for the 3 long-3 short carry trade portfolio in different volatility regimes. The result is a 
beta of -3.29 at the low volatility regime, 2.73 at the high volatility regime, and -1.21 on 
average. They concluded that the beta depends strongly on the volatility regime, which 
explains part of the failure of UIP in previous studies. However, the average beta is too low to 
fully explain UIP failure by volatility regimes. 
Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen [2008] analyzed the crash risk of carry trades. They found 
that high interest rate currencies have negatively skewed returns, while low interest rates 
currencies have positively skewed ones. Furthermore, they regressed the change of the VIX 
Index (S&P 500 implied volatility index) to the return of the carry portfolio and found a 
negative relationship. For both market risk indicators, an increase of risk leads to negative 
carry returns. For the 3-3 portfolio, the relationship is strongly significant, while this is not the 
case for the optimized portfolio of Ackermann, Pohl, and Schmedders [2012]. 
All these studies show that risk has an influence on the UIP regression. Carry returns are 
sensitive to changes in risk. Investors are risk-averse, but the Sharpe ratios are still too high 
and the skewness is not sufficiently low to serve as a comprehensive explanation of UIP failure. 
Thus, it is well worth extending regression (2) by a risk factor. 
Peso problems 
A peso problem means an event that occurs with a low probability but with a relatively strong 
influence. A good, recent example is the exchange rate limit between CHF and EUR that was 
set at 1.20. The Swiss national bank forcefully stated that it would not allow the EUR/CHF 
exchange rate to drop below 1.20. Since the announcement on September 6 2011, this boundary 
has held. Nonetheless, the potential remains and, if investors want to protect themselves 
against a drop below 1.20, they have to pay a premium of 3.21% p.a. for a put option (a 
European put option with a strike price of 1.20 and a maturity of one year’s due date March 26 
2012, source ZKB Trading). As long as this does not happen, it is possible to profit from UIP 
violation with a carry trade, as forward rates have been traded below 1.20, or to simply sell put 
options with a strike price of 1.20. This strategy would generate steady, small profits, as long 
as the Swiss national bank defends 1.20. Furthermore, profits would appear to be very low risk 
ex-post, as the EUR/CHF exchange rate was very stable in 2012 and was close to 1.20. 
However, in case of the peso event that the Swiss national bank breaks its promise to defend 
1.20, the loss would probably be immense. 
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Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelsk, and Rebelo [2011] addressed this problem in a more 
general way. They considered a two-state regime-switching model. In one state, the peso event 
does not occur and the carry trade is successful. In the other state, the peso event occurs and 
the carry trade return is negative. They analyzed this empirically by combining the carry trade 
with option protection, using data from 1987-2009 for 20 different countries. Although the 
return decreases from 3.0% to 1.6% for the peso-protected portfolio, the Sharpe ratio decreases 
only slightly, from 0.48 to 0.45, as the volatility also decreases. This means that the cost of 
protection against worse peso events is less than is the profit that is generated by the carry 
trade. 
Jurek [2008] also analyzed the carry trade with option protection for the period of 1999-2007 
for G10 currencies. He concluded that 30-40% of the carry trade profit could be explained by 
crash risk. Crash-neutral carry portfolios generate significant profits, with Sharpe ratios of 
between 0.63 and 1.28 for different hedging and portfolio construction strategies, while 
skewness is positive for most strategies. He stated that the implied volatility should be 
approximately four times higher than it is for unobserved peso events in order to explain UIP 
failure and to reduce the profitability of the carry trade sufficiently. 
Empirical analysis has not provided sufficient evidence to conclude that UIP failure could be 
explained by peso events alone. As we have seen, option prices are cheap enough that hedged 
carry trade strategies still generate profits. Furthermore, we have over 35 years of data 
including some major crises, such as the LTCM crisis in 1998, the IT Bubble in 2000, the 
financial crisis in 2008 and the European debt crisis starting in 2010. All these events can be 
regarded as peso events for a certain currency. While carry returns for affected currencies have 
been negative during these crises (for example, the JPY appreciated 28% against the AUD in 
October 2008, which is extremely large compared to the return by the interest differential of 
roughly 0.5% in that month), returns have subsequently been positive. In addition, given the 
cross-section of many currencies that have been subject to empirical analysis, it is implausible 
that all of them would suffer from unobserved peso risks simultaneously. 
Distorted Beliefs 
Gourinchas and Tornell [2004] offered another explanation for UIP failure. If investors 
systematically misjudge the duration of the interest difference, the failure of UIP could be 
explained. By comparing the estimated interest differentials of the investors with those 
realized, empirical analysis reveals that investors underestimate the persistence of interest 
differentials, and therefore overestimate transitory interest rate shocks. Since investors realize 
that interest differentials persist for a period of time, they readjust their future beliefs 
regarding the persistence, which can lead to an appreciation of the higher-yielding exchange 
rate. 
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Let us use the example of Figure 1. Firstly, there is an interest shock of 2% in the foreign 
interest rate at t. Investors initially believe that the difference will persist for one period. The 
exchange rate of the foreign currency appreciates by 2% at t, and is expected to depreciate to 
the original value at t+1. However, at t+1, the foreign interest rate still remains 2% higher 
than the domestic one. Investors again anticipate that this will only hold for the next period. 
The effect of the interest rate remaining 2% higher for another period compensates for the 
depreciation from the initial increase, so that the exchange rate remains unchanged at t+1. 
The interest difference generates a return of 2% at t+1. Finally, at t+2, investors realize that 
the interest rate difference will persist for another 4 periods, which would increase the exchange 
rate by 8%, although this is reduced by 2% by the depreciation caused by the difference in the 
previous period. Thus, at t+2, the exchange rate increases by 6% and the interest rate gains 
are again 2%. At t+3, the exchange rate losses are offset by the interest rate gains, as future 
interest rate expectations do not change. At t+4, the foreign interest rate decreases to the 
same level as the domestic one. Investors might think that this is only a temporarily effect and 
that the interest rate will increase again for the last two periods. As a result, the exchange rate 
falls by only 2% at t+4, but the interest difference is 0. In the last two periods, the interest 
rate difference remains at 0% and the exchange rate drops by 2% in each period. However, 
these two periods do not account for UIP regressions, since the interest rate difference is 0. A 
regression of UIP in this example would result in a beta smaller than 0, since the exchange rate 
appreciated during the period in which the interest rate difference was positive. Furthermore, 
an investor who buys the foreign currency at t will make profit. 
Figure 3 presents the development of the example described above. 
Empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that investors underestimate the persistence of 
interest differentials, as Gourinchas and Tornell [2004] showed by comparing interest rate 
forecasts to realized interest rates.  
Davis, Miller, and Prodan [2009] estimated the decay rate of quarterly interest differentials to 
be between 0.16 and 0.29. They showed that, if the decay rate is correctly anticipated, the beta 
is 1 and UIP holds. If the decay rate is overestimated, the beta can be negative and UIP is 
violated. 
Craighead, Davis, and Miller [2010] proposed another explanation, in that UIP failure is a 
mixture of transaction costs and volatility. In the zone of inactivity around the zero interest 
differential, either the transaction costs outweigh the carry return, or the return is too small 
compared to the risk. If UIP is regressed over all interest differentials, the inactivity zone 
invalidates the results. UIP should hold only if the interest differentials are large enough. They 
also estimate the decay rate of interest differentials which, in their case, is between 3% and 5% 
for monthly and 11% and 20% for quarterly interest rates. However, the decay rate is very 
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unstable over time, which can explain investors’ failure to anticipate the decay rate correctly, 
and is consistent with unstable betas. Large interest differentials are more likely to decay than 
are small ones.  
While Gourinchas and Tornell [2004] do not explain why investors do not adjust their beliefs, 
Ilut [2008] does. The explanation is as follows: the investor is not certain regarding the 
probability that an increase in an interest differential will be temporary or persistent. Under 
ambiguity aversion, the investor will underinvest in the high interest rate currency (compared 
to the optimal investment knowing the true probability), as s/he is more pessimistic about the 
probability that the interest differential is persistent. On average, the investor will be surprised 
by the longer persistence of the interest rate, and will continue to invest more in the high 
interest rate currency, which can even lead to a slow appreciation of the high interest rate 
currency. The theory of distorted beliefs can explain UIP failure and negative betas, if investors 
cannot correctly estimate the future interest differentials. However, empirical validation of this 
theory is still scarce. 
Figure 3: Exchange Rate and Total Return Development with Distorted Beliefs 
 
This illustration shows the effect of an unexpected interest rate increase on the future exchange rate and 
the interest rate return, with the assumption of risk neutral investors. However, in this illustration, the 
duration of the interest rate difference is first underestimated and is then overestimated. 
 
II.2.4 Excursion: Interest Rate Theory 
Similar to the uncovered interest rate parity, interest rate theory was also first discussed by 
Fisher [1896], Shiller [1990] summarized the different theories. A basic theory for the term 
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structure of interest rates is the expectation theory. The simple version of this theory suggests 
that the long-term interest rates represent the expected future short-term interest rates, 
assuming risk neutrality. If the long-term interest rates were below the short-term interest 
rates, investors would expect that the short-term interest rate would fall. Given this theory, 
the expected profit from an investment in the 10-year bond is the same as a subsequent 
investment in two 5-year bonds. 
The market segmentation theory assumes that the market is segmented into different 
maturities. These maturities are not substitutes for each other. An example of this theory is 
that companies prefer to get long-term loans, while retail investors prefer to invest their wealth 
in short-term bonds or in deposit accounts. This preference increases the long-term interest 
rates, and decreases the short-term rates. 
A more moderate version of the pure expectation and market segmentation theory is the 
liquidity premium theory. A popular model was developed by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross [1985]. 
They state that long-term rates should be equal to the expected short-term rates plus a 
liquidity premium, as investors prefer short-term bonds. In contrast to the segmentation 
theory, different maturities are substitutes for each other, although they are not perfect ones. 
The theory can also account for the risk aversion of investors, as the liquidity premium is also 
known as the risk premium. 
Bansal and Zhou [2002] developed a term structure model with regime shifts between high- and 
low-volatility regimes. In their two-factor regime-switching model, the risk premium depends on 
the regime. When confronted with empirical data from the US, they showed that the high-
volatility regime coincides with low-risk premiums and economic contraction. 
Chinn and Guy [2004] connected the interest rate theory with exchange rate movements. In 
their model, four different kinds of shocks can occur: exchange market shocks, inflation shocks, 
output shocks, and term structure shocks. In applying the Taylor Rule, an initial exchange rate 
depreciation leads to an increase in inflation, output, and interest rates. In the subsequent 
periods, the exchange rates appreciate back to the initial level, while inflation, output and 
interest rates fall, which contradicts UIP. The relationship of inflation shocks and output 
shocks is the reverse, as an initial increase in inflation or output leads to higher interest rates 
and to an appreciation in the exchange rate. During the subsequent reversion, the inflation, the 
interest rates, the output, and the exchange rates decrease, which is in line with UIP. 
Bekaert, Wei, and Xing [2007] analyzed the failure of the interest rate parity and the term 
structure simultaneously, using a vector autoregression. They found that UIP is dependent on 
the currency pair (it holds for the USD-DEM, but fails for the USD-GBP and the DEM-GBP), 
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while the term structure expectation theory fails for all currency pairs. However, they did not 
see any difference in the time horizon for UIP. 
The interest rate theory shows a close relationship between the dynamics of interest rates, 
exchange rates, and risk premiums. Therefore, an empirical validation of the standard UIP 
regression (2) is disturbed by many disturbance factors, such as time-varying risk premiums 
and dynamics in interest rates. To circumvent these disturbance factors, I suggest modifying 
the uncovered interest rate parity with the dynamics of the interest rate and a risk factor. 
II.3 Modified Uncovered Interest Rate Parity 
In chapter 2, I pointed out two main reasons for UIP failure in the conventional analysis. 
Firstly, investors are risk-averse, contrary to UIP assumptions. Secondly, the persistence of 
interest differentials influences tests of UIP. This theory argues that investors underestimate 
the persistence, just as they overestimate the decay rate. As a result, the UIP regression should 
be adjusted to incorporate these effects. Why returns on long-term bonds improve the UIP 
relationship can be illustrated via perpetual bonds. 
II.3.1 Perpetual Bonds 
The expectation theory of the interest rate term structure basically states that the returns from 
every bond should be equal to the risk-free rate. This is illustrated with a perpetuity bond. In 
an economy with no uncertainty, the price of this perpetuity is: 
푃푡 = ∑ ∏ 1(1 + 푖휏′)
휏
휏′=푡
∞
휏=푡
 
where 1 is the coupon of the perpetuity paid at time 휏 . The price change from t to t+1 is 
푃푡+1푃푡 = (1 + 푖푡) 
 
The price of a perpetuity bond in the foreign currency, discounted with the foreign interest 
rate, is 
푃푡∗ = ∑ ∏ 1(1 + 푖휏′∗ )
휏
휏′=푡
∞
휏=푡
 
and the price change from t to t+1 is 
 
푃푡+1∗푃푡∗ = (1 + 푖푡∗)  
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Thus, if we substitute (1 + it) with the log prices of Pt+1 Pt  and (1 + it∗)  with the log prices of Pt+1∗Pt∗  in the UIP equation, we see the following relationship between the domestic and the 
foreign perpetuity: 
This does not only hold for perpetuities. For a bond with maturity T, ∞ has to be replaced 
with T. Thus, the price of the bond is: 
퐵푡 = ∑ ∏ 1(1 + 푖휏′)
휏
휏′=푡
푇
휏=푡
 
and the price change is 
퐵푡+1퐵푡 = (1 + 푖푡) 
 
Therefore, the return of every bond is equal to the risk-free rate under the expectation theory, 
and that is why bond returns must also fulfill the UIP relationship. We obtain the following 
relationship between the domestic and the foreign bond: 
II.3.2 Modification of UIP 
In the standard UIP equation, the maturity of the interest rate is the same as the measurement 
period for the exchange rate return. Using bond returns with different maturities for return 
periods shorter than the maturity, the UIP equation is more general. Therefore, I needed to 
substitute the interest rate by the return of a bond. 
(r(t, t + 1) − r∗(t, t + 1)) is the return difference between the return of the domestic and the 
foreign currency bond. The bond return is defined as follows: 
C is the constant coupon rate of the bond, which is paid at t+1, t+2 … T. PV is the present 
value of the bond, 
 푠푡+1 − 푠푡 = (푝푡+1 − 푝푡) − (푝푡+1∗ − 푝푡∗)   
 푠푡+1 − 푠푡 = (푏푡+1 − 푏푡) − (푏푡+1∗ − 푏푡∗) (7)  
 푠푡+1 − 푠푡 = 훼 + 훽푅푒푡푢푟푛(푟(푡, 푡 + 1) − 푟∗(푡, 푡 + 1)) + 푒푡+1 (8) 
 푟(푡, 푡 + 1) = 퐶 + 푃푉푡+1푃푉푡 − 1 (9) 
 푃푉푡 = ∑ 푁 ∗ 퐶(1 + 푖푡)푡
푇
푡=1
+ 푁(1 + 푖푇 )푇  (10) 
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where N is the notional amount of the bond. As I used an interest rate swaps instead of bonds 
in this paper, I used the swap rate for C. 
The short-term return of the long-term bond can be separated into expected and unexpected 
returns. The expected return for one month is the 1-month interest rate under the expectation 
hypothesis of interest rate term structure. The expected return is equal across all maturities if 
the expectation theory holds perfectly. The expected return refers to the standard UIP 
regression in regression (2). 
If expectation theory does not hold, the unexpected return would contain this information. The 
unexpected return is the realized bond return minus the expected return. The regression for the 
unexpected return is 
If the unexpected return is not zero, the UIP regression cannot hold for all maturities. Short-
term interest rates are free from unexpected returns, which could cause their failure in the UIP 
regression. Therefore, it is reasonable to construct the UIP regression using long-term interest 
rates over a short horizon, as long-term interest rates capture the effect of unexpected interest 
returns, while the short horizon generates sufficient data to be of significance. 
In the next step, I added a risk factor. I think of risk in terms of the CAPM model. An increase 
in an asset risk which, in our example is the currency risk, reduces the market return-to-risk 
ratio respective to the risk premium. Consequently, the price of the asset must decrease until 
the risk premium is equal to the market risk premium of other assets. Therefore, an increase in 
risk will reduce the value of high-yielding currencies, leading to a depreciation thereof. 
Regression (12) includes the changes to the volatility as a risk factor, and is related to the 
model by Clarida, Davis, and Pedersen [2009] on page 1385, where they model the volatility 
changes for several regimes. In the regression herein, there are only two regimes, in which the 
interest rate difference is either positive (sign(it − it∗) = 1) or negative (sign(it − it∗) = −1). 
The term sign(it − it∗) differentiates whether (it − it∗) is positive or negative, since βVolatility is 
expected to have the opposite sign for negative (it − it∗). As 휎푡 depends on st+1 − st, there is an 
endogenic problem, and the resulting absolute values have to be interpreted with caution. 
Nevertheless, the resulting values provide valuable information when we want to determine 
whether an increase in volatility leads to an appreciation or a depreciation of the currency with 
the relatively higher interest rate. 
With these two factors in place, the standard regression (2) is modified in a multilinear 
regression, as follows: 
 푠푡+1 − 푠푡 = 훼 + 훽푈푛푒푥푝푒푐푡푒푑(푟(푡, 푡 + 1) − 푟∗(푡, 푡 + 1) − (푖푡 − 푖푡∗)) + 푒푡+1 (11) 
 푠푡+1 − 푠푡 = 훼 + 훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦((휎푡+1 − 휎푡) ∗ 푠푖푔푛(푖푡 − 푖푡∗)) + 푒푡+1 (12) 
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A test of the modified UIP regression is α = 0, βReturn > 0 and βVolatility > 0. As investors are 
risk-averse, I do not require βReturn to be equal to 1. However, we can assume that βReturn is 
smaller than 1, because it would be 0 if there were not any trade, as the exchange rate would 
not move in such a case. As soon as there are trades, βReturn will increase towards 1. Lower 
risk aversions means becoming closer to 1. βVolatility only covers the variation of risk over time, 
not the risk-aversion itself.  
The inclusion of the long-term interest return difference should lead to significant improvement 
in the UIP regression. Firstly, the magnitude of the long-term interest returns is much higher 
than it is for the returns of short-term interest differentials. Thus, the disturbance caused by 
other effects is smaller. Furthermore, distorted beliefs do not influence the regression of long-
term interest return differences, because those beliefs are incorporated into the unexpected 
interest return of long-term interest rates. Secondly, the short-term interest rate is a biased 
measure of the future interest rate, since investors often anticipate changes to central bank 
interest rates. Central banks often (but not always) provide hints as to the future development 
of interest rates. As a result, if a rise in the central bank interest rate is anticipated by all 
investors, the short-term interest rate will change, while the long-term will not change 
significantly. Swanson [2006] analyzed the forecast capability of investors in detail. Thirdly, 
another problem is that interest rates, as well as interest differentials between two currencies, 
contain unit roots (see, for example, Romero-Ávila [2007] or Meese and Singleton [1982]). 
However, the return of the long-term interest difference has no unit root. 
II.3.3 Data 
I used Bloomberg and Datastream as sources of data. The currency universe consists of the US 
dollar (USD), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the Japanese yen (JPY), the Swiss franc (CHF), the 
British pound (GBP), the Australian dollar (AUD), and the Euro (EUR)3.  
Spot exchange rates (st) against USD are provided by Bloomberg. Cross-exchanges rates are 
derived from the USD exchange rates. For the (short-term) interest rates (it), I used either the 
official LIBOR rates from Bloomberg with maturities of one month, two months, three months, 
and six months, or the 12- month interbank rate from Datastream. The advantage of the 12-
month interbank rate is the longer horizon. For the long-term interest rate returns r(t, t + 1), I 
used swap rates with maturities of two years, three years, four years, five years, seven years, 10 
                                         
3 Before the introduction of the EUR on 1.1.1999, I used the German mark (DEM) instead of the EUR. 
 
st+1 − st = α + βReturn(r(t, t + 1) − r∗(t, t + 1) − it∗)+   훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦((휎푡+1 − 휎푡) ∗ 푠푖푔푛(푖푡 − 푖푡∗)) + 푒푡+1 (13) 
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years, 15 years, 20 years, and 30 years. I took the 5-year government yield as a comparison, so 
as to be sure that the swap and bond rates produced similar results. The advantage of the 
swap rates is that they are actively traded and have consistent terms and conditions, as they 
are all based on LIBOR rates, and have the same framework dictated by ISDA (International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association). An important condition is that swaps have a constant 
maturity. There are trade prices available for the swap rate every day. This is an advantage for 
government yields, which do not have equal terms and conditions. On the other hand, 
government yields typically have a longer data horizon.  
Perpetual interest rates would be the best proxy for long-term interest returns, but many 
currencies do not have them. Swap rates with a maturity of 40 and 50 years are also available, 
although these do not exist for all currencies. The swap rates with maturities above 10 years 
are available for all currencies, but only for a short time. Furthermore, long-term swap rates 
are not as liquid as are the 10-year ones. The liquidity of long-term interest rate instruments 
can be observed via interest rate futures. While there are 10-year bond futures for all G7 
currencies, there are only two 30-year bond futures, for USD and for EUR. In 2012, the daily 
trading volume was 950’000 contracts for the 10-year USD bond future and 330’000 contracts 
for the USD 30-year future (each traded future is worth roughly $100’000). The daily volume 
was 660’000 for the EUR 10-year bond future, and 8’000 for the 30-year bond future. Thus, 
liquidity is much smaller for long-term maturity contracts. Therefore, the 10-year swap rate is 
considered to be the most reliable proxy for a perpetual bond. 
For the volatility, I used the currency volatility index by JP Morgan (JPMVXYG7 Index), 
which is the average, implied volatility of the G7 currencies. The volatility index began on 
June 1 1992. Since results depend heavily on the choice of the base currency, I regressed all 
currency pairs against each other, once in individual regressions for all 21 currency pairs, and 
once in a fixed-effects cross-panel regression.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 1991-2012 
 
USD AUD JPY GBP CHF CAD EUR 
LIBOR 1M 3.52% 5.68% 1.07% 5.08% 2.25% 3.90% 3.71%
Swap 10Y 5.48% 6.94% 2.44% 5.99% 3.68% 5.75% 5.11%
Exchange Rate Return 0.00% 1.36% 2.06% -0.78% 1.53% 0.70% 0.05%
This table presents the average one month LIBOR interest rate and the average 10-year swap rate from 
1991-2012. The exchange rate return is the annual return of the specific currency against the USD. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main data in this paper. All currencies, except 
the GBP, appreciated against the USD. However, the average one-month LIBOR and 10-year 
swap rates were higher for AUD, GBP, and CAD than they were for USD. The term spread, 
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the difference between the 10-year swap rate and the one-month LIBOR is positive for each 
currency, and averages 1.46%. 
II.3.4 Empirical Analysis of Standard UIP 
Most studies test the uncovered interest rate parity with short-term interest rates and 
regression (2), despite its vulnerability. Table 2 presents the regression results for the standard 
regression with the dataset of this paper.  
Table 2: UIP Standard Regression with 1-Month LIBOR 1987-2012 
  
R2 α 휷푳풆풗풆풍 Confidence Interval 95% Observations 
Panel  0.00 - -1.00 (-4.04) [-1.49 -0.52] 6'552 
         
USD AUD 0.00 0.00 (0.53) -0.93 (-1.03) [-2.71 0.85] 312 
USD JPY 0.01 -0.01 (-2.34) -1.88 (-2.01) [-3.72 -0.04] 312 
USD GBP 0.00 -0.00 (-0.12) 0.24 (0.16) [-2.60 3.08] 312 
USD CHF 0.01 -0.00 (-1.17) -1.42 (-1.26) [-3.64 0.80] 312 
USD CAD 0.00 -0.00 (-0.41) -0.44 (-0.67) [-1.73 0.85] 312 
USD EUR 0.00 -0.00 (-0.22) -0.37 (-0.36) [-2.36 1.63] 312 
AUD JPY 0.00 -0.00 (-0.54) -0.73 (-0.70) [-2.81 1.34] 312 
AUD GBP 0.00 0.00 (0.40) -1.27 (-1.00) [-3.79 1.24] 312 
AUD CHF 0.00 -0.00 (-0.90) -1.18 (-1.08) [-3.32 0.97] 312 
AUD CAD 0.00 -0.00 (-0.06) -0.48 (-0.50) [-2.35 1.39] 312 
AUD EUR 0.00 0.00 (0.11) -0.36 (-0.43) [-2.05 1.32] 312 
JPY GBP 0.00 0.00 (0.95) -0.49 (-0.44) [-2.65 1.67] 312 
JPY CHF 0.01 0.00 (1.63) -3.32 (-1.91) [-6.73 0.09] 312 
JPY CAD 0.00 0.01 (1.29) -1.54 (-1.03) [-4.48 1.40] 312 
JPY EUR 0.00 0.00 (0.32) 0.28 (0.15) [-3.40 3.95] 312 
GBP CHF 0.01 -0.01 (-2.18) -1.60 (-2.14) [-3.08 -0.13] 312 
GBP CAD 0.01 -0.00 (-1.55) -2.56 (-1.70) [-5.52 0.40] 312 
GBP EUR 0.00 -0.00 (-0.65) -0.52 (-0.74) [-1.92 0.87] 312 
CHF CAD 0.02 0.01 (2.25) -3.02 (-2.16) [-5.77 -0.27] 312 
CHF EUR 0.01 0.00 (2.48) -2.26 (-1.95) [-4.54 0.02] 312 
CAD EUR 0.00 -0.00 (-0.06) -1.14 (-1.01) [-3.36 1.08] 312 
This table shows the results of the standard UIP regression (2) for each currency pair and the panel 
regression (with fixed effects) of all pairs, using  the one month LIBOR level as the explanatory and the 
one month change of exchange rate as the explained variable during the period from 1987-2012. The 
reported t-statistics are the Newey-West estimators (Newey and West [1987]), which are adjusted for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity  
I used non-log exchange rates for the entire empirical analysis, as the interest rates and interest 
rate returns are also discrete. I also computed the results with log data, and the results are 
very similar. 
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The results of the panel regression are disappointing. The R-squared is 0.00, and the beta has 
the wrong sign and is significantly smaller than 0 at the 99% significance level, with a t-value 
of -4.04. For the individual currency pairs, the resulting betas are far from having a significant 
beta. The corresponding t-values would be +/-1.97 for the 95% significance level and +/-2.59 
for to 99% level. Only USD/GBP and JPY/EUR have a positive beta (0.24 and 0.28, 
respectively). Three currency pairs (USD/JPY, GBP/CHF, and CHF/CAD) have a beta that 
is significantly smaller than 0 at the 95% level, while all others are not significantly different 
from 0 at the 95% significance level. At the 99% significance level, none is significantly 
different from 0, while four pairs are significantly different from 1. The confidence interval is 
quite large, which makes a reasonable conclusion difficult. The upper bound of the confidence 
interval is in the region of 10 out of 21 pairs above 1, which explains why few studies find 
positive betas for certain time windows. Generally, these results are similar to those in the 
existing literature, meaning that UIP does not hold at the short horizon with short-term 
interest rates. In addition, most results even have the wrong sign for UIP to hold. 
The results are robust for the use of interest rate maturity and as a source for the one-month 
frequency. Table 3 presents the panel regression results with different maturities over the 
horizon from 1991-2012.  
Table 3: UIP Panel Regression with Different Interest Rates 1991-2012 
1991-2011  1M 12M Swap 5y Swap 10y Gov 5y* Swap 5y* 휷푳풆풗풆풍 -0.95 -1.10 -2.12 -1.72 -1.71 -1.54 
t-value -2.71 -2.96 -3.63 -2.45 -2.12 -2.43 
This table shows the results of the panel regression (2) (with fixed effects) for different interest rate 
maturities, using the level of the interest rate as the explanatory and the one-month change of exchange 
rate as the explained variable. The period is from 1991-2012, with the exception of Gov 5y* and Swap 
5y*, where the period is 1995-2012. The reported t-statistics are Newey West estimators, which are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems.  
The beta is negative for all maturities, and is even more negative for long-term maturities at 
the short horizon. The difference between the regression with 5-year government rates to 5-year 
swap rates is small. However, it should be pointed out that only the level of the long-term 
interest rate is regressed against the exchange rate change over one month in this instance. 
While most previous studies reported negative betas or values around 0, the occasional study 
also found positive betas. One reason for this is that the results depend on the choice of 
currencies pairs, as we have seen in Table 2. Table 3 shows that the choice of interest rate 
maturity also matters to some extent, while swap or government rates produce similar results. 
Another issue is that the relationship is very unstable over time, as presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 presents the 5-year rolling regression of the particular rates. A 5-year rolling regression 
is regression (2) for 60 months, which means that the first point for the 12-month regression is 
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the beta over the period from December 31 1979 to December 31 1984. The second point in the 
graph is the regression results from January 31 1980- January 31 1985. Not all regressions start 
in December 31 1984, as not all interest rates are available from the beginning of the year. 
Figure 4: 5-Year Rolling UIP Panel Regression with Different Interest Rates 
This figure shows the 5-year rolling panel standard UIP regression (2) (with fixed effects) for different 
interest rate maturities, using the level of the interest rate as the explanatory and the one-month change 
of exchange rate as the explained variable.  The period is from 1980-2012. The reported t-statistics are 
Newey West estimators, which are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. 
Figure 5 presents the results of the rolling regression for the one- month interest rates, and 
shows the periods in which the beta is significant at a 95% significance level.  
In the period during 1994-1995, the beta was significantly positive. However, from 1996-2007 it 
was often significantly negative, contrary to UIP. Between 2007 and 2008, the beta increased 
sharply to a level above 1. This was mainly driven by the financial crisis in 2008, when a 
massive unwinding of carry trades led to the crash of high-yielding currencies, and to an 
appreciation of low-yielding currencies (see Melvin and Taylor [2009] for details). 
Figure 6 presents the results of the 2-year rolling regression for the one-month interest rates, 
and shows the periods where beta is significant at a 95% significance level. 
The 2-year regression has the advantage of providing more detail for the year that influences 
the beta, but has the disadvantage of having fewer data points in order to estimate the 
regression. During the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, the beta was extremely positive (up to 
+6), but became negative again in 2009 and 2010, which means the positive beta in 2008/2009 
was only a temporary phenomenon. The rapid switch from positive significance to negative 
significance within two months is impressive. 
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Figure 5: 5-Year Rolling UIP Panel Regression with 1-Month Interest  
This figure shows 5-year rolling panel regression (2) (no fixed effects as the horizon is too short) for the 
one-month interest rate. The period is from 1987-2012. The reported t-statistics are Newey-West 
estimators, which are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems. 
Figure 6: 2-Year Rolling UIP Panel Regression with 1 Month Interest Rate 
This figure shows the beta for the 2-year rolling panel regression (no fixed-effects as the horizon is too 
short) of the 1-month interest rates, and shows the periods where the beta is significant at a 95% 
significance level. A 2-year rolling regression is regression (2) for 24 months: the first observation for the 
monthly regression is the beta over the period from January 1987 to December 1988, and the last point 
is the beta over the period from January 2011 to December 2012. The significance level is measured 
using Newey-West estimators. 
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Table 4 presents the results of the regression of the 5-year interest rates against the exchange 
rate return over five years, from 1980-2012. This is the same regression as in Chinn [2006], who 
found positive betas. For direct comparability, I used the same maturity, the 5-year swap rate 
(Chinn used the 5-year government bond rate). In the event that the 5-year swap rate was not 
available, I used the 5-year government rate or the 12-month interbank rate. I repeated the 
regression with the 12-month interbank rate and obtained similar results (the beta of the panel 
regression is 0.25 with a t-value of 2.92 for the 12-month rate). 
Table 4: UIP Long-Term Regression with 5-Year Interest Rates 1980-2012 
    R2 α 휷푳풆풗풆풍 Confidence Interval 95% Observations 
Panel 
 
0.02 - 0.44 (3.56) [0.20 0.68] 2'373 
         
USD AUD 0.02 1.00 (0.11) -0.52 (-0.92) [-1.63 0.59] 113 
USD JPY 0.01 -0.99 (-0.09) 0.25 (0.49) [-0.75 1.25] 113 
USD GBP 0.11 -0.44 (-0.02) 1.24 (1.55) [-0.34 2.82] 113 
USD CHF 0.01 -0.84 (-0.05) 0.29 (0.80) [-0.43 1.01] 113 
USD CAD 0.23 -2.04 (-0.06) 1.43 (3.79) [0.68 2.18] 113 
USD EUR 0.11 0.37 (0.02) 0.96 (2.62) [0.23 1.69] 113 
AUD JPY 0.02 0.34 (0.05) 0.68 (1.26) [-0.39 1.74] 113 
AUD GBP 0.04 1.21 (0.06) 0.63 (2.30) [0.09 1.17] 113 
AUD CHF 0.29 2.00 (0.13) 0.98 (3.33) [0.40 1.57] 113 
AUD CAD 0.10 -2.03 (-0.07) -0.61 (-2.07) [-1.20 -0.03] 113 
AUD EUR 0.32 2.09 (0.11) 1.05 (3.79) [0.50 1.60] 113 
JPY GBP 0.00 1.14 (0.36) -0.44 (-0.32) [-3.16 2.29] 113 
JPY CHF 0.24 3.58 (0.09) -1.06 (-3.64) [-1.64 -0.48] 113 
JPY CAD 0.02 0.27 (0.05) 0.73 (0.92) [-0.84 2.31] 113 
JPY EUR 0.04 2.86 (0.17) -0.54 (-1.02) [-1.59 0.51] 113 
GBP CHF 0.02 -0.72 (-0.06) 0.30 (1.07) [-0.25 0.85] 113 
GBP CAD 0.06 -0.64 (-0.02) 0.76 (1.49) [-0.25 1.78] 113 
GBP EUR 0.07 -0.09 (-0.01) 0.63 (2.17) [0.05 1.20] 113 
CHF CAD 0.08 0.24 (0.02) 0.58 (1.85) [-0.04 1.21] 113 
CHF EUR 0.02 0.44 (0.01) 0.41 (1.50) [-0.13 0.94] 113 
CAD EUR 0.20 1.83 (0.07) 0.99 (3.72) [0.46 1.52] 113 
This table shows the results of regression (2) for each currency pair and the panel regression (fixed-
effects) of all pairs, using  the 5-year interest level (multiplied by 5) as the explanatory and the 5-year 
change of exchange rate as the explained variable for the period from 1980-2012. The data are measured 
at a quarterly frequency, which means only 6 of 113 observations are non-overlapping periods. The 
reported t- statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
The long-term UIP regression has a positive beta in the panel regression. This confirms the 
results of Chinn, who also reported positive betas. Four currency pairs are significantly positive 
at the 99% significance level, and another three are significant at the 95% significance level. 
Only one currency pair (JPY/CHF) has a significantly negative beta at 99%, and the 
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AUD/CAD is significantly negative at 95%. Another three pairs have negative betas. Six 
currency pairs are significantly different from 1. 
However, the positive beta in the panel regression holds only over the entire sample horizon. 
For example, in the sample between 1990 and 2012, the resulting beta is -0.05 (-0.17). Since the 
end of Chinn’s data horizon, from 2001-2012, the beta of the panel regression is even 
significantly negative, with a beta of -1.49 and a t value of -3.24. Thus, the long-term UIP with 
5-year interest rates did not work during the past two decades. Furthermore, the data horizon 
is quite short for 5-year regressions, as there are only 33 years of historical data, which results 
in slightly more than 6 of 113 non-overlapping periods. 
Nonetheless, there is still evidence that the UIP relationship works better with long-term 
interest rates and over longer horizons. Chinn and Meredith [2004] explained the difference 
between short- and long-term regression results via the strong influence of the central bank on 
the short-term interest rates, while long-term interest rates can only be influenced indirectly 
(apart from the quantitative easing programs of FED, ECB and the Bank of England, which 
started buying long-term government bonds in the aftermath of the crisis in 2008). Thus, long-
term interest rates should be less endogenous than should short-term ones. 
II.3.5 Empirical Analysis of Modified UIP 
An explanation for the different results over different periods is that the interest differentials 
are not constant. Figure 7 presents the development of the 10-year interest rate differences of 
the AUD, the EUR, and the GBP against the USD. The interest rate differences are also 
unstable, and thus distort the estimates of the betas. 
Figure 8 presents the mean and standard deviation adjusted development of the AUD-USD 
exchange rate and the interest rate difference between AUD and USD. 
The (inverted) exchange rate and the interest rate difference follow a similar pattern, and seem 
to be correlated. When the interest rate difference decreased from 1988 to 2000, the exchange 
rate also depreciated, as predicted by UIP. At the same time, when the interest rate difference 
increased from 2000 to 2007, the exchange rate also appreciated. Thus, although the interest 
rate difference is positive from 2001 to 2007 and the usual UIP would suggest that the 
exchange rate should depreciate, the exchange rate actually appreciated, since the effect of the 
increasing interest rate difference dominated the depreciation effect from the level of the 
exchange rate. As the change in the interest rate difference also influences the exchange rate, it 
should therefore be incorporated into the regression, as suggested in formulas (8) and (13). 
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Figure 7: 10-Year Interest Rates Differences 
This figure shows the development of the interest rate differentials of the AUD, the EUR, and the GBP 
against the USD. The period is from 1988-2012. 
Figure 8: Adjusted 10-Year Interest Rate Differences and Exchange Rate of AUD-
USD 
This figure shows the mean and standard deviation adjusted AUD-USD exchange rate and its interest 
rate differential. The period is from 1988-2012. 
Table 5 presents the results of regression (8) using the return difference between two 
currencies' 10-year swap rate over the period 1991-2012.  
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Table 5: 10-Year Swap Return Difference Regression 1991-2012 
  
R2 α 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% 
Observations 
Panel  0.03 - 0.34 (8.94) [0.27 0.42] 5'544 
         
USD AUD 0.02 -0.00 (-0.51) 0.33 (1.66) [-0.06 0.72] 264 
USD JPY 0.04 -0.00 (-0.28) 0.28 (2.77) [0.08 0.48] 264 
USD GBP 0.10 0.00 (0.25) 0.49 (3.46) [0.21 0.77] 264 
USD CHF 0.08 -0.00 (-0.02) 0.52 (4.21) [0.27 0.76] 264 
USD CAD 0.00 -0.00 (-0.18) -0.10 (-0.77) [-0.36 0.16] 264 
USD EUR 0.12 0.00 (0.23) 0.67 (5.84) [0.44 0.89] 264 
AUD JPY 0.03 0.00 (0.66) 0.37 (2.03) [0.01 0.72] 264 
AUD GBP 0.03 0.00 (1.37) 0.30 (1.96) [-0.00 0.59] 264 
AUD CHF 0.04 0.00 (0.67) 0.34 (2.46) [0.07 0.61] 264 
AUD CAD 0.02 0.00 (0.77) 0.26 (1.53) [-0.07 0.58] 264 
AUD EUR 0.02 0.00 (1.02) 0.27 (1.95) [-0.00 0.55] 264 
JPY GBP 0.05 0.00 (0.55) 0.43 (3.20) [0.17 0.69] 264 
JPY CHF 0.06 0.00 (0.21) 0.48 (3.70) [0.22 0.73] 264 
JPY CAD 0.01 0.00 (0.51) 0.17 (1.11) [-0.13 0.48] 264 
JPY EUR 0.05 0.00 (0.47) 0.47 (3.51) [0.20 0.73] 264 
GBP CHF 0.03 -0.00 (-0.45) 0.34 (1.48) [-0.11 0.78] 264 
GBP CAD 0.03 -0.00 (-0.46) 0.32 (2.43) [0.06 0.58] 264 
GBP EUR 0.04 0.00 (0.03) 0.42 (1.90) [-0.02 0.86] 264 
CHF CAD 0.02 0.00 (0.31) 0.29 (1.75) [-0.04 0.62] 264 
CHF EUR 0.00 0.00 (1.54) 0.09 (0.64) [-0.18 0.35] 264 
CAD EUR 0.01 0.00 (0.62) 0.24 (1.45) [-0.09 0.56] 264 
This table shows the results of regression (8) for each currency pair and the panel regression (fixed-
effects) of all pairs, using the monthly 10-year swap return as the explanatory and the 1-month change 
of the exchange rate as the explained variable in the period from 1991-2012. The reported t-statistics are 
Newey-West estimators. 
The results of regression (8) are favorable for the UIP theory. The R-squared for the panel 
regression is at least 0.03, although this figure is still low. The beta is positive, as expected, 
which means that if the swap return difference between two countries is positive, then the 
exchange rate between those two countries will depreciate. βReturn is significantly positive at 
the 99% level (t-value is 8.94). The theoretical risk-neutral value of the beta would be 1, as a 
decrease in the interest rate by 1% should depreciate the currency by the present value of this 
10-year change. However, with the risk aversion and other distortions, it is not surprising that 
the beta is well below 1. 
In the individual regression, only one currency pair (USD/CAD) has a negative beta, which is 
most likely caused by the close economic relationships of those two countries. Seven currency 
pairs have positive betas at a 99% significance level and another three at 95%, leaving half of 
the pairs without a significant beta. These results are also robust for the choice of the interest 
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rate maturity (12 months, 5 years), although the 12-month interest rate clearly has a lower 
beta and significance level than do the others.  
The relationship between the swap return and the exchange rate became stronger over the 
sample. Figure 9 presents the 2-year rolling regression of the 10-year swap return differences, 
and shows the periods in which the beta is significant at a 95% significance level. 
Figure 9: 2-Year Rolling Regression 10 Year Swap Return Difference 
This figure shows the beta of the 2-year rolling panel regression (no fixed-effects as the horizon is too 
short), using  the monthly 10-year swap return as the explanatory and the 1-month change of the 
exchange rate as the explained variable for the period from 1991-2012. The shaded areas are the periods 
in which the beta is significantly different from zero, at a 95% significance level. A 2-year rolling 
regression is regression (8) for 24 months, which means the first point for the 1-month regression is the 
beta over the period from January 1991 to December 1992, and the last point is the beta over the period 
from January 2011 to December 2012. The significance level is measured with Newey-West estimators. 
The 2-year regression began to be significantly positive in 1997, which is the regression period 
from 1995-1997. Before that, it was significantly positive from 1992-1994 and significantly 
negative from 1994-1996. However, since 1997, the beta remained significantly positive, 
although at a moderate level between 0 and 0.5, until 2006. Thus, the beta already became 
much more positive between 0.5 and 0.75, in 2006 (period 2004-2006). Since then, it has settled 
at levels between 0.75 and 1.25. An important observation is that it did not rise further after 
the financial crisis of 2009 and 2010, contrary to the beta of the UIP regression in Figure 6.  
What happened during the crisis? Before the crisis, interest differentials had been high, and 
currencies with high interest rates had been at elevated values. During the crisis, high interest 
rate currencies depreciated dramatically, and so did their interest rates (thus, the long-term 
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interest return difference was positive). Therefore, during this phase, exchange rates behaved as 
predicted by UIP, in that high interest rate currencies should depreciate. However, after the 
financial crisis in 2008, interest rates differentials rose again (thus, the long-term interest return 
difference was negative), and so did the exchange rates. While UIP in the standard form would 
have suggested that the AUD-USD exchange rate should have depreciated further, since the 
interest differential was always positive, the exchange rate appreciated strongly. Figure 9 shows 
that the rise can be explained via the rising interest differential, while the effect of UIP in the 
standard form is unclear (Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
Why the beta decreased dramatically, beginning at the end of 2004-2006 period, is an open 
question. The sharp increase in the panel regression was not caused by a single currency, but 
occurred for most currencies, and the effect was more pronounced for currencies with high 
interest differentials. A possible explanation could be that the market has become more 
efficient as a greater number of active investors invested in currencies. A possible indication of 
an increase in the number of active investors is the sharp increase in trading volumes, and open 
interest in the currency futures market. Although currency futures volumes are only a small 
fraction of the total currency trading volume, they are typically used by speculative investors. 
Furthermore, only futures data are available on an annual basis.  
The trading volume of the total currency market is reported every three years by the Triennial 
Survey, and shows a similar development. Figure 10 presents the trading volume of currency 
futures. The trading volume was stable, between 30’000 and 50’000 traded contracts per day 
(with an approximate worth of $4 billion), until 2002. However, between 2002 and 2006, the 
trading volume increased more than tenfold, to 500’000 contracts per day. 
Figure 10: Daily Trading Volume in Currency Futures 
This figure shows the daily trading volume of the six biggest currency futures from 1990 to 2012 (all 
against the USD, and each future has a value of 100'000 times the exchange rate). 
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This is consistent with the analysis by King and Rime [2010], who showed that the share of 
financial institutions in the trading volume of the entire currency market increased 
dramatically between 2001 and 2010. They argued that the reason for the increase in trading 
was that financial institutions have had better electronic access during the past 10 years. Until 
1999, electronic trading was only available for interbank trading (starting in 1992 with Reuters 
2000); thus, customers had to pay relatively high bid-ask spreads in the nontransparent 
market. In 1999, Currenex started as the first multibank platform available for customers. 
Other platforms followed, including FXConnect in 2000, BARX in 2001, Autobahn in 2002, 
and Velocity in 2006.  
Meanwhile, the volume of interest rate swaps also increased significantly. In 1990, the year-end 
amount of the outstanding notional amount was $ 3400 billion4, and this amount increased to $ 
426’700 billion in 2009. Data that are more recent are not available. The notional amount 
includes interest rate swaps, interest rate options, and cross-currency swaps. The share of the 
interest rate swaps was 77% in 1997, and no data that are more recent are available. 
Figure 11: Notional Amount of Outstanding Interest Rate Swaps 
This figure shows the year-end notional amount of interest rate swaps, interest rate options, and cross-
currency swaps since 1990. 
II.3.6 UIP – Change of Volatility Regression 
Another problem that distorts the results of the UIP regression is the risk aversion of the 
investors. As we have seen, a possible way of measuring this effect is regression (12). Table 6 
                                         
4 Source: http://www.isda.org/statistics/historical.html 
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presents the results of this regression, with the G7 implied currency volatility index by JP 
Morgan as a measure of the volatility, and the 1-month interest differential as a measure of 
whether the interest differential is positive or negative. 
Table 6: Change of Implied Volatility Regression 1993-2012 
  R2 α 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚 Confidence 
Interval 95% 
Observations 
Panel 
 
0.08 - 0.78 10.27 [0.63 0.93] 5040 
         
USD AUD 0.15 -0.00 (-0.43) 1.22 (4.13) [0.64 1.80] 240 
USD JPY 0.11 -0.00 (-0.58) 0.91 (5.39) [0.58 1.25] 240 
USD GBP 0.07 -0.00 (-0.02) 0.56 (2.94) [0.18 0.93] 240 
USD CHF 0.00 -0.00 (-0.75) 0.16 (0.59) [-0.38 0.71] 240 
USD CAD 0.01 -0.00 (-0.58) -0.24 (-0.69) [-0.91 0.44] 240 
USD EUR 0.03 -0.00 (-0.11) 0.42 (1.38) [-0.18 1.02] 240 
AUD JPY 0.31 0.00 (0.38) 2.18 (11.37) [1.80 2.56] 240 
AUD GBP 0.07 0.00 (0.86) 0.74 (5.81) [0.49 0.99] 240 
AUD CHF 0.23 0.00 (0.08) 1.50 (9.66) [1.19 1.81] 240 
AUD CAD 0.07 0.00 (0.62) 0.59 (5.17) [0.37 0.82] 240 
AUD EUR 0.15 0.00 (1.00) 1.05 (5.78) [0.70 1.41] 240 
JPY GBP 0.17 0.00 (0.92) 1.40 (7.44) [1.03 1.78] 240 
JPY CHF 0.06 0.00 (0.15) 0.79 (3.83) [0.38 1.19] 240 
JPY CAD 0.23 0.00 (0.69) 1.72 (8.03) [1.30 2.14] 240 
JPY EUR 0.15 0.00 (0.90) 1.28 (4.88) [0.77 1.80] 240 
GBP CHF 0.06 -0.00 (-0.84) 0.57 (4.04) [0.29 0.85] 240 
GBP CAD 0.01 -0.00 (-0.32) -0.20 (-1.58) [-0.46 0.05] 240 
GBP EUR 0.00 0.00 (0.15) 0.08 (0.64) [-0.17 0.34] 240 
CHF CAD 0.09 0.00 (0.84) 0.90 (4.38) [0.49 1.30] 240 
CHF EUR 0.12 0.00 (2.12) 0.48 (3.51) [0.21 0.74] 240 
CAD EUR 0.01 0.00 (0.59) 0.22 (1.13) [-0.16 0.61] 240 
This table shows the results of regression (12) for each currency pair, and the panel regression (fixed-
effects) of all pairs, using the 1-month change of the implied volatility (multiplied by the sign of the 
interest differential) as the explanatory and the 1-month change of the exchange rate as the explained 
variable in the period from 1993-2012. The reported t-statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
The results in Table 7 confirm the hypothesis that volatility has a strong impact on the UIP 
relationship. When the interest differential is positive and volatility increases, the high interest 
rate currency depreciates, while it appreciates when the volatility decreases. The beta from the 
panel regression is 0.78, and has a significantly high t-value of 10.27, while the R-squared is 
0.08. With regard to the individual currency pairs, only the GBP/CAD and the USD/CAD are 
negative, but insignificantly so. Another four pairs (USD/GBP, USD/CHF, USD/EUR, 
GBP/EUR, and CAD/EUR) have positive, insignificant betas, while all others (15 of 21) are 
significant at the 99% level. 
 
Figure 12 presents the results of the 2-year rolling regression of the change of implied volatility. 
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Figure 12: Rolling Beta Change of Implied Volatility Panel Regression 
This figure shows the beta for the 2-year rolling panel regression (no fixed-effects, as the horizon is too 
short), regressing the 1-month change of implied volatility (multiplied by the sign of the interest 
differential) on the 1-month change of the exchange rate over the period from 1993-2012. The shaded 
areas are the periods in which the beta is significant at a 95% significance level. A 2-year rolling 
regression is regression (12) for 24 months, which means the first point for the 1-month regression is the 
beta over the period from January 1991 to December 1992, and the last point is the beta over the period 
from January 2011 to December 2012. The significance level is measured with Newey-West estimators. 
The rolling regression reveals that the beta of the change of implied volatility was always 
positive, with values between 0.1 and 1.4. Thus, volatility has always had a strong impact on 
the exchange rate, as expected from the theory of risk aversion. This also confirms the UIP 
theory to some extent, in the sense that there seem to be investors who are trying to exploit 
the UIP failure, pushing exchange rates closer to UIP and abandoning their trades when the 
risk increases. 
II.3.7 UIP – Multiple Regression 
As we have seen in chapters II.3.4 to II.3.6, the long-term interest return difference and the 
change of volatility are generally both very significant, while the level of the interest 
differential is not significant. Thus, it is well worth looking at a multiple regression. However, 
both βLevel and βReturn measure the interest rate return, with the distinction that βLevel 
measures the return of a short-term interest rate, and βReturnof a long-term interest rate. As βLevel and βReturn are not independent variables, I will only include βReturn  and βVolatilityin 
the multilinear regression. 
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Table 7 presents the results of the multilinear regression (13). The results are similar to those 
of the single regressions. The R-squared is relatively high, 0.10 in the panel regression and 0.34 
for the highest individual currency pair AUD-JPY, in contrast to the standard UIP regression 
that achieves values of 0.00 or 0.01. The 10-year swap return difference and the change of 
volatility are both highly significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic gives a value of 2.05, which 
means there is no autocorrelation. 
Table 7: Multilinear Regression 1993-2012 
  
R2 α 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚 Observations 
Panel 
 
0.10 - 
 
0.30 (7.81) 0.75 (10.04) 5'040 
          
USD AUD 0.17 -0.00 (-0.60) 0.28 (1.58) 1.16 (4.23) 240 
USD JPY 0.14 -0.00 (-0.24) 0.27 (2.81) 0.90 (5.25) 240 
USD GBP 0.11 -0.00 (-0.19) 0.32 (3.38) 0.53 (2.99) 240 
USD CHF 0.05 -0.00 (-0.45) 0.41 (2.97) 0.11 (0.37) 240 
USD CAD 0.01 -0.00 (-0.57) -0.05 (-0.36) -0.24 (-0.71) 240 
USD EUR 0.11 -0.00 (-0.08) 0.55 (4.92) 0.39 (1.38) 240 
AUD JPY 0.34 0.00 (0.93) 0.30 (1.99) 2.12 (11.40) 240 
AUD GBP 0.07 0.00 (0.90) 0.11 (0.74) 0.71 (5.94) 240 
AUD CHF 0.24 0.00 (0.35) 0.20 (1.51) 1.44 (8.28) 240 
AUD CAD 0.10 0.00 (0.85) 0.36 (2.15) 0.54 (5.05) 240 
AUD EUR 0.16 0.00 (1.13) 0.18 (1.31) 1.02 (5.36) 240 
JPY GBP 0.20 0.00 (0.40) 0.34 (2.64) 1.38 (6.94) 240 
JPY CHF 0.11 -0.00 (-0.16) 0.46 (2.84) 0.83 (3.89) 240 
JPY CAD 0.24 0.00 (0.43) 0.18 (1.25) 1.70 (7.67) 240 
JPY EUR 0.18 0.00 (0.43) 0.39 (3.38) 1.27 (4.86) 240 
GBP CHF 0.09 -0.00 (-0.37) 0.36 (1.45) 0.51 (3.43) 240 
GBP CAD 0.02 -0.00 (-0.29) 0.19 (1.47) -0.18 (-1.35) 240 
GBP EUR 0.06 0.00 (0.46) 0.55 (2.07) 0.06 (0.49) 240 
CHF CAD 0.10 0.00 (0.61) 0.21 (1.15) 0.86 (3.96) 240 
CHF EUR 0.12 0.00 (2.06) 0.07 (0.62) 0.47 (3.71) 240 
CAD EUR 0.02 0.00 (0.64) 0.26 (1.43) 0.23 (1.20) 240 
This table shows the results of multilinear regression (13) for each currency pair and the panel regression 
(fixed-effects) of all pairs, using the monthly 10-year swap return as the interest return (훽푅푒푡푢푟푛), and 
the 1-month change of the implied volatility (훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦) as the explanatory variables, and the 1-month 
change of the exchange rate as the explained variable. The period is from 1993-2012. The reported t-
statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
II.3.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
If the average interest rate difference is small, the results can be distorted, because UIP is not 
the dominant factor in this area. Returns from carry trades are very small if the interest 
differentials are small, or might even be negative if the transaction costs are incorporated. 
Thus, it is not worth exploiting the profit opportunities. Table 8 presents the results of 
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regression (13), considering only currency pairs where the average interest differential over the 
sample period is smaller than 1%, is at least 1%, and is at least 2%, respectively.  
Table 8: Multilinear Regression Constrained to Average Interest Differential 1993-
2012 
  
R2 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚 Observations 
Panel All 0.10 0.30 (7.81) 0.75 (10.04) 5‘040 
Panel >2% 0.19 0.28 (5.14) 1.27 (13.02) 1‘920 
Panel >1% 0.15 0.29 (6.61) 1.02 (12.63) 3‘360 
Panel <=1% 0.03 0.28 (4.56) 0.22 (2.09) 1‘680 
This table shows the results of the multilinear regression (13) for the panel regression (fixed-effects), 
considering only currency pairs where the average interest differential is smaller than 1%, is at least 1%, 
and is at least 2%, respectively, using the monthly 10-year swap return (훽푅푒푡푢푟푛) and the 1-month 
change of the implied volatility (훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦) as the explanatory variables, and the 1-month change of the 
exchange rate as the explained variable. The period is from 1993-2012. The reported t-statistics are 
Newey-West estimators. 
The higher the interest differential, the higher the beta of the change of volatility. The R-
squared increases from 0.10 to 0.15 for interest differentials that are at least 1%, and to 0.19 for 
differentials that are at least 2%. However, the R-squared falls to 0.03 when the interest 
differential is smaller than 1%, since the effect of the change of volatility decreases. The βReturn 
does not change significantly with different levels of interest differentials. 
Table 9 presents the results of multilinear regression (13), comparing monthly, weekly, and 
daily data. 
Table 9: Multilinear Regression with Different Return Periods 1993-2012 
  
R2 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚 Observations 
Panel Monthly 0.10 0.30 (7.81) 0.75 (10.04) 5‘040 
Panel Weekly 0.09 0.20 (10.28) 0.72 (12.86) 21‘903 
Panel Daily (avg5) 0.05 0.11 (3.77) 0.51 (6.95) 105‘798 
This table shows the results of multilinear regression (13) for the panel regression (fixed-effects) of all 
currency pairs, using different return periods (monthly, weekly, and daily) for the 10-year swap return 
(훽푅푒푡푢푟푛) and the change of the implied volatility (훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦). The period is from 1993-2012. The 
reported t-statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
Both the swap return difference and the change of volatility are also significant at shorter 
horizons, although the R-squared decreases. One problem with shorter data is that the interest 
rates and the exchange rates are not recorded at exactly the same time. 
                                         
5 For the daily data, I used the average data of each individual regression, since the capacity in Matlab 
is too limited to conduct a regression with three variables and roughly 100’000 observations per variable. 
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Figure 13 presents the 2-year rolling panel regression of the swap returns, considering only 
USD currency pairs. Although the beta is lower than it is in the total sample, it is still often 
significantly larger than 0. 
Figure 13: 2-Year Rolling Regression 10-Year Swap Return Difference for USD 
Currency Pairs 
This figure shows the beta of the 2-year rolling panel regression for USD currency pairs (no fixed-effects 
as the horizon is too short), using the monthly 10-year swap return as the explanatory and the 1-month 
change of the exchange rate as the explained variable for the period from 1991-2012. The shaded areas 
are the periods in which the beta is significantly different from zero at the 95% significance level. A 2-
year rolling regression is regression (8) for 24 months, which means the first point for the 1-month 
regression is the beta over the period from January 1991 to December 1992, and the last point is the 
beta over the period from January 2011 to December 2012. The significance level is measured with 
Newey-West estimators. 
Table 10 presents the results of the multiple regression of the 10-year swap return difference of 
month t and the lagged value t-1, as well as the change to the volatility. 
Table 10: Multilinear Regression with Lagged Variables 1993-2012 
 
R2 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏(풕) 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏(풕− ퟏ) 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚(풕) 휷푽풐풍풂풕풊풍풊풕풚(풕− ퟏ) Observations 
Panel 0.11 0.31 (7.95) 0.09 (3.00) 0.77 (9.77) 0.20 (3.03) 5019 
This table shows the results of multilinear regression (13) for the panel regression (fixed-effects) of all 
currency pairs, including the 1-month lagged values of 훽푅푒푡푢푟푛 and 훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦 as the explanatory 
variables. The period is from 1993-2012. The reported t-statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
The regression results suggest that the 10-year swap return difference and the change of the 
implied volatility affect not only the current exchange rate, but also the exchange rate of the 
next month, although there is no autocorrelation in the swap return or in the change of the 
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implied volatility, as the Durbin-Watson tests reveals. However, exchange rates have unit roots 
and are autocorrelated, which is probably the reason for this result. If I use only the lagged 
variables, the R-squared is reduced to 0.00, but the values of the lagged variables are similar, 
at 0.08 for 훽푅푒푡푢푟푛 and 0.14 for 훽푉표푙푎푡푖푙푖푡푦 , respectively. 
The results are also robust for the choice of the interest rate maturity. These panel regression 
results are presented in Table 11, and the 2-year rolling regression of selected maturities is 
presented in Figure 14. 
Table 11: Interest Rate Return Difference with Different Interest Rate Maturities  
Interest Rate Start End R2 휷푹풆풕풖풓풏6 
1M 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.00 -0.83 (-2.09) 
2M 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.00 -0.53 (-1.24) 
3M 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.00 -0.21 (-0.48) 
6M 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.00 0.89 (1.98) 
12M 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.02 1.06 (4.40) 
2Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.04 1.04 (7.21) 
3Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.05 0.84 (8.42) 
4Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.05 0.73 (9.14) 
5Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.06 0.64 (9.43) 
7Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.05 0.51 (9.96) 
10Y 31.12.1990 31.12.2012 0.03 0.34 (8.98) 
      
1M 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.00 1.79 (2.46) 
12M 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.06 2.58 (7.61) 
5Y 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.20 1.61 (16.47) 
10Y 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.12 0.80 (13.82) 
15Y 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.07 0.45 (11.28) 
20Y 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.06 0.33 (10.02) 
30Y 31.12.2001 31.12.2012 0.03 0.19 (7.87) 
This table shows the results of panel regression (8) (fixed-effects) for different interest rate maturities, 
using the monthly swap return as the explanatory and the 1-month change of the exchange rate as the 
explained variable in the period from 1991-2012. The reported t-statistics are Newey-West estimators. 
For short-term maturities of up to three months, the βReturn  is negative. This is because it is 
dominated by the βLevel. For one month, the βReturn is the same as the βLevel. For longer 
maturities, the change to the interest rate increasingly dominates the monthly return. However, 
the level of the βReturn seems to be confusing at first glance, as it has its maximum at the 12-
month interest rate, and its highest R-squared at the 5-year interest rate. The reason for this is 
that a small interest rate change has much greater return implications for long-term interest 
rates. Thus, the long-term interest rate returns typically have a higher magnitude than do 
                                         
6 The 30-year swap rates start in 2002. 
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medium-term interest rate returns. As we regress those returns against the same magnitude of 
exchange rate returns, the βReturn is smaller for long-term interest rates than it is for medium-
term interest rates.  
Figure 14: 2-Year Rolling Regression with Different Interest Rate Maturities 
This figure shows the beta of the 2-year rolling panel regression (no fixed-effects as the horizon is too 
short), using monthly swap returns with different maturities as the explanatory and the 1-month change 
of the exchange rate as the explained variable in the period from 2002-2012. A 2-year rolling regression is 
regression (8) for 24 months, which means that the first point for the 1-month regression is the beta over 
the period from January 2002 to December 2003, and the last point is the beta over the period from 
January 2011 to December 2012. The significance level is measured with Newey-West estimators. 
These results can be explained in the context of expectation theory. If expectation theory 
worked perfectly and all investors knew the development of future interest rates, the return of 
a short-term bond would be equal to the return of a long-term bond. In this case, the βReturn 
would be the same for all maturities. However, future interest rates are unknown, except for 
the 1-month interest rate in our regression, as the maturity has the same length as the 
regression window. For all longer maturities, there is uncertainty regarding future interest rate 
development. We can divide the return of each maturity into an expected and an unexpected 
return. The expected return equals the 1-month interest rate. 
The unexpected return is the difference between the return of the bond and the 1-month 
interest rate. We can regress the expected return against the 10-year swap return, giving us an 
R-squared of 0.00. However, regressing the expected return on the 12-month returns gives an 
R-squared of 0.30; thus, the 12-month return can be partly explained by the expected return. 
On the other hand, the regression of the unexpected return against the 10-year return results in 
an R-squared of 0.99. For the 12-month return, the R-squared is 0.17. Therefore, almost 
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everything in the 10-year return is explained by the unexpected return, while the 1-month 
interest rate has no explanatory power for the 10-year return. The 12-month return is partly 
explained by the expected return and the unexpected return. 
The result is similar when the expected and the unexpected returns are regressed against the 
exchange rate change. The unexpected return (regression 11) has an R-squared of 0.04 and a 
beta of 0.35, similar to if we were to regress the 10-year return against the exchange rate 
change. The expected return has an R-squared of 0.00 and a beta of -0.83. This means that the 
exchange rate is driven by the unexpected interest rate return, which is determined by 
unexpected interest rate changes. As long-term interest rate returns are dominated by 
unexpected returns and short-term interest rate returns are dominated by expected exchange 
rate changes, this explains why UIP works well for long-term interest rates, and reasonably 
well for medium term interest rates, but not for short-term interest rates. 
This proves that short-term and long-term interest rate return differentials have a very loose 
relationship, and helps to explain why the βReturn is in line with UIP for medium and long-
term interest rates, but not for short ones. If one thing is certain, it is that it cannot work for 
both equally, unless the short-term and long-term interest rate return differentials are equal. 
I also tested a regression with only the change of the interest differential, where the beta is -
1.72, which is as expected. An increase in the foreign interest rate leads to an appreciation of 
the foreign currency. The increase in the foreign interest rate also leads to a negative swap 
return, and that is why the βReturn is positive. 
II.3.9 Econometrics 
It should be stressed that, as the βLevel is close to -1, there is a second order effect that would 
implicitly result in a positive βReturn . However, the effect on the βReturn is only about 0.01. 
The influence depends on the interest rates, and is between 0.008 and 0.012 with interest rates 
between 0 and 10%. As an example, let us assume that interest rates are 0 for both currencies. 
The foreign interest rate then increases to 1%. With a βLevel of -1 in UIP, the foreign currency 
will appreciate 112 % (as the interest rate difference is now -1%), which is 0.0833%. However, the 
present value of the 10-year foreign bond decreases to 9.87%, which means the interest return 
difference is +9.87%. Thus, if we regress the interest rate return of 9.87% on an exchange rate 
return of 0.0833%, the βReturn would be roughly 0.01(= 0.08339.87 %). 
The results can be misleading if the variables have a unit root or are co-integrated. Table 12 
presents the unit root test for exchange rates, exchange rate returns, interest differentials, 
interest returns, and differentials. I used the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the unit root. 
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Table 12: Unit Root Test 1991-2012 
  Exchange 
Rate 
Level 
Exchange 
Rate 
Return 
Swap 
Differentials 
Level 
Swap 
Return 
Difference 
USD JPY Yes No Yes No 
USD GBP Yes No Yes No 
USD CHF Yes No No No 
USD CAD Yes No Yes No 
USD DEM Yes No No No 
JPY GBP Yes No No No 
JPY CHF Yes No Yes No 
JPY CAD Yes No Yes No 
JPY DEM Yes No Yes No 
GBP CHF Yes No Yes No 
GBP CAD Yes No Yes No 
GBP DEM Yes No Yes No 
CHF CAD Yes No Yes No 
CHF DEM Yes No Yes No 
CAD DEM Yes No Yes No 
USD AUD Yes No Yes No 
AUD JPY Yes No No No 
AUD GBP Yes No No No 
AUD CHF Yes No Yes No 
AUD CAD Yes No Yes No 
AUD DEM Yes No No No 
This table shows the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for the exchange rates, exchange rate 
returns, swap differentials, and swap differential returns for all currency pairs. ‘Yes’ means that a unit 
root cannot be rejected, while ‘no’ means that a unit root can be rejected. 
The unit root test shows that the exchange rate has a unit root. The interest differential has a 
unit root in 15 of 21 currency pairs. The implied volatility level also has a unit root (not 
reported in the table). However, using the deltas of the variables instead of the level, the unit 
root problem vanishes for all variables. Thus, results from regression (2) with the βLevel might 
be misleading as the interest rate levels are used, while there are no such problems with βReturn 
and βVolatility. 
Table 13 presents the results for the Johansen cointegration test for cointegration. The 
cointegration tests shows that the exchange rate and the level of the interest differentials are 
cointegrated in 11 of 21 currency pairs. The exchange rate and the level of volatility are also 
cointegrated in 9 of 21 currency pairs, due to the endogenic problems. Even exchange rate 
returns and the level of interest differentials are cointegrated for three currency pairs. However, 
interest differential returns and volatility changes are not cointegrated with the exchange rate 
return. 
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Table 13: Cointegration Test 1993-2012 
  Exchange Rate 
Level– Swap 
Differentials 
Level 
Exchange Rate 
Level -
Volatility 
Level 
Exchange Rate 
Return – Swap 
Differentials 
Level 
Exchange Rate 
Return - Swap 
Return 
Difference 
Exchange Rate 
Return – 
Volatility 
Change 
USD AUD Yes Yes No No No 
USD JPY Yes Yes Yes No No 
USD GBP No No No No No 
USD CHF Yes Yes No No No 
USD CAD Yes Yes No No No 
USD DEM No No No No No 
AUD JPY No No No No No 
AUD GBP Yes Yes No No No 
AUD CHF No No No No No 
AUD CAD No No No No No 
AUD DEM No No No No No 
JPY GBP Yes No Yes No No 
JPY CHF No No No No No 
JPY CAD Yes No No No No 
JPY DEM No No Yes No No 
GBP CHF Yes Yes No No No 
GBP CAD Yes Yes No No No 
GBP DEM Yes Yes No No No 
CHF CAD No No No No No 
CHF DEM Yes Yes No No No 
CAD DEM No No No No No 
This table shows the cointegration test for exchange rates, exchange rate returns, swap differentials, 
swap differential returns, volatility levels, and volatility changes for all currency pairs. ‘Yes’ means that 
the cointegration of rank 1 cannot be rejected, while ‘no’ means the cointegration rank 1 can be rejected. 
Table 14 presents the results of the Granger causality test for interest differential returns, 
exchange rate returns, and volatility changes. 
Exchange rate returns do not predict interest differential returns or volatility changes (except 
for USD-CAD), but interest differential returns and volatility changes do sometimes predict 
exchange rate returns. This confirms that exchange rate returns must be on the left side of the 
regression. 
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Table 14: Granger Causality Test 1991-2012 
  
Swap Return 
Difference -
Exchange Rate 
Return 
Volatility 
Change-Exchange 
Rate Return 
Exchange Rate 
Return -Swap 
Return Difference 
Exchange Rate 
Return-Volatility 
Change 
USD AUD  No   Yes   No   No  
USD JPY  No   No   No   No  
USD GBP  No   No   No   No  
USD CHF  No   Yes   No   No  
USD CAD  No   Yes   No   Yes  
USD DEM  No   No   No   No  
AUD JPY  Yes   No   No   No  
AUD GBP  Yes   No   No   No  
AUD CHF  Yes   No   No   No  
AUD CAD  Yes   No   No   No  
AUD DEM  Yes   No   No   No  
JPY GBP  No   No   No   No  
JPY CHF  No   Yes   No   No  
JPY CAD  No   Yes   No   No  
JPY DEM  No   Yes   No   No  
GBP CHF  No   No   No   No  
GBP CAD  Yes   No   No   No  
GBP DEM  No   No   No   No  
CHF CAD  Yes   No   No   No  
CHF DEM  Yes   No   No   No  
CAD DEM  Yes   No   No   No  
This table shows the Granger causality test for exchange rate returns, swap differential returns, and 
volatility changes for all currency pairs. ‘Yes’ means variable 1 causes variable two, while ‘No’ means 
that it does not.  
Table 15 presents the results of a vector autoregression for exchange rate returns and a swap 
return difference with three lags. 
The vector autoregression does not show a clear pattern for exchange rate returns and swap 
return difference individually; thus, we can conclude that exchange rate returns have no 
autocorrelation, and neither have swap returns. However, the first lag of the swap return 
difference has a positive beta for most currencies, which confirms the results in Table 10 with 
lagged variables. Half of the currency pairs are also positive for t-2. 
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Table 15: Vector Autoregression 1991-2012 
  Exchange Rate 
Returns on 
Exchange Rate 
Returns 
Swap Return 
Difference on 
Exchange Rate 
Returns 
Swap Return 
Difference  on Swap 
Return Difference 
Exchange Rate 
Returns on Swap 
Return Difference 
  
Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta 
  t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3 t-1 t-2 t-3 
USD AUD 0.03 -0.05 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 
USD JPY 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.13 -0.06 -0.17 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.25 -0.08 
USD GBP 0.13 -0.03 0.14 -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 
USD CHF -0.02 -0.08 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 
USD CAD -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.09 0.13 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.04 
USD DEM 0.04 -0.06 0.10 0.17 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 
AUD JPY 0.02 0.05 -0.04 0.27 0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.06 -0.13 0.03 
AUD GBP -0.09 -0.16 0.01 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 
AUD CHF -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.27 0.42 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
AUD CAD -0.09 -0.12 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.15 0.01 -0.05 
AUD DEM -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.28 0.38 0.11 -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.10 
JPY GBP 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 -0.22 -0.14 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.08 -0.17 -0.08 
JPY CHF -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.36 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.04 -0.03 
JPY CAD -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.14 -0.13 -0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 
JPY DEM 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.18 0.04 
GBP CHF 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.05 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.16 
GBP CAD -0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.32 -0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.15 -0.23 -0.17 
GBP DEM 0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.09 -0.18 0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.12 -0.08 
CHF CAD -0.09 0.07 -0.00 0.29 0.14 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 
CHF DEM -0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13 
CAD DEM -0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.31 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 
This table shows the betas of the vector autoregression for exchange rate returns and swap differential 
returns for all currency pairs with three lags. 
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II.4 Concluding Remarks 
The uncovered interest rate parity has been a puzzle for decades, particularly when confronted 
with empirical data. The analysis has been incomplete, as only short-term interest rates have 
been analyzed and risk aversion has been ignored. This puzzle can be solved, to a degree, by 
taking long-term interest rate returns or changes in long-term bond prices, respectively. The 
time-varying risk plays an important part in the UIP regression. However, the important thing 
is to take the return of the long-term interest rate - here, I used the 10-year swap return. The 
return also includes unexpected interest rate returns and therefore avoids the problem of future 
interest rate estimation errors. In the empirical analysis, I found a beta that had been pushed 
close to 1 in the past couple of years, confirming the UIP theory. Thus, the failure of UIP for 
short-term maturities is caused by the failure of the expectation theory of the interest rate 
term structure. As a result, if a model to forecast future long-term interest rates were to exist, 
this model should also be able to forecast future spot exchange rates, something that hardly 
any model has ever been able to do. 
In terms of further research, it would be interesting to analyze the constituents of the interest 
rates. Generally, interest rates consist of the risk-free rate, and a liquidity premium plus a 
credit risk premium. So far, the G7 countries have been considered to be very liquid and low-
risk; thus, the swap rates should represent the riskless rate. However, this might no longer be 
true, as the market risk of the G7 countries is no longer considered to be identical by the 
financial markets. In the latter case, an increase in the interest rate driven by increased credit 
risk will not lead to an appreciation of that currency, but rather to a depreciation. Corte, 
Sarno, Schmeling, and Wagner [2013] have recently begun with this research. 
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Abstract 
The first equity futures was launched in 1982 on the S&P 500 Index. The futures 
market has grown enormously since then, and is more liquid than is the cash 
market in many countries. The analysis here proves that the futures market is 
highly efficient from many perspectives. Transaction costs in futures are on average 
one third of those in the cash market. Arbitrage is hardly ever possible. As futures 
contain information about future dividends, they can be used to analyze the market 
estimation for dividends. Even this proves to be quite efficient, with an exception 
in 2008, when the market either underestimated the subsequent dividends, or the 
increased risk aversion caused market values of future dividends that were too low. 
Withholding taxes caused a split between the futures and the cash markets. For 
investors who cannot reclaim foreign withholding taxes, it is beneficial for them to 
invest only in futures, as dividend earnings implied in the futures price are not 
taxed. 
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III.1  Introduction 
More than 30 years ago, on April 21 in 1982, the S&P 500 Index Futures was launched as one 
of the first equity index futures.1  
The growth of equity futures trading continued in the following years; thus, the major stock 
indices of almost every country currently have a futures market. This offers the opportunity to 
invest in a global equity portfolio using only a few futures (synthetic investments), instead of 
thousands of single stocks (cash investments). 
The futures market offers numerous advantages compared to the cash market. The transaction 
costs are much lower in the (established) futures market, and the liquidity is currently two 
times higher (compared to chapter III.2.4). The improved liquidity enables larger trades 
without market impact. Furthermore, a single futures trade generates the exposure to several 
hundred individual stocks at once. Unproblematic leverage is also possible, since the margin 
requirements for futures are roughly 10% those of the nominal, and short sales are possible 
without additional costs. A little-known advantage of futures is the implied withholding tax 
benefit: While a foreign investor often loses the withholding tax on dividend earnings to some 
extent, the future, theoretically, has no withholding tax losses. Trading in some futures is 
possible 24 hours a day, which is especially important for global portfolios, while cash markets 
are open asynchronously. 
It is commonly known that short-term investors should buy futures, since they are cheaper in 
terms of transaction costs, while long-term investors should buy cash stocks, as ongoing costs of 
the cash markets are lower. However, it is unclear how long an investment should last in order 
for cash investments to be cheaper than futures.  
Unfortunately, despite the long and broad acceptance of MSCI World as a global benchmark, 
there is still no liquid MSCI World futures available. In recent years, the MSCI EAFE Futures 
(Europe, Australia, and the Far East) have achieved acceptance, but the daily turnover is only 
$150 million, which is still very small. As an example, the EURO STOXX 50 futures have a 
daily turnover of $44 billion. Thus, a global futures investment for large investors has to be 
replicated using a combination of several stock index futures. 
Jorion and Roisenberg (1993) were the first to analyze the performance and transaction costs of 
an international, synthetic portfolio. They used five futures to replicate the MSCI World 
                                         
1 The Value Line Index Futures traded on the Kansas City Board of Trade was the first equity futures, 
launched on February 16, 1982. This futures was far less successful than the S&P 500 Futures, and is 
rarely still traded (Source http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_1980s.html). 
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international equity benchmark for the period from 1987-1990. At this time, one-way 
transaction costs were 15 bps in the cash US stock market and 4 bps in the futures market. 
MSCI World contained 21 countries, although South Africa has dropped out, and Austria, 
Greece, Israel, and Portugal have been included in the index in the meantime. The tracking 
error of these five futures, compared to the MSCI World Index, was 3.02%, and the 
outperformance of the futures was 4.4%. 
Waring and Attwood (1999) analyzed the horizon from 1989-1996 for nine country indices of 
the MSCI EAFE Benchmark. The US and Canada were excluded, since these countries are 
domestic and not international from the perspective of a US investor. Their study focuses on a 
detailed transaction cost comparison between futures and cash investments, including 
commissions, market impact, taxes, management fees, securities lending revenues, rollover 
costs, and so-called futures mispricing costs. They estimate the net costs to establish and 
maintain positions for one year to be within a range of between -0.05% and -1.24% in the cash 
market, and 0.86% and -1.45% in the futures market. Over a 10-year horizon, they found a 
positive return on the futures compared to the MSCI indices in the UK, France, Germany, and 
Italy, while the return was negative in Australia, Spain, Hong Kong, Sweden, and Japan. The 
tracking error of the futures, compared to the individual country indices, varied between 1 and 
4%.  
Hill and Naviwala [1999] analyzed the transaction costs, performance and tracking error of the 
S&P 500 for the period from 1992-1998. They estimated the annual costs for the S&P 500 
futures to be 5-8, and 30 bps for the cash stocks. In their analysis, the futures performance was, 
on average, 5 bps below the gross return index. The standard deviation of the futures deviation 
from the fair value is denoted as 0.20%, and the tracking error between the futures and the 
index performance is 0.56% on a quarterly basis, and 0.98% on monthly basis. They mentioned 
that the annualized quarterly tracking error is a better measure, since the daily mispricing has 
a mean reversion. 
In this paper, the analysis of the papers above is combined. In the first part, the theoretical 
considerations of the synthetic investments are analyzed. In the second part, the investments 
are analyzed empirically for individual futures compared to their index, while the last part 
presents the characteristics of a global portfolio with MSCI World as a benchmark. It will 
provide guidance for large international investors like pension funds, mutual funds, or ETFs 
who invest in global equity portfolios.  
The individual analysis reveals that futures are priced very efficiently compared to their index 
in every way, with certain exceptions during the financial crisis. The price deviation of a 
futures to its index is usually within the no-arbitrage bounds, which are provided by the 
transaction costs. The transaction costs of futures are, on average, only 3.3 basis points, and 
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therefore 1/3 of the cash market transaction costs. The return of a futures is similar to the 
return of a cash investment. Even the cost to rollover a futures has been quite exact, although 
the dividends are not precisely known in advance. It was only during the financial crisis that 
the future dividends were either underestimated, or were priced very low due to risk aversion.  
A global futures portfolio has a tracking error of 0.67% to the MSCI World index. The futures 
return was 0.29% below the total gross return of a cash investment, but was 0.37% above the 
total net return of a cash investment. The difference between the total return and the total net 
return of a cash investment is the withholding taxes. Thus, for long-term investments, the tax 
status of the investors is decisive. If they are not able to reclaim withholding taxes in foreign 
countries, they will have a higher return with a futures investment in all cases. For investors 
who can reclaim withholding taxes, the holding period for futures should not exceed several 
months, because otherwise the ongoing costs will exceed the initial transaction cost benefit. 
III.2 Framework for Synthetic Equity Investment 
III.2.1 Data 
The basic universe is the MSCI World Index of the developed markets. Table 1 presents the 
country universe, their weights in the MSCI World developed as of December 31 2012, and the 
related futures. If there were more than one futures for a country with different indices, I chose 
the futures whose index had the lowest tracking error to the MSCI country index. MSCI uses 
the market capitalization of the MSCI Country Indices to determine the weights of each 
country in the MSCI World. There are currently no futures available for Ireland and New 
Zealand. For Japan, I used the TOPIX futures instead of the more famous Nikkei 225 Future, 
since the TOPIX futures has a smaller tracking error to MSCI Japan.2 
The countries in the MSCI Eurozone (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) can alternatively be replicated with the 
EURO STOXX 50 Futures. MSCI Eurozone has a weight of 12.33% in the MSCI World Index. 
 
 
                                         
2 The TOPIX Futures has roughly 1600 constituents, while the MSCI Japan has only 350. However, the 
TOPIX and the MSCI Japan are both capital-weighted indices, while the Nikkei is a price-weighted 
index. 
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Table 1: Universe 
MSCI 
 
Weight 
 
Future 
MSCI USA 
 
52.56% 
 
S&P 500 Futures 
MSCI Japan 
 
8.55% 
 
TOPIX Futures 
MSCI UK 
 
9.65% 
 
FTSE 100 Futures 
MSCI Canada 
 
4.89% 
 
S&P TSX 60 Futures 
MSCI France 
 
4.09% 
 
Cac40 Futures 
MSCI Australia 
 
3.81% 
 
S&P ASX 200 Futures 
MSCI Switzerland 
 
3.56% 
 
SMI Futures 
MSCI Germany 
 
3.75% 
 
DAX 30 Futures 
MSCI Spain 
 
1.29% 
 
IBEX 35 Futures 
MSCI Sweden 
 
1.35% 
 
OMXS30 Futures 
MSCI Italy 
 
0.96% 
 
FTSE MIB Futures 
MSCI Netherlands 
 
1.07% 
 
AEX Futures 
MSCI Hong Kong 
 
1.34% 
 
Hang Seng Futures 
MSCI Singapore 
 
0.80% 
 
MSCI Singapore Futures 
MSCI Finland 
 
0.34% 
 
OMXH25 Futures 
MSCI Denmark 
 
0.49% 
 
OMXC20 Futures 
MSCI Belgium 
 
0.50% 
 
BEL20 Futures 
MSCI Israel 
 
0.23% 
 
TA 25 Futures 
MSCI Norway 
 
0.39% 
 
OBX Futures 
MSCI Austria 
 
0.13% 
 
ATX Futures 
MSCI Ireland 
 
0.11% 
  MSCI Greece 
 
0.02% 
 
FTSE ATHEX 20 Futures 
MSCI Portugal 
 
0.08% 
 
PSI 20 Futures 
MSCI New Zealand 
 
0.05% 
  This table presents the universe of the MSCI World with a due date of December 31 2012, the weight of 
each country and the corresponding future. 
III.2.2 Data Source 
The primary data source is Bloomberg, since it has an extremely comprehensive database of 
futures. The data horizon is from February 26 1999 to December 31 2012. There are two 
reasons why I did not look at older data. Firstly, the completeness of available data decreases 
rapidly in the earlier years. Secondly, older data are less representative for trading advice 
today. 
Intraday Data: For the bid-ask spread and trading volume analysis, I used the intraday tick-
by-tick data at Bloomberg from September 1 2009 to February 28 2010. For the intraday data 
of the S&P 500 in 2008, the data provider is also Bloomberg. 
MSCI: The MSCI indices are the official international indices in USD, including both gross 
and net return indices. 
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FX: For the currency exchange rate, the official MSCI exchange rates against the USD were 
used. 
Interest Rates: The maturity of the interest rate is between one day and six months. If the 
maturity does not match the expiration, the interest rate is linearly interpolated. The LIBOR 
and swap interest rates are used. As the swap rate is the preferred rate, but is not available for 
the beginning of the time period, LIBOR is used in the first period and swap rates in the 
second. Table 2 indicates which rate is used, and at which date it switches from LIBOR to 
swap rates. 
Table 2: Interest Rates 
 
First Period Second Period Change Date 
USD LIBOR Swap Rate 04.12.2001 
JPY LIBOR Swap Rate 15.03.2002 
GBP LIBOR Swap Rate 14.12.2000 
EUR Swap Rate Swap Rate - 
CAD LIBOR Swap Rate 03.05.2002 
AUD LIBOR Swap Rate 23.10.2001 
CHF LIBOR Swap Rate 17.08.2000 
SEK STIBOR Swap Rate 03.08.2004 
HKD HIBOR Swap Rate 08.08.2001 
SGD Swap Rate Swap Rate 07.11.2001 
DKK CIBOR Swap Rate 01.02.2001 
NOK NIBOR NIBOR - 
This table presents the chosen interest rate for each currency, and the switch date from LIBOR to the 
swap rate. 
Futures/Indices: Not all futures or gross return indices exist for the entire period. Table 3 
shows the start date of the futures/indices that began during the period in question. 
Table 3: Start Date Futures/Indices 
Future/Index Start Date 
S&P ASX 200 31.05.2000 
FTSE MIB 31.03.2004 
OMXS30 28.02.2005 
FTSE Athex 20 28.11.2008 
OMXH25 30.09.2005 
EURO STOXX 50 31.01.2001 
This table presents the start date of futures and indices for all countries in which one of them started 
later than the general starting period of February 26 1999. 
The EURO STOXX 50 Futures is available for the entire period, but the EURO STOXX 50 
gross return index is only available from January 31 2001. Comparisons between the return of 
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the EURO STOXX 50 Futures and the gross return index start on January 31 2001, while 
portfolio comparisons between futures and the MSCI also start on December 31 1999, since all 
MSCI data are available from the beginning. 
The following gross return indices are from Datastream, since the data quality is either 
insufficient or the data are not available from Bloomberg: S&P TSX 60,  S&P ASX 200, AEX, 
Hang Seng, MSCI Singapore, OMX Copenhagen, FTSE Athex 20, and OMX Helsinki 25. 
Transaction costs: The source for the brokerage costs is the Zuercher Kantonalbank (ZKB), 
based in Switzerland. 
III.2.3 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are an important factor in the performance of equity portfolios, particularly 
if the turnover within the portfolio is high. There are several sources of transaction costs. The 
most important are the spread of the bid and the offer price. A trade that must be executed 
immediately is traded at the bid price in the event of a sell-order, and at the offer price in the 
event of a buy-order. Furthermore, some countries demand a transaction fee, also called Tobin 
tax. Lastly, the bank that executes the order also charges a brokerage fee, which can be 
substantially higher than all the fees above. The brokerage fee varies depending on the bank, 
the exchange, the client, and the order size. In this paper, I used the costs for institutional 
investors trading with the Swiss bank ZKB as a reference.  
The spread to the mid-price is defined as follows:  
½ 퐵퐴 − 푆푝푟푒푎푑 = 푃푎 − 푃푏푃푎 + 푃푏 
where Pb is the bid price and Pa is the asking price. In the cash market, I took the weighted 
bid-ask spreads of each individual stock in the index to calculate the bid-ask spread of the 
index. For some futures and equity markets, bid and ask prices are not recorded, which is 
usually the case in open outcry markets without electronic trading. For those markets, I used 
the trade spread as a proxy for the spread to the mid-price. The methodology is from Wang, 
Chung, and Yang [2007]. 
½ 푇 − 푆푝푟푒푎푑 = |푇푃푡+1 − 푇푃푡|푇푃푡+1 + 푇푃푡  
where  푇  is the trade spread, which is the spread between the transaction price  TPt  at time t 
and the price TPt+1 at time t+1. TPt+1 is the next transaction price that is unequal to TPt, 
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and which had changed the direction of the price from increase to decrease, or vice versa. The 
brokerage fee for large program trades3 in the MSCI World is 3 Bps at ZKB. This fee includes 
both the brokerage fee and the exchange fee, but not the taxes. The brokerage fee for futures is 
individual for each future, and is independent from the number of futures. 
For futures, rollover costs incur. The brokerage fees for the rollover of a futures have to be paid 
twice, and a rollover spread also occurs. For most futures, there is actually a quoted bid- and 
ask-price for the rollover difference between the current and the next futures contract. This 
spread is typically lower than is the bid-ask spread. For these cases, I used the spread of the 
bid-ask rollover difference. If there a rollover spread available were not available, I took the 
ordinary bid-ask spread of the future.4 Nonetheless, the rollover spread is an upper boundary 
for the actual costs, since there is no time pressure to execute the rollover immediately. 
Therefore, the rollover could be executed with a limited order, thus avoiding part- or full-
spread costs. 
Table 4 shows the transaction cost of the developed MSCI country indices and the 
corresponding futures.5 
Table 4: Transaction Costs 
Country Instrument 
Broker-
age Fee 
Transac-
tion Tax 
1/2 BA 
Spread 
1/2 BA 
FX Total 
Rollover 
Costs 
USA S&P 500 Futures  0.2     1.2     1.3   2.2  
USA MSCI US  3.0   0.2   2.3     5.5    
Japan TOPIX Futures  1.2     2.9   2.7   6.7   11.5  
Japan MSCI Japan  3.0     7.6   2.7   13.3    
UK FTSE 100 Futures  0.4     0.7   1.8   2.9   5.5  
UK6 MSCI UK  3.0   25.0   4.6   1.8   34.4    
France Cac40 Futures  0.7     1.0   0.8   2.5   8.2  
France MSCI France  3.0     2.6   0.8   6.5    
Canada S&P TSX 60 Futures  0.5     1.4   3.6   5.5   4.8  
Canada MSCI Canada  3.0     2.4   3.6   9.0    
Australia S&P ASX 200 Futures  0.4     1.3   3.5   5.2   7.4  
                                         
3 According to the NYSE, a large program trade is a basket of at least 15 shares with a market value of 
$ 1 Mio. or more http://www.nyse.com/press/1294312649052.html. 
4 There is no rollover spread for FTSE MIB, OMXS30, or TA 25. 
5 The source for the brokerage fee is ZKB Asset Management. The sources for the bid-ask spread are the 
quoted spreads from September 1 2009 to February 28 2010, and constitute the average of all intraday 
quotes during the main trading sessions. For the rollover spreads, only the last trading week of the 
expiring futures was considered. 
6 The UK has a stamp duty of 50 bps for a buy per share and a 1£ levy for a sell per trade; thus, the 
tax is an average of 25 bps per trade. 
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Australia MSCI Australia  3.0     5.2   3.5   11.7    
Germany DAX 30 Futures  0.2     0.7   0.8   1.7   2.9  
Germany MSCI Germany  3.0     2.8   0.8   6.6    
Switzerland SMI Futures  0.2     1.1   1.3   2.7   4.8  
Switzerland MSCI Switzerland  3.0     4.6   1.3   8.9    
Spain IBEX 35 Futures  0.5     1.4   0.8   2.7   14.9  
Spain MSCI Spain  3.0     3.7   0.8   7.6    
Italy FTSE MIB Futures  0.4     1.5   0.8   2.7   15.3  
Italy MSCI Italy  3.0     4.5   0.8   8.3    
Netherlands AEX Futures  0.6     1.2   0.8   2.6   22.7  
Netherlands MSCI Netherlands  3.0     6.9   0.8   10.7    
Sweden OMXS30 Futures  4.5     1.9   4.6   11.0   153.6  
Sweden MSCI Sweden  3.0     4.9   4.6   12.5    
Hong Kong Hang Seng Futures  0.5     0.6   1.8   2.8   15.4  
Hong Kong MSCI Hong Kong  3.0   10.9   6.7   1.8   22.4    
Singapore MSCI Singapore Futures  2.3     2.3   3.3   7.8   71.4  
Singapore MSCI Singapore  3.0     13.3   3.3   19.6    
Belgium BEL20 Futures  2.1     13.3   0.8   16.2   57.3  
Belgium MSCI Belgium  3.0     4.0   0.8   7.8    
Denmark OMXC20 Futures  9.6     20.0   2.2   31.7   503.4  
Denmark MSCI Denmark  3.0     7.9   2.2   13.0    
Norway OBX Futures  7.6     9.0   5.0   21.6   306.0  
Norway MSCI Norway  3.0     4.6   5.0   12.6    
Greece FTSE Athex 20 Futures  2.1     6.2   0.8   9.2   39.3  
Greece MSCI Greece  3.0     29.6   0.8   33.5    
Austria ATX Futures  2.7     21.9   0.8   25.4   108.4  
Austria MSCI Austria  3.0     7.9   0.8   11.8    
Portugal PSI 20 Futures  -     15.5   0.8   16.3   87.5  
Portugal MSCI Portugal  3.0     5.8   0.8   9.7    
Finland OMXH25 Futures  -     18.7   0.8   19.5   32.0  
Finland MSCI Finland  3.0     5.1   0.8   8.9    
Ireland    -     -   0.8   0.8    
Ireland MSCI Ireland  3.0   100.0   13.2   0.8   117.0    
New 
Zealand    -     -   4.8   4.8    
New 
Zealand MSCI New Zealand  3.0     13.1   4.8   20.9    
Eurozone EURO STOXX 50 Futures  0.7     1.8   0.8   3.3   12.1  
Eurozone MSCI Eurozone  3.0     4.2   0.8   8.0    
Israel TA 25 Futures  -     10.5   8.3   18.8   84.1  
Israel MSCI Israel             
This table presents the transaction costs for futures and cash investments for each country in the MSCI 
world. The costs are denoted in basis points. The costs were recorded in 2010. 
  
107 
The lowest transaction costs are in the USA, with 1.3 bps for the futures and 5.5 bps for the 
cash market. The most expensive market is Ireland with 117 bps, due to its stamp duty of 100 
bps, followed by the UK with 34.4 bps (25 bps stamp duty). In Belgium, Denmark, Norway, 
Austria, Portugal, and Finland, the futures are more expensive than is the cash market. The 
futures trading volume in those markets is below that of the cash volume. 
Neal [1996] has a bid-ask spread of 64 bps for the S&P 500. Chan and Lakonishok [1993] 
estimated transaction costs for large institutional investors as being approximately 16 bps for 
S&P 500. Beebower and Priest [1980] estimated 70 bps transaction costs for the S&P500. 
Wang, Chung, and Yang [2007] estimated a bid-ask spread of 1.6 bps for the S&P 500 Futures. 
Kurov and Zabotina [2005] have 1.2 bps for S&P 500 Futures, which is already close to the 0.6 
bps in this study. Kurov and Zabotina [2005] showed that the bid-ask spread depends strongly 
on the minimum tick size, which is currently 0.1 index points for the S&P 500. Thus, several 
factors led to lower transaction costs: liquidity increased during the past decades, the minimum 
tick size was reduced in many markets and the index level increased, all of which produced 
lower bid-ask spreads. The EURO STOXX 50 has a relatively high bid-ask spread, more than 
twice that of the Cac40 Futures. The reason is that the minimum tick size is high, with 1 index 
point, which equaled roughly 5 bps in 2012. 
To my knowledge, Waring and Attwood [1999] were the only people who made a comparison of 
global transaction costs for futures and for the cash market. They analyzed nine countries in 
the MSCI EAFE, and found average transaction costs of 43 bps for the cash market, 31 bps for 
futures and 38 bps annual rollover costs. The problem is that they included market impact 
costs for a $1 billion portfolio, which is difficult to estimate. I have transaction costs of 13.7 
bps for the cash market and 4.3 bps for futures in those countries, but I excluded market 
impact costs and included currency transaction costs. While I got 3 bps brokerage fees for the 
cash market and 0.9 Bps for futures, while they reported 12.1 for cash and 2.1 for futures.  
The reasons that the transaction costs are so different are that the transaction costs have 
decreased during the last couple of decades, the brokerage fees of banks are different and are 
client specific, and some studies include market impact costs. However, the liquidity is 
currently very high, and the top level of both the S&P 500 and the EURO STOXX 50 order 
book have 50 million volume more than is tradable at the bid-ask price.  
In this study, I excluded the market impact cost in order to obtain a proper comparison of 
transaction costs. It is reasonable to assume that, for a volume of several $ 100 million, there 
are no market impact costs, but only the bid-ask spread costs. Nonetheless, if the volume is 
higher than several $ 100 million, it might be reasonable not to trade everything at once or, if 
possible, to trade it in the closing auction. 
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III.2.4 Trading 
Table 5 lists the number of stocks, the daily trading volume, and the trading hours of the 
MSCI country index compared to its corresponding future.  
Table 5: Trading Details 
Instrument #Stocks  Volume7  Trading Hours8 
S&P 500 Futures9  500   98'039   00:00-24:00  
MSCI US  602   33'585   09:30-16:00  
TOPIX Futures  1'600   4‘196   19:00-05:00  
MSCI Japan  344   14'936   19:00-01:00  
FTSE 100 Futures  100   8'632   02:00-16:00  
MSCI UK  102   6'733   03:00-11:30  
Cac40 Futures  40   6'076   02:00-16:00  
MSCI France  71   5'342   03:00-11:30  
S&P TSX 60 Futures  66   1'573   06:00-16:00  
MSCI Canada  99   3'790   09:30-16:00  
S&P ASX 200 Futures  200   3'251   00:00-24:00  
MSCI Australia  73   3'175   18:00-00:00  
DAX 30 Futures  30   27'417   02:00-16:00  
MSCI Germany  49   4'922   03:00-11:30  
SMI Futures  20   2'277   02:00-16:00  
MSCI Switzerland  40   3'084   03:00-11:30  
IBEX 35 Futures  35   2'198   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Spain  30   2'790   03:00-11:30  
FTSE MIB Futures  40   2'183   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Italy  34   3'638   03:00-11:30  
AEX Futures  24   2'874   02:00-16:00  
MSCI Netherlands  23   1'458   03:00-11:30  
OMXS30 Futures  30   965   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Sweden  30   1'440   03:00-11:30  
Hang Seng Futures  42   9706   21:00-03:00  
MSCI Hong Kong  40   815   21:00-03:00  
MSCI Singapore Futures  29   364   19:30-12:00  
MSCI Singapore  29   656   20:00-04:30  
BEL20 Futures  20   7   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Belgium  13   407   03:00-11:30  
                                         
7 The source for the trading volume is Bloomberg. The cash indices are the average trading volume of 
equities from September 1 2009 to March 24 2010. The futures consist of the median trading volume 
since there are spikes preceding the expiry of the futures, due to rollover transactions. 
8 Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have a break during local lunchtime. THE S&P ASX 200 Futures 
have 40 minutes’ break after the closing of the cash market. 
9 The S&P 500 Futures have $5 billion trading volume, while the S&P 500 E-Mini Futures have $93 
billion. 
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OMXC20 Futures  20   2   03:00-11:00  
MSCI Denmark  13   398   03:00-11:30  
OBX Futures  25   47   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Norway  8   716   03:00-11:30  
FTSE Athex 20 Futures  20   81   03:00-08:00  
MSCI Greece  11   245   03:30-09:00  
ATX Futures  20   6   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Austria  8   161   03:00-11:30  
PSI 20 Futures  20   1   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Portugal  8   177   03:00-11:30  
OMXH25 Futures  25   2   00:00-24:00  
MSCI Finland  16   585   03:00-11:30  
TA 25 Futures  25   164   03:00-11:30  
MSCI Israel  17   367   02:30-11:00  
EURO STOXX 50 Futures  50   43'873   02:00-16:00  
MSCI Eurozone  268   19'802   03:00-11:30  
This table presents the trading details for futures and cash investments for each country in the MSCI 
world. The number of stocks is the number of stocks in the future, or in the MSCI Index in June 
2010.The volume is the daily trading volume in $ billion recorded during the period from September 1 
2009 to March 24 2010. The trading hours are the periods in which trading is possible, as of June 30 
2010. 
Most futures match the MSCI index quite closely regarding the number of stocks. However, the 
TOPIX Futures has 1600 stocks, which is much more than that of the MSCI Japan, which has 
with 344. While the Nikkei 225 would seem to be more adequate considering the number of 
stocks, it is a price-weighted index and not a market-capitalization weighted index, like the 
MSCI Japan. Thus, the weights of the large stocks are more precise in the TOPIX future, an 
aspect that is more important since they are the main driver of the capital-weighted MSCI 
index. The EURO STOXX 50 Futures has only 50 stocks, compared to MSCI Eurozone with 
268 stocks. For Singapore, there is an MSCI futures that is liquid. 
Some countries have much greater trading volume in the futures than in the cash market. The 
S&P 500 Futures has the price-weighted volume of $98 billion per day, while the cash market 
has only $34 billion. Hill and Naviwala [1999] measured the volume of the S&P 500 in 1998, 
and found it was $34 billion. Thus, the volume has nearly tripled over the past 12 years. The 
EURO STOXX 50 Futures has $44 billion, while the cash market, which is even broader, has 
only $19 billion. The DAX Futures has a volume of $27 billion, compared to $ 5 billion in 
MSCI Germany, while the Hang Seng Futures are also much more liquid than are those of 
MSCI Hong Kong ($9 billion versus $1 billion). In Japan, the TOPIX Futures volume is, at $4 
billion, much lower than that of the MSCI Japan ($15 billion). An equally large part of the 
Japanese futures market is traded on the Nikkei 225. In Belgium, Norway, Greece, Austria, 
Portugal, and Finland, the futures market is much more illiquid than is the cash market. The 
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volume in these markets is below $100 million and, in Portugal, it is only $1 million. Hence, 
these futures are not practical for large futures portfolios. 
In the major markets, the futures market is open for 14 hours per day, while the cash market is 
open for 8.5 hours. The S&P 500 and the S&P ASX 200 Futures are tradable 24 hours per day. 
In the smaller market, the trading hours for futures are similar to those of the cash market. 
However, the volume is much lower in the futures market outside of the cash market’s trading 
hours. Bid-ask spreads are also higher, up to twice the regular value. 
III.2.5 Withholding Taxes 
Table 6 shows the withholding tax rate and the dividend yield of the MSCI country indices.  
All countries except for the UK, Hong Kong, and Singapore deduct withholding taxes on 
dividends. International investors can lose those taxes. Most countries have double taxation 
treaties, which reduce the tax losses on dividends to 15% for most countries. An exception is 
the home country of the investors, where institutional investors do not pay withholding taxes. 
Thus, the market is fragmented: some investors pay full withholding taxes, some pay only 
reduced rates, and home investors do not pay any taxes at all. The MSCI contributes to this 
fact with two return indices: the total gross return index reinvests the full dividend amount, 
while the net return international index invests only the dividends’ net full withholding taxes.10 
Futures imply no explicit taxes, and there is no market fragmentation since the price is the 
same for all investors. The dividend return is included in the price. However, the taxes on 
dividends might be adjusted in the price, and interest earnings are taxable in the home 
country11. However, institutional investors can reclaim withholding taxes in the home country. 
Thus, the only aspect that is important for them is the futures implied dividend return 
compared to the dividend return that they would receive with cash equities. 
The dividend yield is lowest in Japan with 1.7%, which is also the country that had the lowest 
interest rates during the past 10 years. New Zealand had the highest yield, with 6.7%. The 
average dividend yield in the MSCI World was 2.9%. An investor who has to pay full 
withholding taxes would have lost 0.66% per year if s/he had invested in the MSCI World. 
S/he could have reduced the loss to 0.35% under double taxation benefits.12  
 
                                         
10 http://www.mscibarra.com/eqb/methodology/meth_docs/MSCI_Feb11_IndexCalcMethodology.pdf 
11 A synthetic investor can place the cash money completely in his home country and achieve interest 
earnings aboard with currency forwards or currency futures. 
12 In certain countries, such as the US, some investors like pension funds are even fully tax-exempt. 
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Table 6: Withholding Tax Rates 
Country 
Withholding Tax 
Rate Dividend Yield 
Full Withholding 
Tax Loss 
Reduced With-
holding Tax Loss 
USA 30.00% 2.4% 0.72% 0.4% 
Japan 7.00% 1.7% 0.12% 0.1% 
UK 0.00% 3.9% 0.00% 0.0% 
France 25.00% 3.5% 0.88% 0.5% 
Canada 25.00% 3.7% 0.93% 0.6% 
Australia 30.00% 4.9% 1.48% 0.7% 
Germany 26.38% 4.0% 1.07% 0.6% 
Switzerland 35.00% 2.1% 0.72% 0.3% 
Spain 19.00% 4.1% 0.79% 0.6% 
Italy 27.00% 5.3% 1.42% 0.8% 
Netherlands 15.00% 4.1% 0.61% 0.6% 
Sweden 30.00% 4.5% 1.34% 0.7% 
Hong Kong 0.00% 4.2% 0.00% 0.0% 
Singapore 0.00% 4.3% 0.00% 0.0% 
Belgium 25.00% 4.1% 1.03% 0.6% 
Denmark 28.00% 2.5% 0.70% 0.4% 
Norway 25.00% 4.5% 1.12% 0.7% 
Greece 10.00% 2.3% 0.23% 0.2% 
Austria 25.00% 3.3% 0.82% 0.5% 
Portugal 20.00% 4.2% 0.85% 0.6% 
Finland 28.00% 5.0% 1.40% 0.7% 
Ireland 20.00% 2.5% 0.50% 0.4% 
New Zealand 15.00% 6.7% 1.00% 1.0% 
Israel 20.00% 2.1% 0.00% 0.0% 
Eurozone 25.00% 2.9% 0.00% 0.0% 
World 23.14% 2.9% 0.65% 0.35% 
This table shows the withholding tax rate and the dividend yield of the MSCI country indices. The 
dividend yield is from Datastream and reports the average yield from December 31 1999 to December 31 
2009. The withholding tax rate is that of June 2010. The withholding tax loss is the dividend multiplied 
by the withholding tax rate. The reduced withholding tax loss is the dividend yield multiplied by the 
recued withholding tax rate under double tax agreements. 
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III.2.6 Theoretical Futures Price 
A popular model to derive the fair value of the futures price is the cost-of-carry model. Kaldor 
[1939] described this model for commodity futures, which already have a much longer existence. 
For equity futures, the pricing formula is as follows (see, for example, Miller, Muthuswamy and 
Whaley [1994], or Neal [1996]): 
where Ft∗ is the fair value of the futures price, It is the spot price of the index, rt is the 
continuous interest rate with maturity T and is assumed to be constant over the contract life, 
T-t is the time to maturity, and Di is the dividend paid on day i. From (1), it follows that Ft∗ = It on expiry. The fair value of the futures price is nothing other than the compounded 
value of the stock index at the expiry of the futures contract, less the compounded dividends 
until expiry. Thus, as the name says, it is the futures value of the current index price. 
Futures contain almost no counterparty risk,13 since the exchange guarantees the daily 
settlement of the contract. As a result, rt is the risk-free interest rate. Currently, the OIS 
interest rate is considered to be the best proxy for the risk-free interest rate, since it is also 
settled daily via a cash settlement and there is no notional exchange. 
Excursion: Risk-Free Interest Rates: 
For the data from 1999 to 2002, I used the LIBOR as the interest rate, since the OIS is not yet 
available and the interbank risk was negligible during this period (compared to the interest rate 
analysis in the attachment). For data after 2002, I used the OIS because the OIS contains 
almost no interbank risk, while the LIBOR contains the full interbank risk spread. The LIBOR 
is the London interbank offered rate, which is the daily fixed offered interest rate of the British 
Bankers Association. The OIS is the overnight indexed swap, which has a fixed leg and a 
floating leg. The floating leg is tied to the daily overnight reference index. The fixed rate of this 
swap is probably the best risk-free interest rate that is available today (for a detailed 
argument, see Hull and White [2013]). Table 7 and Figure 1 present the descriptive statistics 
for the different types of US interest instruments.  
The three-month LIBOR is, on average, 2.77% over the entire sample period, while the three-
month treasury is 2.31. The 0.46% difference represents the credit risk. In the period between 
                                         
13 During the crash in October 1987 and the drop of the S&P 500 Futures of 29%, the default of the 
clearing house was not always impossible (see Bernanke [1990]). 
 퐹푡∗ = 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) − ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇
푖=푡+1
 (1) 
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2002-2006, this difference was much smaller (0.26%), while the gap widened in the period from 
2007-2012 (0.62%). The difference is similar for all maturities. 
The three-month Swap OIS is, on average, 2.56% over the period 2002-2006, while the LIBOR 
is 2.68%. Therefore, in this first period, LIBOR and Swap OIS are very similar, with a 
difference of only 12 basis points. In the period from 2007-2012, the difference increases to 43 
basis points, which makes the Swap OIS rate a much better proxy for the risk-free rate in that 
period. 
However, the three-month treasury rate is still 19 basis points below the Swap OIS in the 
period from 2007-2012. So why not use the treasury rate as the risk-free rate? As Hull and 
White [2013] argued, the treasury rate is sometimes too low with regard to the true risk-free 
rate, as treasuries have some special tax treatments. They estimated the credit risk on the 
Swap OIS rate to be around five basis points14, which is very small. Another problem is that 
government bills in other countries are not as equally risk-free as they are in the US. Therefore, 
the Swap OIS is currently considered to be the best risk-free rate proxy that is globally 
comparable. 
Table 7: Average US Interest Rate Levels 
 
 
6M 3M 1M 1D 
19
99
-
20
12
 
LIBOR 2.90 2.77 2.65 N/A 
Swap N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Treasury 2.44 2.31 N/A N/A 
 
     
20
02
-
20
06
 
LIBOR 2.79 2.68 2.59 2.52
Swap 2.66 2.56 2.50 2.46 
Treasury 2.58 2.42 2.33 N/A 
 
     
20
07
-
20
12
 
LIBOR 1.86 1.67 1.50 1.38
Swap 1.24 1.24 1.25 1.26 
Treasury 1.16 1.05 1.00 N/A 
This table shows the average US interest rate over the period 1999-2012 and for the sub-periods 2002-
2006 and 2007-2012. Four different maturities are presented; 6 months, 3 months, 1 month and 1 day. 
There are three different interest rate types: LIBOR, which is the unsecured, interbank-offered rate, the 
swap rate, which is an overnight index swap (OIS) on an overnight index rate, and the Treasury rate, 
which is the effective federal funds rate in the US. Treasury rates are the yield to maturity of US 
treasury bills. 
 
                                         
14 They estimated the credit risk by comparing the unsecured overnight rate with the secured overnight 
repo rate. 
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Figure 1: Development of the US 3-Month Interest Rates for Different Types of 
Instruments 
This figure shows the development in the US of the LIBOR, the Swap OIS rate and the treasury rate 
over the period 1999-2012, with a constant maturity of three months. 
III.2.7 Theoretical Futures Return 
The return of a futures investment consists of the return of the futures and the collateral 
return, since the futures investment needs only a fraction of that of a cash investment. In the 
case of international investments, there is also a currency return. In these cases, the collateral 
can be either in the foreign currency or in the domestic currency, and the currency exposure 
can be constructed synthetically with a currency futures or a currency forward. If the currency 
risk is objectionable, the latter transactions can be omitted. The futures alone do not have a 
currency risk, but the profit or loss has a currency risk if it is not immediately converted into 
the domestic currency. 
For the futures investment, a fraction of the futures notional has to be deposited into the bank 
as initial margin, for the protection of the bank from large, daily movements of the future. The 
remainder can be invested in cash on deposit. To match the maturity of the future, it is 
reasonable to invest the collateral with the same expiry date as the future. The precise one-day 
return (from t to t+1) of a futures investment that is equal to a cash total return investment 
in the home country is: 
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 푅̃ = (퐹푡+1 − 퐹푡)/푒푥푝 (푟푡
(푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )퐼푡 + 푒푥푝 (푟푡
1365) − 1 (2) 
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(Ft+1 − Ft)/exp(rt (T−t−1)365 ) is the present value at t+1 of the futures return, and exp(rt 1365) −1 is the return for the collateral. The initial investment is the current index level (compare to 
Figlewski [1984], or to Hill and Naviwala [1999]). 
Formula (2) has exactly the same return as a cash investment: 
퐼푡+1 − 퐼푡 + 퐷푡+1퐼푡  
Proof: If we replace the futures price in formula (2) with formula (1), we get 
푅̃ = 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 + (퐼푡+1푒푥푝 (푟푡+1 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 ) − ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡+1 (푇 − 푡 − 2)365 )푇푖=푡+2 − 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )푇푖=푡+1 )
퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
 
as rt is assumed to be constant over the lifetime of the futures contract, the expression can be 
simplified by replacing rt+1 with rt: 
= 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 + (퐼푡+1푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 ) − ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 2)365 )푇푖=푡+2 − 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )푇푖=푡+1 )
퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
 
 
= 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 +
퐷푡+1푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
+ (퐼푡+1푒푥푝 (푟푡
(푇 − 푡 − 1)365 ) − 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ))
퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
 
 
= 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 + 퐷푡+1퐼푡 +∗
(퐼푡+1푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 ) − 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ))
퐼푡 ∗ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
 
 
= 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 + 퐷푡+1퐼푡 +
퐼푡+1퐼푡 − 푒푥푝 (푟푡
1365) 
 
= 퐷푡+1퐼푡 +
(퐼푡+1)퐼푡 − 1 
which is exactly the same as the return of a cash investment. 
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Similarly, It can be replaced in (2) with 
퐼푡 = (퐹푡 + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 )
푇
푖=푡+1
) /푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) 
from (1). We then get: 
푅̃ = (퐹푡+1 − 퐹푡)/푒푥푝 (푟푡
(푇 − 푡 − 1)365 ) ∗ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 푇 − 푡365 )
퐹푡 + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 )푇푖=푡+1
+ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 
 
= (퐹푡+1 − 퐹푡) ∗ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365)퐹푡 + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )푇푖=푡+1
+ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 
 
Theoretically, (2) and (3) are identical. In practice, (3) is superior to (2), since mispriced 
futures are better integrated. Suppose, for example, that the futures price is 1000 and the index 
price is 1000. There are no dividends and no interest. If the futures price increases to 1100 as a 
result of mispricing, that is a gain of 100, which is 10% in both (2) and (3). However, if the 
futures price falls back to 1000, that is a loss of 100, which is -10% in (2) and -9.09% in (3). 
Thus, it would be a geometrical return of -1% in (2) and 0% in (3). Obviously, there should not 
be any loss, since a gain of 100 plus a loss of 100 is 0.  
How much should I invest if I want to replicate a cash investment with a futures? The 
investment amount has to be derived from the index. Let us assume that the index level is 
1000, the futures price is 1050, and the contract size15 of the futures is 10. In this case, one 
futures has to be bought to replicate a $ 10’000 cash investment. After every dividend 
payment, the futures investment has to be increased to replicate the reinvestment of the 
dividends in a total return index. 
                                         
15 The contract size of the futures specifies the relation to the index. If the contract size is 10, then one 
futures is worth 10 times the index. Contract sizes of the equity futures in this analysis vary between 10 
and 10’000. 
 푅̃ = ⎝⎜
⎜⎛1 + (퐹푡+1 − 퐹푡)퐹푡 + ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )푇푖=푡+1 ⎠
⎟⎟⎞ ∗ 푒푥푝 (푟푡 1365) − 1 (3) 
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III.2.8 Dividend Uncertainty 
The determination of the futures price requires knowledge regarding the futures dividend 
payment. However, such dividends are uncertain. In the theory of external habit models, 
volatile dividends are an important factor for the explanation of the equity premium puzzle. 
The external habit model is able to explain the high equity premium under certain assumptions 
with the relationship between consumption claims and dividend earnings. The problem is that 
the model needs to make certain assumptions for parameters to solve for the price-dividend 
ratio. With futures prices, this can be measured directly with the implied dividend in the 
future. Suppose that there exists a stochastic discount factor of the form 
퐵푡(퐶푡+1/퐶푡)−퐺푡 
for some time-varying but non-random Bt and Gt > 0, as in the external habit model by 
Campbell and Cochrane [1999]. Gt is the risk-aversion factor. Then, the price Pt  of an asset 
that pays a single risky dividend is (compare this to Wachter [2005]) 
푃푡 = 퐸푡 (퐵푡 (퐶푡+1퐶푡 )
−퐺푡 퐷푡+1) 
while the price of a one-period risk-free bond is 
푃푡푓 = 퐸푡 (퐵푡 (퐶푡+1퐶푡 )
−퐺푡 퐷푡+1) 
Suppose that log consumption growth is a random walk, with normally distributed changes. 
Log-dividend growth is a normally-distributed deviation, time-varying expected value µt. The 
joint specification is 
푙표푔퐶푡+1 = 휇퐶 + 푙표푔퐶푡 + 휀퐶 
 
푙표푔퐷푡+1 = 휇푡 + 휀퐷 
 
Let σC2  and σD2  be the variance of εC and  εD respectively, and let σCD be the covariance. 
The products of the lognormal random variables are lognormal, as is the power, so the insides 
of both expectations are lognormal. Recall that for a lognormal random variable X, if log X has 
mean µ and variance σ2, then 
푙표푔퐸(푋) =  휇 + 휎2/2 
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By this result, 
and 
If we consider the log ratio of (3) and (4), this can be simplified to 
Thus the market price of 퐸푡(Dt) is equal to the dividend yield µt minus the risk premium (σD2 − 2GtσCD)/2. We can solve equation (5) for Gt: 
Thus, futures have the unique property of implicitly measuring the market price of the future 
dividends. While Campbell and Cochrane [1999] and Wachter [2005] needed to make 
assumptions for the parameters in order to estimate Gt, with futures data Gt can be observed 
within this data in chapter 3.3. 
III.3 Efficiency of Synthetic Investments 
III.3.1 Price 
The difference of the theoretical futures price according to the cost of carry model and the 
actual market futures price shows whether a futures is fairly priced or not. Table 8 presents the 
standard error of this day-end difference in the period from July 2009 to June 2010. A higher 
standard error indicates that the futures price deviated to a greater degree from its fair value. 
For the interest rate, I used the daily three-month interest rate for three--month contracts and 
the one-month rate for one- month contracts, as the term premium is very small at the short 
end of the curve (compare this to Table 7). 
The historical prices show that the standard error of the difference between the theoretical and 
the actual futures price is small. For 19 of 22 futures, it is lower than the round-trip 
transaction costs, which means the standard error lies within the theoretical no-arbitrage 
bounds. For monthly expiring futures (in the big markets like Spain and France), the standard 
error is generally smaller. Higher transaction costs also lead to higher volatility, since the 
deviation must be larger in order for arbitrageurs to make a profitable arbitrage trade. Greece 
 푙표푔푃푡 = 푙표푔퐵푡 + 휇푡 − 퐺푡휇퐶 + (휎퐷2 − 2퐺푡휎퐶퐷 + 퐺푡2휎퐶2 )/2 (4) 
 푙표푔푃푡푓 = 푙표푔퐵푡 − 퐺푡휇퐶 + 퐺푡2휎퐶2 /2  (5) 
 푙표푔 푃푡푃푡푓 = 휇푡 + (휎퐷
2 − 2퐺푡휎퐶퐷)/2 (6) 
 퐺푡 = ⎝⎜
⎛휎퐷22 − (푙표푔 푃푡푃푡푓 − 휇푡)⎠⎟
⎞ /휎퐶퐷 (7) 
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has the highest volatility, as well as the highest transaction costs. Thus, there was rarely an 
arbitrage opportunity during this period.  
Table 8: Fair Value Deviation from Futures Price 
Country 
Standard 
Error 
Round Trip Transaction 
Costs 
USA 0.14% 0.14% 
Japan 0.26% 0.29% 
UK 0.14% 0.68% 
France 0.05% 0.15% 
Canada 0.20% 0.15% 
Australia 0.28% 0.20% 
Germany 0.14% 0.13% 
Switzerland 0.14% 0.18% 
Spain 0.09% 0.17% 
Italy 0.12% 0.19% 
Netherlands 0.07% 0.23% 
Sweden 0.16% 0.29% 
Hong Kong 0.29% 0.43% 
Singapore 0.31% 0.42% 
Belgium 0.33% 0.45% 
Denmark 0.23% 0.81% 
Norway 0.52% 0.48% 
Greece 0.57% 0.82% 
Austria 0.30% 0.71% 
Portugal 0.22% 0.49% 
Finland 0.14% 0.54% 
Eurozone 0.14% 0.19% 
The second column in the table shows the standard error of the difference between the theoretical and 
the actual futures price, measured during the period from July 2009 to June 2010. The third column 
presents the round-trip transaction costs for an arbitrage trade, which incorporates the buying and 
selling of a future, and the buying and selling of cash stocks, according to the transaction costs in Table 
4. 
Figure 2 shows the daily fair value deviation for the S&P 500 Futures from 1999-2012. The 
deviation during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was much higher than it was before. One 
problem is that the futures index in the USA closes 15 minutes later than does the cash index. 
The volatility increased during the crises, which increased the deviation in those 15 minutes. 
However, Figure 3 shows that, most of the time, the deviation between the S&P 500 Futures 
and the Index at 4 pm is similar to the closing price deviation. The standard error of the 
deviation in 2008 is 0.36% at the 4 pm futures price and 0.37% at the 4:15 pm futures price. 
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Figure 2: Fair Value Deviation S&P 500 Futures 
This figure shows the basis of the S&P 500 Futures over the period from March 1999 to December 2012. 
The basis is the difference between the theoretical futures price and the actual market futures price. The 
lower and upper bound is the range wherein arbitrage is not directly possible due to transaction costs. 
Furthermore, transaction costs were higher during the crisis, due to higher bid-ask spreads. 
Nonetheless, there might have been some arbitrage opportunities, but arbitrageurs were 
probably not capable of conducting business given the lack of trading limits. Over the entire 
sample period from February 26 1999 to December 31 2012, the standard deviation was 0.21%, 
which is similar to the 0.20% in the study by Hill and Naviwala [1999]. 
Figure 4 shows the fair value deviation for a smaller market, the Austrian ATX index. While 
the deviation has usually been within the no-arbitrage bounds, there was an astonishing spike 
during the financial crisis in the period from September to November 2008, where the fair value 
of the futures rose permanently, up to 10% above the actual futures price. As there are no 
dividend payouts in the last quarter for the ATX, it cannot be the estimation uncertainty that 
caused this deviation. However, the ATX Index had lost more than 50% in the month following 
the Lehman collapse. The prohibition of short sales might have had some influence. 
As we have seen so far, the arbitrage opportunities in large markets like the S&P 500 have 
been very limited; thus, the price efficiency is quite high. For smaller markets like the ATX, 
here was a huge opportunity in 2008, at least for investors who wanted to buy, as there was a 
short-sales prohibition. 
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Figure 3: End of Day Deviation in 2008 
This figure shows the fair value deviation of the S&P 500 Futures at 4 pm and 4:15 pm for the year 
2008. The fair value deviation is the difference between the theoretical futures price and the actual 
market futures price. The S&P 500 Index has its closing price at 4 pm and the S&P 500 Futures has its 
closing price at 4:15 pm. Therefore, the price of the S&P 500 Futures at 4 pm is an intraday price. 
Figure 4: Basis ATX Futures 1999-2010 
This figure shows the fair value deviation of the ATX Futures over the period from March 1999 to 
December 2012. The fair value deviation is the difference between the theoretical futures price and the 
actual market futures price. The lower and upper bound is the range wherein arbitrage is not directly 
possible due to transaction costs. 
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III.3.2 Return 
Table 9 presents the historical returns of the returns futures, their indices, and the related 
MSCI country index, using formula (2) to calculate the futures returns. This allows us to see 
exactly whether the futures return is above or below the total return index. I used monthly 
data and annualized them by multiplying the arithmetic average by 12.  
Table 9: Historical Futures and Index Returns 1999-2012 
Country Index TR Index NR Futures TR MSCI TR 
USA 4.13% 3.58% 3.81% 3.97% 
Japan 3.43% 3.30% 3.29% 3.13% 
UK 4.65% 4.62% 4.39% 4.73% 
France 6.28% 5.59% 6.19% 6.56% 
Canada 11.88% 11.35% 11.78% 12.20% 
Australia 15.06% 14.19% 14.66% 15.16% 
Germany 7.97% 7.35% 7.94% 7.93% 
Switzerland 6.79% 6.12% 6.35% 6.89% 
Spain 6.93% 6.19% 6.94% 7.59% 
Italy 2.81% 1.63% 2.81% 3.25% 
Netherlands 4.33% 3.69% 4.04% 5.77% 
Sweden 12.21% 11.14% 12.48% 12.16% 
Hong Kong 12.14% 12.14% 12.15% 11.71% 
Singapore 12.59% 12.59% 12.06% 13.90% 
Belgium 5.29% 4.45% 4.91% 4.54% 
Denmark 12.09% 11.59% 12.05% 12.70% 
Norway 16.81% 16.03% 17.46% 16.02% 
Greece -11.96% -12.45% -8.65% -19.06% 
Austria 12.73% 12.11% 13.76% 8.53% 
Portugal 2.43% 1.66% 2.03% 2.42% 
Finland 6.25% 5.04% 9.35% 3.54% 
Eurozone 4.56% 4.04% 4.29% 5.85% 
This table presents the annualized return in USD from 1999-2012. Index TR is the total return index, 
meaning all dividends are fully reinvested. Index NR is the net return index, meaning only the net 
dividend amount of withholding taxes is reinvested. The Futures TR is the total return of a futures 
investment. MSCI TR is the total return index of the MSCI country index corresponding to the country 
of origin of the futures.  
In most countries, the futures return is below the index gross return, with the exceptions of 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, Hong Kong, Norway, Austria, and Finland. However, the futures return 
is above the index net return in most countries, except for Japan, the UK, Singapore, and 
Greece. The UK and Singapore are special cases, since the gross and net returns are essentially 
equal, as they are in Hong Kong, because the withholding tax rate is 0.  
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Table 10: Tracking Error of Futures, Indices, and MSCI 
Country Futures vs. Index Index vs. MSCI Futures vs. MSCI 
USA 0.37% 0.74% 0.82% 
Japan 1.72% 2.67% 3.46% 
UK 1.11% 1.12% 1.72% 
France 0.92% 1.51% 1.89% 
Canada 0.95% 1.55% 1.74% 
Australia 1.57% 1.57% 2.45% 
Germany 1.36% 1.73% 2.14% 
Switzerland 1.34% 1.14% 1.90% 
Spain 1.09% 2.74% 3.11% 
Italy 0.69% 1.73% 1.98% 
Netherlands 0.73% 4.49% 4.57% 
Sweden 1.47% 2.23% 2.72% 
Hong Kong 1.88% 8.22% 8.46% 
Singapore 2.48% 3.52% 4.24% 
Belgium 1.39% 5.48% 5.71% 
Denmark 3.28% 4.63% 5.39% 
Norway 3.13% 3.44% 5.01% 
Greece 4.24% 17.94% 18.34% 
Austria 4.34% 4.46% 6.69% 
Portugal 1.69% 4.10% 4.34% 
Finland 3.02% 10.75% 10.49% 
Eurozone 1.43% 6.03% 6.16% 
This table presents the annualized tracking error of futures, indices and the MSCI. The period is 
February 1999 to December 2012. The tracking error is the volatility of the return difference between 
two return series.  
Table 10 presents the historical tracking error of the returns futures, their indices, and the 
related MSCI country index. The tracking error between the futures and the index arises either 
because of futures mispricing, or as a result of different closing times between the futures and 
the index. This tracking error is random. The tracking error between the S&P 500 Futures and 
the S&P 500 index is 0.37% and is thus the smallest among all countries16. The highest 
tracking error is that of Austria with 4.34%, which is also one of the countries with the highest 
transaction costs and fair value deviation (remember Table 8). 
                                         
16 It is standard in the financial industry to measure the tracking error using monthly data. However, I 
acknowledge the objection of Hill and Naviwala [1999], in that the monthly measurement overstates the 
tracking error of futures due to the mean reversion of price deviations. Using quarterly measurements, 
the tracking error would actually decline to 0.23% for the S&P 500 Futures or 0.87% for the TOPIX 
Futures. 
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The tracking error between the index and the MSCI shows how well the constituents in the 
index cover the ones in the MSCI country index. Remember from Table 5 that the USA, the 
UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Hong Kong, and Singapore were countries in which 
the number of shares in the index was close17 to that in the MSCI? Nevertheless, Hong Kong 
and the Netherlands have a high tracking error between the index and the MSCI. In the 
Netherlands, the AEX Index is not market-capitalization weighted but price-weighted, 
producing the high tracking error of 4.49%. In Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index includes all 
Hong Kong listed stocks with primary listings, while MSCI Kong excludes Hang Seng-listed 
Chinese stocks, such as H-shares (companies incorporated into Mainland China) and red-chips 
(incorporated overseas but controlled by the Chinese government).  
The tracking error between the futures and the MSCI index is the combination of the factors 
mentioned above. Because the factors are not perfectly correlated but are independent, this 
tracking error is smaller than is the sum of the individual tracking errors. The tracking error 
problem arises due to mispricing of the futures, different closing times, and different 
constituents between the futures and the MSCI. As Table 10 shows, the constituent mismatch 
is the main driver of the tracking error, since the deviation between the Index and the MSCI is 
larger than is the deviation between the futures and the Index. 
Figure 5 shows the historical, cumulated withholding taxes and the return differences between 
the S&P 500 gross return index and the S&P 500 Futures return, computed with formula (2). 
The data are from January 2000 to December 2012. The cumulated full withholding tax is the 
difference between the MSCI gross and net returns. The reduced withholding tax is 50% of the 
full withholding tax, accounting for the double tax agreements. 
There are two sources of return differences between the futures and the gross return index. The 
first and most important is the mispricing of the futures on the rollover day. This leads to a 
permanent return difference. The second is the mispricing of the futures on the measurement 
day, which here is the end of month. The second error is only temporary, given that there is no 
mispricing on the rollover day. The mispricing of the futures may be for several reasons: firstly, 
the dividends are uncertain on the rollover day, therefore the dividend estimations could be 
different from the realized dividends. Furthermore, some market participants receive net 
dividends, while others receive gross dividends. Thus, the fair value of futures is not equal for 
all participants. The interest rates might also be different for different participants. In addition, 
possibly the most important reason is a different offer-demand structure in the futures market 
than in the cash one. Arbitrageurs can only offset this difference up to the arbitrage bounds. 
                                         
17 Less than 20% deviation in the number of companies. 
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Figure 5: Cumulated Difference between S&P 500 Gross and Futures Returns 
This figure compares the withholding tax impact. The green line is the cumulated full withholding of the 
S&P 500. The red line is the cumulated, reduced withholding tax, which is half of the full withholding 
tax. The blue line is the return difference between the S&P 500 total return index and the futures 
return. The period is January 2000 to December 2012. 
The return of the S&P 500 Futures is significantly lower than is the S&P 500 total gross return 
index, at a 95% significance level, but is also significantly higher than the net return. However, 
it is not significantly different from the middle path between the gross and net return; in other 
words, the return with the reduced withholding tax rate. Thus, for investors who benefit from 
the reduced withholding tax rate – as most investors do – the S&P 500 Futures achieves an 
equal return to that which they would receive when investing in cash equities. For investors 
who pay the full withholding tax rate, the futures investment achieves a superior return. 
The increase of the difference in autumn 200818 was caused by the mispricing of the rollover 
spread. The rollover of the futures contract from September to December 2008 was on 
September 18. On this day, the December contract was six Index points above the September 
contract, while the fair value of the December contract should have been 1 point below the 
September contract. These six points are a loss of 0.5%. Therefore, the key point is that the 
implied dividend from the December contract was 0.5% too low, causing the price of the 
contract to be 0.5% too high. 
                                         
18 24 bps loss in October and 7 bps in November, compared to the reduced withholding tax loss. 
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Interestingly, the overpricing would have disappeared if the LIBOR had been used instead of 
the Swap rate, as it was 3.2%, compared to the swap rate at 1.6%.19 If market participants 
used the LIBOR to calculate the fair value of the futures price, this could have explained the 
difference.20 The overpricing was persistent during the days before rollover, which confirms this 
observation. As the futures market was 38 bps overpriced on September 30, the loss did not 
occur in September but in October and November, since the futures were still 20 bps 
overpriced on October 31. The index lost 17% in October and 7.5% in November, and the 
volatility was 76% during that period. 
Figure 6 shows the same data for the EURO STOXX 50 and Figure for the FTSE 100, an 
index with no withholding taxes. The return of the EURO STOXX 50 Futures and the gross 
return index is not significantly different, neither is it different from the reduced withholding 
tax return. However, the return difference between the index total return and the futures 
return again resembles the reduced withholding tax. Again, in 2008, there was a lower return in 
the EURO STOXX 50 Futures than there was in the cash index investment.  
For the FTSE Futures, the September futures were 5.9 points above the fair value during the 
rollover of the futures from September to December on 18 September 2008, while the December 
futures were 28.7 above the fair value. This difference equates to 0.46%. However, as the FTSE 
100 index has no withholding taxes, the tax difference cannot be the explanation for the worse 
return of the futures compared to the cash investment.  
Figure 8 shows the same data for the DAX, a total return index. The DAX Futures is the only 
futures that does not suffer from dividend uncertainty, as the futures refers to a total return 
index. As can be seen in Figure 8, the return of the DAX Futures tracks the return of its 
corresponding DAX index very closely. Thus, the main reason for the return difference in 
futures and cash investments is not that some participants might have priced the futures 
according to LIBOR instead of using true risk-free interest rates. Otherwise, we should see 
similar differences in the DAX Futures and in the EURO STOXX 50 Futures. However, the 
explanation is to be found in the dividend uncertainty. Investors have been more risk-averse or 
have underestimated the dividends during the financial crisis, causing futures prices to be too 
high and therefore their returns to be too low. As the DAX Futures have no dividend 
uncertainty, its futures return racks the index return more closely, and there was no major 
difference during the financial crisis. 
                                         
19 This was in the middle of the financial crisis, when the LIBOR rate disconnected sharply from the 
risk-free rate. 
20 Obviously, investors can invest in the LIBOR instead of a pure risk-free rate, but this investment is 
more risky than is the corresponding cash investment, since there is additional counterparty risk from 
the money invested in the LIBOR market. 
127 
Figure 6: Cumulated Difference between EURO STOXX 50 Gross and Futures 
Returns 
This figure compares the withholding tax impact. The green line is the cumulated full withholding of the 
EURO STOXX 50. The red line is the cumulated reduced withholding tax, which is half of the full 
withholding tax. The blue line is the return difference between the EURO STOXX 50 total return index 
and the futures return. The period is April 2001 to December 2012. 
Figure 7: Cumulated Difference between FTSE 100 Gross and Futures Returns 
This figure compares the withholding tax impact. The green line is the cumulated full withholding of the 
FTSE 100. The red line is the cumulated reduced withholding tax, which is half of the full withholding 
tax. The blue line is the return difference between the FTSE 100 total return index and the futures 
return.  
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Figure 8: Cumulated Difference between DAX Gross and Futures Returns 
This figure compares the withholding tax impact. The green line is the cumulated full withholding of the 
DAX. The red line is the cumulated reduced withholding tax, which is half of the full withholding tax. 
The blue line is the return difference between the DAX total return index and the futures return.  
III.3.3 Dividends 
A dividend analysis is appropriate, as we have seen in chapter III.3.2 that dividends are the 
main reason for return differences between futures and cash investments. As all parameters 
except dividends are known, the futures implied dividend can be measured with the futures 
price, the interest rate, and the index value.  
Remember from (1) that the futures price is 
퐹푡∗ = 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) − ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇
푖=푡+1
 
Thus, the market estimation of dividends implied by the futures price from t+1 to T is 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇
푖=푡+1
= 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇 − 푡)365 ) − 퐹푡 
The problem is that the futures price is too volatile for an exact measurement of D, as the 
offer-demand structure in the futures market can be different from that of the cash one, and 
the day-end value is measured at a slightly different point in time (compare this to chapter 
2.6). This problem can be solved by looking at the difference between the implied dividend of 
both the first and the second futures contracts. This difference is much more stable. The 
implied dividend for futures 1 (Ft,1) and for futures 2 (Ft,2) is 
-4.00%
-2.00%
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
C
um
ul
at
ed
 R
et
ur
n 
D
iff
er
en
ce
Date
Difference DAX TR vs. DAX Futures Return cumulated
Full Witholding Tax
Reduced Witholding Tax
129 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇1
푖=푡+1
= 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡)365 ) − 퐹푡,1 
 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇2
푖=푡+1
= 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡)365 ) − 퐹푡,2 
where T1 is the expiration date of futures 1 and T2 is the expiration date of futures 2. 
The implied dividend spread between futures 1 (Ft,1) and futures 2 (Ft,2) is determined as 
follows: 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇2
푖=푡+1
− ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇1
푖=푡+1
= 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡)365 ) − 퐹푡,2 − 퐼푡푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡)365 ) + 퐹푡,1 ⟺ 
≈ 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇2
푖=푇1+1
≈ 퐼푡 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푇1)365 ) + 퐹푡,1 − 퐹푡,2 
Thus, the dividends from T1+1 to T2 are approximately the price difference between futures 1 
and 2, plus the interest earnings over that period. The measurement error between futures and 
index prices is almost offset as we construct the differences between the two futures prices.  
Figure 9 presents this difference for the S&P 500 Futures and compares it to the actually 
realized dividend amount in the period between futures 1 and futures 2. The delta between the 
futures implied dividend spread and the realized dividend spread shows some spikes in the 
period from 1999 to 2001, caused by minor data quality. The futures implied dividend spread is 
usually below the realized dividend, and on average, the delta is -0.56 index points or -0.04% of 
the index value. From 2002 to 2006, the delta was between 0 and -1 index points, which is very 
small as the tick size is only 0.25 index points. In 2008, the delta became much more negative 
at 6.24 index points, respectively 0.46% of the index value. The negative delta means that 
either the dividends have been underestimated, or the uncertainty regarding dividends caused 
this discount due to risk aversion. This explains why the futures performance was slightly 
worse than was the cash index performance, as the second futures is always slightly too 
expensive. As there is no uncertainty at expiration, this leads to a permanent loss. 
 
 
∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇2
푖=푡+1
− ∑ 퐷푖푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡 − 1)365 )
푇1
푖=푡+1
= 퐼푡 (푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇2 − 푡)365 ) − 푒푥푝 (푟푡 (푇1 − 푡)365 )) + 퐹푡,1 − 퐹푡,2 
(8) 
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Figure 9: Realized and Futures Implied Dividends for S&P 500 
This figure compares the dividend spread between the first and second S&P 500 Futures contracts. The 
realized dividend spread is the future value of the compounded realized dividends from the expiry of the 
first futures contract until the expiry of the second futures contract. The futures implied dividends are 
the implicit dividends in the same period, given the market price of the index, the futures, and the 
interest rates. Delta is the difference between the futures implied dividend spread and the realized 
dividend spread. The period is from March 1999 to December 2012. 
Figure 10 presents the same analysis for the EURO STOXX 50. In contrast to the S&P 500, 
dividends are not paid regularly, as most dividends in Europe are paid in the first quarter, 
while the dividend amount in the other quarters is minimal. With regard to the delta between 
the futures implied dividend spread and the realized dividend spread, it is also permanently 
negative and, on average, is -2.88 index points, or -0.08% respectively. It had peaks in 2000, 
2001, and 2008. In 2008, the delta had a peak with 17.11 index points, 0.77% respectively. 
Thus, similarly to the S&P 500, dividends had been underestimated or risk aversion had 
increased. 
Figure 11 presents the same analysis for the DAX Futures. The delta is also computed with 
formula (8) but, as this index has no dividend estimation problematic, the left-hand side of the 
equation is zero. Thus, the realized dividend spread is always zero. Therefore, for the DAX 
Futures, the delta is just the pricing error between the first and second futures. The main 
differences compared to the EURO STOXX 50 and the S&P 500 Futures are that the delta is 
not permanently negative, and its magnitude is smaller. On average, the delta is -0.6 index 
points, or -0.01%. 
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Figure 10: Realized and Futures Implied Dividends for EURO STOXX 50 
This figure compares the dividend spread between the first and second EURO STOXX 50 Futures 
contracts. The realized dividend spread is the future value of the compounded realized dividends from 
the expiry of the first futures contract until the expiry of the second futures contract. The futures 
implied dividends are the implicit dividends in the same period, given the market price of the index, the 
futures, and the interest rates. Delta is the difference between the futures implied dividend spread and 
the realized dividend spread. 
Figure 11: Spread for DAX Futures 
This figure compares the spread between the first and second DAX Futures contracts. As the DAX 
Futures has no dividends, the realized spread should be zero. The delta is the implicit spread in the 
period between the expiry of the first futures contract and the expiry of the second futures contract, 
given the market price of the index, the futures, and the interest rates.  
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In order to determine the effect of risk aversion on futures implied dividends, we can take a 
closer look at the S&P 500. The S&P 500 has a unique property in that it is extremely liquid 
and has continuous dividends in each quarter. This allows the determination of risk aversion in 
the external habit model (compare this to chapter 2.8). 
I used formula (7) to compute the values for the risk aversion factor Gt. For the parameters σD2 , and σCD, I took the long-term dividend growth and the consumption growth data from the 
website of Robert Shiller21. This dataset is from 1890-2009, and has the following quarterly 
values: σD2 = 0.34%, and σCD = 0.03%. For µt, I used the dividend from one year ago plus the 
divided growth of the previous quarter (compared to that of the year ago).  
Given this, the value of Gt is calcuated for the S&P 500 and is presented in Figure 12. 
Figure 12: Implied Risk Aversion of S&P 50 Dividend Spread 
This figure presents the implied risk aversion of the S&P 500, derived by the dividend spread of the first 
and second futures contracts. Gt is the risk-aversion factor. The period is from December 2002 to 
December 2012. 
The average value of Gt for the S&P 500 is 7.9, which is far below the estimates of Campbell 
and Cochrane [1999], as their estimate is around 40. Only during the financial crisis did Gt 
increase to a maximum 23.6. Whether the increasing risk-aversion or the dividend 
underestimation was the driver of this increase cannot be determined from this data. 
The lower value for Gt is a puzzle at first glance, but can be explained by lower dividend 
volatility on very short horizons. Thus, a more appropriate way to measure Gt is with long-
                                         
21 http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
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term market valuations of future dividends. With the dividend futures of the EURO STOXX 
50, this might be possible in the future, but more data are needed for a reliable measurement, 
otherwise risk aversion cannot be separated from dividend estimation errors. The dividend 
futures has as a payoff the realized dividend of a certain year. At the beginning of the year, the 
uncertainty is greater, as dividends are uncertain. The uncertainty decreases during the year, 
as an increasing number of dividends have already been paid, and the time to the payment of 
the unrealized dividends decreases. Thus, at the beginning of the year, these futures are also a 
good measurement for the market estimation of the dividends. 
Figure 13 presents the price of the dividend futures and its theoretical value22 from June 2008 
to December 2012. The delta had its peak in January 2009, with 20.81 index points. This 
resembles the delta of 17.11 for the implicit dividend between March 2009 and December 2008 
EURO STOXX 50 Futures in Figure 10. For the dividend future, the delta is a little higher, 
because it also contains the dividends from April to December 2009. Thus, this confirms that 
either the dividends were underestimated at the beginning of 2009, or risk aversion increased 
during that period, resulting in the drop in Figure 10 (and probably also in Figure 9). 
Figure 13: EURO STOXX 50 Dividend Futures 
This figure presents the price of the EURO STOXX 50 Dividend Futures compared to the theoretical 
price of that dividend future, using the compounded value of the actually realized dividends. The 
dividend futures is based on the yearly dividend amount. Delta is the difference between the dividend 
futures price and its theoretical price. 
                                         
22 The theoretical value of the dividend futures is merely the sum of the dividends in that year, 
compounded to the maturity of the future. 
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III.4 Replication of a Global Synthetic Investment 
III.4.1 Portfolio Construction 
For each country in the MSCI World, the futures with the lowest tracking error is used as a 
replication instrument. The weight of the futures is basically the same as the weight of the 
corresponding country in the MSCI World. However, for some countries, no futures exist. In 
such cases, the weight of the other futures increases proportionally, so that the sum of the 
futures weight is always 100%. For each future, a currency forward, buying the currency of the 
futures and selling the domestic currency (USD), is done using the same weight as that of the 
future. The collateral is invested in risk-free USD. 
The futures contracts and the forwards are rolled-on one day before the last trading date, since 
the liquidity of the futures decreases on the expiry date and the futures price is not the closing 
price of the index for all indices. The futures/forward portfolio is rebalanced monthly. This 
means that, every month, the weights of the futures are adjusted to the current MSCI World 
weight.  
III.4.2 Monthly Returns 
Figure 14 shows the cumulated return of the MSCI World gross return compared to the futures 
portfolio in USD for the period from January 2000 to December 2012. 
Figure 14: Cumulated Futures Return versus the MSCI World 
This figure presents the cumulated return of the MSCI World total return index compared to the return 
of a futures portfolio replicating that index on a monthly basis. Each futures is weighted according to the 
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weight of its country in the MSCI World. In the event that no futures was available for a month, all 
other futures were scaled up to the sum of 1. The period is from January 2000 to December 2012. 
The development of both returns is almost identical. Figure 15 shows the difference between 
the futures portfolio and the MSCI World index, so as to reveal the development in more 
detail. 
Figure 15: Cumulated Return Difference between Futures and MSCI World 
This figure presents the cumulated return difference between the world futures portfolio and the MSCI 
World total return index on a monthly basis. Each futures is weighted according to the weight of its 
country in the MSCI World. In the event that no futures was available for a month, all other futures 
were scaled up to the sum of 1. The period is from January 2000 to December 2012. 
The futures portfolio generates an annual return of 3.05%, and the MSCI a gross return 3.26%; 
thus, the futures return is -0.21% below the MSCI gross return index. However, the MSCI net 
return index is 2.77%, which means the futures return is 0.28% above the MSCI net return 
index.  
III.4.3 Tracking Error  
The tracking error between the index gross return and the MSCI World gross return is 0.58% 
p.a. This is the error that is caused by different constituents. The tracking error between the 
futures and the index gross return is 0.43%, due to futures mispricing and different closing 
times. Finally, the tracking error between the futures and the MSCI World gross return index 
is also 0.58%. 
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III.4.4 Transaction Costs 
The transaction costs of the futures portfolio and the MSCI portfolio with the MSCI weightings 
of December 31 2012 are summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11: Transaction Costs Futures versus MSCI 
 Synthetic 
Replication 
MSCI World 
Brokerage Fee 0.5 3.0 
Transaction Tax -   2.7  
1/2 BA Spread 1.6  3.7  
1/2 BA FX 1.1  1.1  
Total Initial Costs 3.3  10.5  
   
Rollover Costs 11.8  0 
Dividend Reinvestment 0 0.5  
Index Change 0  0.5  
Total Annual Maintenance Costs 11.8  1.0  
This table presents the constituents of transaction costs for a cash MSCI World investment compared to 
the costs for a synthetic investment with futures. The weightings are those of December 31 2012. 
These results show that the initial costs of establishing a futures portfolio that replicates the 
MSCI World index are less than a third of the costs to buy the cash stocks. However, the 
annual maintenance costs are much higher, since the futures must be rolled over quarterly or 
monthly. 
III.4.5 Constituents of Futures Portfolios 
Table 12 shows the figures of a futures portfolio with different numbers of futures, in order to 
replicate the MSCI World. One futures means that only the futures whose country has the 
highest weight in the MSCI World is used to replicate the MSCI World portfolio, while two 
futures means that the futures of the two biggest countries are taken. 
A complete futures portfolio is not the best solution, due to the high rollover costs. Reducing 
the number of futures from 21 to 15 reduces the annual costs from 11.5 to 7.8 bps, while the 
tracking error increases slightly from 58 bps 67 bps and the return decreases by 8 bps. Using 10 
futures reduces the return by 13 bps p.a., while the tracking error increases by 43 bps, from 58 
to 101 bps. The initial costs decrease slightly, from 3.2 bps to 2.8 bps, while the maintenance 
costs decrease by almost 50% from 11.5 bps to 6.7 bps. 
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Table 12: Different Futures Portfolios 
 
Return Tracking Error Initial Costs Annual Costs 
1 Future -0.67% 4.13% 1.3 2.2 
2 Futures -0.55% 3.14% 2.3 3.8 
3 Futures -1.31% 2.77% 2.4 4.0 
4 Futures -1.01% 2.54% 2.6 4.1 
5 Futures -0.95% 1.92% 2.6 4.3 
6 Futures -0.66% 1.70% 2.7 4.5 
7 Futures -0.55% 1.26% 2.7 4.5 
8 Futures -0.42% 1.12% 2.7 4.4 
9 Futures -0.37% 1.06% 2.7 4.6 
10 Futures -0.34% 1.01% 2.8 6.7 
11 Futures -0.28% 0.89% 2.8 6.8 
12 Futures -0.29% 0.76% 2.8 7.0 
13 Futures -0.32% 0.70% 2.8 7.1 
14 Futures -0.30% 0.69% 2.8 7.7 
15 Futures -0.29% 0.67% 2.9 7.8 
16 Futures -0.26% 0.66% 3.0 10.0 
17 Futures -0.23% 0.63% 3.1 10.2 
18 Futures -0.24% 0.59% 3.1 11.2 
19 Futures -0.24% 0.59% 3.2 11.4 
20 Futures -0.23% 0.59% 3.2 11.4 
All Futures -0.21% 0.58% 3.2 11.5 
This table presents a return and tracking error analysis for a futures portfolio compared to the MSCI 
World total return index. The first column indicates how many futures are combined in order to 
replicate the MSCI World. The futures are selected according to their weight in the MSCI world on 
December 31 2012, so that for one future, that with the largest country weight in the MSCI world is 
selected. For two futures, the largest and the second largest are selected. The second column presents the 
return difference between the futures portfolio and the MSCI World index. The third column presents 
the tracking between the futures portfolio and the MSCI World index. The fourth column indicates the 
transaction costs to initiate the futures portfolio, while the last column indicates the transaction costs to 
maintain such a futures portfolio. The period is from January 2000 to December 2012. 
Table 13 shows this analysis, replacing all futures in the Eurozone with the EURO STOXX 50 
futures. These results show that the EURO STOXX 50 Futures have the advantage of using 
one futures to capture a large market. If the same number of futures is used, the tracking error 
of the basket including the EURO STOXX 50 Futures is always lower, compared to the basket 
excluding the EURO STOXX 50 Futures. The transaction costs are higher, due to the 
relatively high bid-ask spread of the EURO STOXX 50 Futures, caused by a relatively high 
tick size. The EURO STOXX 50 Futures achieve good results if only a few futures are 
demanded, so example 5-7 futures. In this area, transaction costs are four times lower than 
they are in cash stocks, and annual costs are only 5.4 bps. The tracking error of only five 
futures is 1.09%, which means taking five futures will have a 4 times lower transaction cost, 
only 5.3 bps annual rollover costs, while the cash portfolio invests in 1700 stocks. 
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The optimal solution for investors who want to use only a few futures is in the area of 5-7 
futures, including the EURO STOXX 50 Futures. Someone who is not concerned with the 
number of futures would do better to ignore the EURO STOXX 50 Futures and should rather 
obtain around 15 futures to replicate the MSCI World portfolio with relatively low transaction 
costs and tracking errors. 
Table 13: Different Futures Portfolios, Including the EURO STOXX 50 Futures 
 
Return Tracking Error Initial Costs Annual Costs 
1 Future -0.67% 4.13% 1.3 2.2 
2 Futures -0.65% 2.73% 1.8 4.3 
3 Futures -0.54% 2.19% 2.5 5.3 
4 Futures -1.17% 1.34% 2.5 5.3 
5 Futures -0.92% 1.09% 2.7 5.3 
6 Futures -0.66% 0.93% 2.8 5.4 
7 Futures -0.53% 0.85% 2.8 5.4 
8 Futures -0.48% 0.82% 2.9 7.4 
9 Futures -0.45% 0.78% 2.9 7.5 
10 Futures -0.43% 0.76% 2.9 8.0 
11 Futures -0.40% 0.75% 3.1 10.2 
All Futures -0.37% 0.73% 3.1 11.2 
This table presents a return and tracking error analysis for a futures portfolio compared to the MSCI 
World total return index. The MSCI Eurozone is replicated using the EURO STOXX 50 Futures instead 
of a futures for each country. The first column indicates how many futures are combined to replicate the 
MSCI World. The futures are selected according to their weight in the MSCI world on December 31 
2012, so for 1 future, that with the largest country weight in the MSCI world is selected. For two 
futures, the largest and the second largest are selected. The second column presents the return difference 
between the futures portfolio and the MSCI World index. The third column presents the tracking 
between the futures portfolio and the MSCI World index. The fourth column indicates the transaction 
costs to initiate the futures portfolio, while the last column indicates the transaction costs to maintain 
such a futures portfolio. The period is from January 2000 to December 2012. 
III.4.6 Investment Advice for Both Markets  
The optimal futures portfolio depends on the trading activity, the relevance of the tracking 
error, the transaction costs, and the withholding taxes of the specific investor. 
Let us assume we have three kinds of investors: firstly, a US investor, representing an investor 
of a large country, with a domestic currency of USD and who can completely reclaim the 
withholding tax in the US, but who can reclaim only 50% in the rest of the world. Secondly, a 
Swiss Investor, representing a small country, with a domestic currency  of CHF and who can 
completely reclaim the withholding tax in Switzerland, but who can reclaim only 50% in the 
rest of the world. Thirdly, a global investor, which could be an international fund such as the 
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iShares MSCI World ETF, and which cannot usually reclaim any withholding taxes and is 
based in USD. 
Table 14 shows the analysis for these three investors, using the 15 largest futures. All investors 
have annual transaction costs of 7.8 bps and a tracking error of 67 bps against the MSCI 
World portfolio if they take the 15 largest futures. Furthermore, the historical loss of those 
futures against their total return index was 29.1 bps, which is 8 bps higher than in chapter 
III.4.2, because here we use only 15 futures. 
The initial transaction costs are 2.4 bps for the US investor and for the global investor, as both 
have USD as their domestic currency and do not have currency costs on 50% of the portfolio 
that is invested in USD. The initial costs for the Swiss investor are 3.5 bps, which is higher 
because s/he has higher currency transaction costs. S/he has to change 96% of the portfolio 
into foreign currency, and the currency bid-ask spreads against CHF are slightly higher than 
they are for USD.  
Table 14: Transaction Costs for Different Investors 
 
US Investor Swiss Investor Global Investor MSCI World 
Annual Transaction Costs  7.8   7.8   7.8   1.0  
Historical Futures Loss  29.1   29.1   29.1  
 Implicit WHT Benefit  14.1  31.8   66.1  
 
Total Annual Costs  22.8  5.1  -29.2   1.0  
Initial Costs  2.4   3.5   2.4   10.0  
Tracking Error 0.67% 0.67% 0.67% 0.00% 
This table presents different kinds of transaction costs in basis points. The transaction costs for different 
investors in futures are listed in columns 2-4 and for a cash MSCI World portfolio in the last column. 
The historical futures loss happens in the period from January 2000 to December 2012 
The biggest difference is generated by the implicit withholding tax benefit. The withholding 
tax benefit is actually the withholding tax costs that are incurred by the cash investor in the 
MSCI world. The futures investor does not pay these costs, as s/he can invest the collateral 
from the futures domestically. Since the futures investor does not pay these costs, it is an 
implicit benefit for him or her. For the US investor, the benefit is the lowest, with 14.1 bps, 
because s/he cannot benefit in the US market because s/he could reclaim all withholding taxes 
completely in the cash market. For the Swiss investor, the benefit is 31.8 bps, since s/he could 
reclaim only the Swiss taxes in full. For the global investor, the benefit is 66.1 bps and is thus 
the highest of all, because s/he cannot reclaim any withholding taxes and pays the full rate in 
every country. 
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For all investors, it is only worth using the futures portfolio to replicate the MSCI world if they 
can accept a tracking error of 67 bps p.a. A passive investor with lower tracking error 
permission cannot buy a complete futures portfolio. However, s/he could use a fraction of his or 
her portfolio to invest in futures in order to manage short-term transactions, which could 
indicate a fund manager with in- and outflows of his or her fund. 
How long does it take to achieve a cost equivalence of futures and cash investments? 
US investor: For the US investor, the cost equivalence of futures and cash is after 4 months. 
Thus, the round-trip transaction costs are equal after 8 months. This means that the US 
investor should conduct all transactions that have a horizon shorter than 8 months with 
futures. Alternatively, s/he could use futures for global investments and invest in his or her 
home cash market. 
Swiss investor: For the Swiss investor, the cost equivalence of futures and cash market is 
after 1.5 years. Thus, the round-trip transaction costs are equal after 3.0 years. This means 
that the Swiss investor should conduct all transactions that have a horizon shorter than 3.0 
years with futures. Only long-term investments of more than 3.0 years should be done via cash 
investments. 
Global investor: For the global investor who loses all withholding taxes with the cash 
investment, it is always better to invest in futures. With the futures portfolio, s/he gains 29.2 
bps against the cash portfolio every year. 
III.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper has analyzed the equity futures in comparison to the cash equity market from 
different perspectives. Overall, the futures market is highly efficient from every perspective. 
There have been some arbitrage opportunities from time to time, but only for small markets. 
Futures can also be used to observe the market estimation of the future dividends. Even this 
has proved to be very efficient, with a major exception in 2008. Futures implied dividends show 
that the market has underestimated the subsequent realized dividends, or increased risk-
aversion has caused a lower market value of future dividends. However, the analysis also proves 
that tax effects did not cause this deviation, as the tax-free futures FTSE 100 exhibits the 
same underestimation.  
Given the efficiency of the futures pricing, futures offer two main advantages. Firstly, 
transaction costs are, on average, one third less for futures investments than they are in the 
cash index. However, this benefit decreases with time, as the ongoing costs of futures are higher 
because they have to be rolled-over periodically. Secondly, futures have an implicit withholding 
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tax benefit, as dividends are received implicitly with the futures price and are not taxable, 
while withholding taxes have to be paid in the cash market and many investors cannot 
completely reclaim them in foreign countries. Thus, it depends on the tax status of the investor 
as to whether it is better to invest solely in futures, or whether a futures investment should 
only be for a limited time, as ongoing costs eat up the initial transaction cost benefit. 
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